80. Editorial Note
On April 4, 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered, approved, and forwarded to Secretary McNamaraJCSM-210-61, a plan of logistic support for the Zapata operation. The plan included a detailed concept of development for the later phase of the operation and programmed covert military support for the concept. (Chronology of JCS Participation in Bumpy Road; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)
From 6 to 8:18 p.m. that evening, President Kennedy met at the Department of State with members of the Joint Chiefs and others involved in planning the Zapata operation. The Presidentʼs appointment book does not indicate the participants in the meeting, but notes taken on the meeting establish that Senator William Fulbright was invited to participate. (Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Appointment Book) According to summary notes on the meeting prepared by General Gray on May 9:
“This meeting was held in the State Department and Senator Fulbright was also present. Senator Fulbright spoke out against the plan. The President again indicated his preference for an operation which would infiltrate the force in units of 200-250 and then develop them through a build up. Colonel Hawkins from CIA expressed the belief that landing small groups would merely serve to alert Castro and they would be eliminated one by one. He indicated that a group of 200 was below the critical number able to defend themselves. Mr. Rusk expressed opposition to the plan but Mr. Berle and Mr. Mann expressed general approval. Mr. McNamara also expressed approval of the general concept. The President indicated that he still wished to make the operation appear as an internal uprising and wished to consider the matter further the next morning.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)
After the conference with the President on April 4, Secretary McNamara requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reconsider the rules of [Page 186] engagement for the Bumpy Road operation to ensure that the United States would not become overtly engaged with Castroʼs armed forces. (Memorandum for the record, prepared by Mitchell; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Paramilitary Study)