Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

56. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara ⁰

JCSM-146-61

Washington, March 10, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Evaluation of the CIA Cuban Volunteer Task Force (S)

1. JCSM-57-61, dated 3 February 1961,¹ which forwarded the conclusions of the Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, pointed up the desirability for the conduct of an independent evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and detailed analysis of logistics plans by a team of Army, Naval and Air Force officers if practicable without danger of compromise of the Plan.

2. At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 February 1961, the Director of Central Intelligence concurred and requested that such an evaluation be conducted.

3. The report by the inspection team is attached as an Appendix hereto.

a. The conclusions contained in paragraphs 6 through 10 of the report are generally valid. In view of the odds for achieving surprise as expressed in paragraph 10 of the report, CIA should investigate means for improving the security and cover for movement of the Task Force. If this investigation reveals that appreciable improvement in security is not practicable, then the chances of success of the CIA Para-Military Plan should be reevaluated.

b. Implementation of the recommendation contained in paragraph 12 of the report would give more assurance of surprise. However, there are serious drawbacks to a totally airborne operation in these particular circumstances. Any damage to the airstrip or crash of an aircraft on the strip would probably hinder operations for a considerable period of time. This would be particularly serious since no alternate strip is available. Also, if only one Cuban combat plane escapes destruction and interdicts the field, the operation would be seriously handicapped. Therefore, it is not believed that the increased surprise achieved outweighs the risk of possible failure.

4. Based upon a general review of the military portion of the plan, an evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the forces, and an analysis of the logistics plans, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that, from a military standpoint, since the small invasion force will retain the initiative until the location of the landing is determined the plan could be expected to achieve initial success. Ultimate success will depend on the extent to which the initial assault serves as a catalyst for further action on the part of anti-Castro elements throughout Cuba.

5. It is recommended that:

a. The Secretary of Defense support the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in paragraph 4 above.

b. A decision with respect to the employment of this task force be made at the earliest practicable date in order to initiate final preparation and training.

c. A military instructor, experienced in operational logistics, be assigned to the training unit immediately for the final phase of training.

d. The views expressed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, and the recommendation contained in subparagraph c above, be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence, together with three copies of the report in the Appendix hereto, for his information and consideration.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L.L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

EVALUATION OF CIA TASK FORCE

The Problem

1. To inspect the Cuban Volunteer Force in order to evaluate its military effectiveness and determine the adequacy of its logistic support.

Factors Bearing on the Problem

2. Approval of paragraph 1-p of JCSM 57-61, 3 February 1961 required an evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and a detailed analysis of logistic plans.

3. The evaluation team left CONUS 24 February, spent two days in the training area, and returned to CONUS 27 February 1961.

4. For additional factors, see:

a. Enclosure “A” for air factors.

b. Enclosure “B” for ground factors.

c. Enclosure “C” for logistic factors.

Discussion

5. a. See Enclosure “A” for a discussion of the military effective-ness of the Cuban Volunteer Air Force.

b. See Enclosure “B” for a discussion of the tactical training of the ground element and its capability to carry out its contemplated mission.

c. See Enclosure “C” for a discussion of the adequacy of logistic support for Cuban Volunteer Forces relative to the assigned mission.

Conclusions

6. By 15 March 1961 the aircrews and support elements of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force will have achieved adequate military effectiveness to permit accomplishment of the air mission.

7. By 15 March 1961, the ground element of the task force will have achieved adequate military effectiveness to permit it to successfully carry out its mission.

8. The Cuban Volunteer Force is not able to sustain itself logistically for an extended operation. There is a marginal capability of operating for a period of thirty days with the present logistic organization.

9. The logistic organization is not well defined, solidly constituted, nor adequately trained. Assignment of a qualified military instructor for logistic training should increase the logistic capability to an acceptable minimum.

10. Surprise is essential to the success of the mission. However, odds against achieving surprise are believed to be about 85 to 15. Loss of surprise would likely create conditions beyond the military effectiveness of the Volunteer Cuban Force. This could lead to the destruction of part or all of the invasion force.

Recommendations

11. It is recommended that a decision to use this force against Castro be made at the earliest practicable date in order to permit final preparation and training to be initiated.

12. It is recommended that serious consideration be given to airlifting the troops of the invasion force, rather than continuing with the amphibious operation, except as it might be used as a cover, and for major logistic support.

13. It is recommended that a military instructor experienced in operational logistics be assigned to the training unit immediately for the final phase of training.

Air Evaluator—Lt Col B.W. Tarwater, USAF ²

Ground Evaluator—Col J.R. Wright, USA

Logistic Evaluator—Lt Col R.B. Wall, USMC

Enclosure “A”

EVALUATION OF AIR ELEMENT CIA TASK FORCE

The Problem

1. To evaluate the military effectiveness of the Cuban Volunteer Air Force.

Factors Bearing on the Problem

2. Facts—The Cuban Volunteer Air Force has:

a. 16 B-26 pilots, 9 of these have between 1800 and 11,500 hours total flying time, with between 76 hours and 33 minutes, and 99 hours 25 minutes training in the B-26 at Retalhuleu. Each of these pilots has flown approximately 20 strafing sorties, fired 16, 5 inch rockets and dropped 30 bombs—15 skip and 15 glide. The other 7 B-26 pilots have between 1200 and 6000 hours total flying time, with between 20 hours and 10 minutes, and 48 hours and 45 minutes training in the B-26 at Retalhuleu. Each of these 7 pilots has flown approximately 5 strafing sorties, fired 6, 5 inch rockets, and dropped 9 bombs—3 skip and 6 glide.

b. They have 16 navigator-co-pilots for the B-26s with Loran and low level navigation qualifications.

c. They have 7 crews trained in the C-46, and 8 crews trained in the C-54.

d. Nine of the sixteen B-26 crews, three of the C-46 crews, and five of the C-54 crews have flown missions over Cuba from Retalhuleu. As far as is known all these crews successfully reached the assigned drop zones.

e. Except for one ride with a Cuban pilot on a strafing, rocket firing, and bombing mission, evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the aircrews is based on second hand reports.

f. All Americans and Cubans queried as to the operational effectiveness of the aircrews agreed that it was definitely adequate to accomplish the assigned mission.

g. The Volunteer Air Force at Retalhuleu has an overall in-commission rate of approximately 92%.

h. The para-drop personnel at Retalhuleu are daily successfully preparing para-drops.

i. The armorers at Retalhuleu are daily successfully arming B-26 aircraft for strafing, rocket, and bombing training.

j. There are adequate support personnel, aircraft, aircraft parts, P.O.L. and munitions on hand, on the way, or on order, to permit mission accomplishment. (See the Appendix for additional Facts Bearing on the Problem.)

3. Assumptions—on which CIA bases its current plan:

a. The air strikes will be conducted with the benefit of surprise.

b. The combat aircraft of the Cuban Air Force will probably be located on three, and not more than six airfields.

c. Intelligence estimates indicating very poor Cuban air defense capabilities are accurate.

d. The anti-aircraft gunners will continue to be required to receive permission from their headquarters in Havana before firing on unidentified aircraft.

e. The B-26 missions will be flown from Puerto Cabezas.

4. Assumption—of the evaluator:

a. As indicated by personnel in charge of the air operation:

(1) Simulated strikes against an airfield with dispersed aircraft, and a maximum effort refueling and rearming exercise, will be conducted by the B-26 crews during the first week in March, and any apparent weaknesses which may develop will be eliminated.

(2) After the B-26s have moved to Puerto Cabezas nine B-26s will be simultaneously refueled and rearmed in minimum time, and any apparent weaknesses which may develop will be eliminated.

b. As indicated by personnel in charge of the air operation they will have adequate runway clearing equipment available during the air operation.

c. As indicated by personnel in charge, the operation will be conducted during the dry season, or a shelter will be built for the preparation and loading of the para-drops, and pierced steel planking will be provided to assure all weather parking for the aircraft.

Discussion

5. Due to operational and scheduled training requirements it was impossible to observe the Volunteer Cuban Air Force in simulated tactical operations as requested. Consequently, with the exception of one ride with a Cuban pilot on a strafing, rocket firing, and bombing mission, the evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the aircrews is based on an examination of personnel and training records, and conversations with Cuban and American personnel.

6. In evaluating the military effectiveness of the aircrews the following factors were considered:

a. The pre-flight procedures, air work, gunnery, rocketry, bombing, and emergency procedures of the Cuban pilot, with whom the evaluator flew, were outstanding.

b. The Cuban pilots have much more total time than the average US pilot that went into combat in World War II.

c. Nine of the B-26 pilots have had between 76 and 100 hours in flying, navigation, and gunnery training in the B-26 at Retalhuleu; and the other seven B-26 pilots have received between 20 and 48 hours in flying, navigation, and gunnery at Retalhuleu, and also have more total time than the average US pilot that went into combat in World War II; and henceforth the seven pilots with the least training will be given priority in B-26 training at Retalhuleu until their time in the B-26 equals that of the first nine B-26 pilots.

d. All of the sixteen B-26 navigator-co-pilots are former pilots and have received Loran and low level navigation training at Retalhuleu.

e. The B-26 crews will participate in simulated tactical operations during the first week in March. Any weaknesses which may become apparent will be eliminated.

f. All Cubans and Americans queried as to the operational effectiveness of the aircrews agreed that it was definitely adequate to accomplish the assigned mission.

g. Nine of the sixteen B-26 crews, three of the C-46 crews, and five of the C-54 crews have flown missions over Cuba from Retalhuleu. As far as is known all of these crews successfully reached their assigned drop zones.

h. Aircrew effectiveness can be most realistically evaluated when measured against the mission requirements. The primary mission requirement of the Cuban Volunteer Air Force is the destruction of Castroʼs combat aircraft. The airstrikes against these aircraft are being planned on the basis of the assumption that surprise will be achieved. As a consequence, Castroʼs combat aircraft will remain based almost entirely upon three airfields, with possibly a few on three other airfields. Furthermore, with the benefit of surprise the numerous anti-aircraft guns at these six airfields, and other primary targets, will not be used against the initial strike, since Castroʼs anti-aircraft gunners are under orders not to fire on any aircraft without permission from their Headquarters in Havana. The rest of the air mission includes air strikes against 4 communication centers, destruction of interdiction targets, and other targets that may develop just prior to or during the invasion. Air drops and logistic support on an emergency basis will also be provided by the Volunteer Cuban Air Force.

i. In addition to the Cuban aircrews listed above, 6 American B-26 pilots, with between 3 to 6000 hours total time each, and combat time in World War II or Korea or both, will be given refresher training in the B-26 and used in the initial air strikes. One of the American pilots will be used in the strikes against each of the six airfields on which Castroʼs combat aircraft are based.

7. On the basis of the factors listed above it is logical to conclude that the aircrews of the Volunteer Air Force have sufficient military effectiveness to achieve the mission requirements.

8. Inasmuch as:

a. The volunteer Air Force at Retalhuleu has an overall in-commission rate of 92%.

b. The para-drop personnel at Retalhuleu are daily successfully preparing para-drops.

c. The armorers at Retalhuleu are daily successfully arming B-26 aircraft for strafing, rocket and bombing training.

d. There are adequate personnel, aircraft, aircraft parts, P.O.L., and munitions on hand, enroute, or on order to permit mission accomplishment. (See the Appendix) In view of the factors listed above, it is concluded that the maintenance, armament, para-drop, and supply capability of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force is adequate to promote military effectiveness to the extent necessary for mission accomplishment.

9. Based on an understanding of Castroʼs and the USSRʼs vital concern in maintaining Castro in power, first hand observations of security conditions at both Retalhuleu and Puerto Cabezas, and conversations with people assigned at both bases, it is concluded that the odds are about 85 to 15 against surprise being achieved in the attack against Castroʼs Cuba. If surprise is not achieved, it is most likely that the air mission will fail. As a consequence, one or more of Castroʼs combat aircraft will likely be available for use against the invasion force, and an aircraft armed with 50 caliber machine guns could sink all or most of the invasion force.

10. The reasons for believing that the odds are about 85 to 15 against surprise being achieved are as follows:

a. With a communist infiltrated town approximately one mile from the airfield, and a railroad on one side of the base and a highway on the other, and trees surrounding the entire base, all providing a constant opportunity for observation of activities at Retalhuleu, it is believed the Castro-communists will know when the main invasion force is airlifted from Retalhuleu to Puerto Cabezas over a period of three nights.

b. The airfield at Puerto Cabezas is presently being developed as the primary strike base. A tent city has been erected off one end of the main runway with adequate facilities for approximately 160 men. Plastic bags are being filled with aviation gas and placed on parking areas off the main runway. The airfield, which is three miles from the town of Puerto Cabezas, has been placed off limits and is guarded by 60 of President Somozaʼs best troops, thereby alerting anyone interested that something unusual is happening at the airfield. Furthermore, several commercial flights arrive daily on this same airstrip, and 50 Nicaraguans from the town of Puerto Cabezas are employed in readying the strike base; and of course they return to their homes in town each night. The docks from which the troops will move into ships for transport to Cuba are three miles from the airfield via a road which runs along the town. So again, in view of Castro-communist interest in maintaining Castro in power, it seems likely that they are aware of the present activities at Puerto Cabezas, and will know when the main invasion force goes aboard the ships for their two day trip to Cuba. Knowing this, it then becomes a not too difficult submarine or air search problem, or both, to determine where and when the force will land. Furthermore, once the main force boards the ships, and it becomes obvious the force is on its way, Castroʼs combat aircraft could be scattered from the six primary airfields, and the anti-aircraft crews alerted, and orders given to shoot unidentified aircraft on sight. These two actions, as well as others that could be taken, could create conditions beyond the military effectiveness of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force. This in turn could lead to the destruction of part or all of the invasion force.

11. A cursory consideration of some of the major factors concerned indicates that the troops of the invasion force could be air rather than amphibious lifted. This would reduce the time necessary to transport the invasion force from Guatemala to Cuba from five days to one day—thereby increasing the chances of achieving surprise by a factor of five to one.

12. Consequently, itʼs believed serious consideration should be given to airlifting the troops of the invasion force, rather than continuing with the amphibious operation, except as it might be used as a cover, and for major logistic support.

Conclusions

13. If the assumption of surprise is correct, and intelligence estimates of Castroʼs air defense capabilities are correct, by 15 March 1961 the aircrews and support elements of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force will have achieved adequate military effectiveness to permit accomplishment of the air mission.

14. The odds against achieving surprise however, are believed to be about 85 to 15. Loss of surprise would likely create conditions beyond the military effectiveness of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force. This could lead to the destruction of part or all of the invasion force.

Recommendations

15. It is recommended that serious consideration be given to airlifting the troops of the invasion force, rather than continuing with the amphibious operation, except as it might be used as a cover, and for major logistic support.

Air Evaluator—Lt Col B.W. Tarwater, USAF

Enclosure “B”

EVALUATION OF GROUND ELEMENT CIA TASK FORCE

The Problem

1. To evaluate the tactical training of the ground element of the task force and to estimate its capability to carry out its contemplated mission.

Facts Bearing on the Problem

2. For facts bearing on the problem, see Appendix “A”.

Discussion

3. For discussion, see Appendix “B”.

Conclusions

4. Based on observations and conversations with trainer personnel on the spot, it is believed that the ground element of this task force has been properly trained to successfully carry out its mission with the exceptions noted below.

5. Additional tactical training is required in defensive operations, coordination, preparation of defensive positions, and counter-attack. These matters are scheduled to be included in the future programmed training.

6. An early decision to proceed with this operation is imperative. The point of no return has been passed and a decision to abandon the scheme is untenable. In the event such a decision should be made, a revolt within the assembled force would probably occur with dire consequences both for the US trainer personnel and for US interests abroad.

Recommendations

7. It is recommended that a decision to proceed with the operation be made at the earliest practicable date.

Ground Evaluator—Colonel J.R. Wright, USA

Appendix “A”

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. Length of service of personnel:

a. Varies—few days to 8 months.

b. Includes former members of the Cuban Constitutional Army, Rebel Army, militia, and personnel with no previous training.

2. Organization:

a. Brig. Hq. (116) and 4 rifle battalions (varies 109-162). T/O for each Bn 150. 1st Bn—parachutists (145).

b. Hv. Gun Bn (104) incl. 4.2 mort., 75 mm recoilless rifles (6-4.2 mort., 3 each RR).

c. Tank Bn (25) now training at Ft. Knox.

3. Training:

a. Guerrilla Opns—by civilian contract pers.

b. Basic military training—some by own personnel, remainder by Special Forces Teams.

c. 40 days at 16 hours per day supervised—additional on own time.

d. Airborne—Physical conditioning, 4 & 8 ft. platform, mock door, harness (chute) control, at least 3 jumps—jumpmaster at least 5 jumps.

e. Infiltration course—day and night—all pers.

f. Reaction course—all personnel.

g. Close combat, unarmed defense—all personnel.

h. Maps and compass—incl. night compass course.

i. Raids, ambushes, patrolling—day and night.

j. Weapons—familiarization firing on all weapons—cross training—field firing exercise.

k. Battalion and Brigade staff procedures and tactical operations including infantry—tank team theory, but no practical work—organization and conduct of the defense.

l. Demolitions and field fortifications.

m. Bayonet training.

n. Communications—nets and procedure.

o. Approximately 25% of all training conducted at night.

p. Physical conditioning stressed in all training.

q. Forward air controllers trained to mark targets and call in air strike, communications adequate.

r. Unit training through battalion (company) completed. Brigade (battalion) level training in progress. Will include simulated beach landings on terrain similar to objective area.

4. Observed Training:

a. Brigade (battalion) in attack;

(1) Included drop of parachute battalion (company) air support (2 B-26), simulated supporting fires by 4.2” and 81 mm mortar sections—blank ammo used.

(2) Use of terrain—good—covered routes used.

(3) Control—fair.

(4) Leadership—good.

(5) Reorganization on objective—good.

(6) Organization of position—good.

b. Battalion (company) in attack;

(1) Live ammunition used in pre-set problem.

(2) Demolition charges used to simulate incoming fire.

(3) Supporting weapons fired live overhead—fire on objective.

(4) Tactics were restricted due to nature of area.

(5) Use of weapons—good to excellent.

(6) Fire and maneuver—excellent.

(7) Evacuation of casualties—good.

(8) Control—excellent.

(9) Physical fitness—superior.

(10) Morale—superior.

c. Firing demonstration—Heavy Gun Battalion;

(1) Included 4.2” mortars, 81 mm mortars, 75 mm recoilless rifles and .50 cal MG.

(2) Accuracy—excellent.

(3) Control—excellent.

(4) Condition of equipment—superior.

(5) Immediate action—excellent.

d. Individual Training;

(1) Mechanical training, cal 30 light MG, M1917A1, Reaction course, field demolitions.

(2) Instructor personnel—good—used interpreters to communicate with trainees.

(3) Effectiveness of instruction—good—interest was high—almost all practical work.

5. Equipment:

a. There are no shortages of equipment which adversely effect training except proper maps of the local area.

b. Minor shortages in T/O&E are enroute to area and are arriving as rapidly as air lift permits.

c. Equipment is well cared for and when all enroute is received will be adequate for contemplated mission.

d. Communications equipment is partly military and partly commercial. These are 72 PRC-10ʼs, 10 PE-33ʼs, and 10 TP-1ʼs used for tactical communications within the Brigade. Equipment is in excellent condition and all in working order. There is an adequate supply of batteries on hand.

e. Parachutes are repacked in the area by well qualified riggers. There have been no chute failures to date.

f. 5-M41 light tanks are at Ft. Knox where the tank unit is currently undergoing training. It was reported that driver training was completed and gunnery training was beginning.

6. Future Training Programmed:

a. Brigade exercises;

(1) Brigade in attack—2 ea of 2 days duration.

(2) Brigade in defense—2 ea of 2 days duration.

(3) Simulated beach landing—5 ea—1 day exercises.

b. Brigade march—35 miles cross-country to beach and return—2 days each way.

c. Final shakedown, rehabilitation of equipment, repair and testing of weapons—7 days.

Appendix “B”

DISCUSSION

1. Individuals observed demonstrated a high degree of competence, considering the quality of personnel and the amount of time that they have been in training.

2. All personnel observed demonstrated excellent physical condition, high morale, and an apparent desire to get on with the job.

3. The leadership appears to be good. Leaders have been carefully selected and replaced when required by personnel who exhibited better potential than those originally selected. There have been very few leaders replaced in the course of the training. None of the leaders appears to harbor any personal political ambitions, nor a burning desire to make the service a career after the operation is completed.

4. All personnel can fire their weapons effectively, can and do maintain them properly, and are cross-trained on other weapons. Most of them have already fired more rounds than the average US soldier would fire in a two-year term of service.

5. The greatest problem facing the Brigade is the long confinement to the area which, while not now an immediate problem, could lead to a breakdown of discipline and control if prolonged or if the incentive which binds them together is removed.

6. Personnel appear eager to learn and it was reported that they devote long hours outside of training time to study and practice.

7. The quality of the personnel is amazing. College graduates with degrees in engineering are employed in the FDC as computers. All forward observers and their radio operators are qualified to adjust the fire of the mortars. Most of the personnel are young, generally from 18 to 31 years of age, and come from the middle class. There are a few older men in camp, but they are not favored and if they canʼt keep up are returned to Miami.

8. Security

a. Every effort has been made to keep this operation secret, but it is obvious that many people in the area are aware of what is going on. Although all troop movements are made at night, firing, explosions, aircraft orbiting over an objective area, parachute drops, and an abnormal number of unfamiliar aircraft in the area are a dead giveaway. A clandestine radio transmitter is known to be operating in the Retalhuleu area. The mayor of Retalhuleu is a card-carrying communist and lives about a mile from the airstrip. Leaflets have been circulated in Guatemala City by the Communist Party giving many of the details of the activity. Although there are some inaccuracies in this material, much of it is accurate. It can therefore be presumed that Castro knows practically all about the operation except when, where, and in what strength.

b. There have been some cases of AWOL among the trainees. At the time of our visit, a group of eight including one company (platoon) commander was missing. On Saturday night, a group of 21 men left the camp and went into a small village nearby to attend a fiesta. By Sunday noon, 19 of this group had returned. Obviously, the presence of Cubans in fairly large groups is known to the people in the area.

Enclosure “C”

EVALUATION OF THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THECIA TASK FORCE

1. The Problem

a. The purpose of this inspection was to evaluate the adequacy of logistic support for Cuban Volunteer Forces relative to the assigned mission.

2. Factors Bearing on the Problem

a. Cuban Volunteer Forces are now in a field bivouac situation while conducting training operations.

b. There are no personnel in the training area either in the Special Forces instruction group or within the Cuban Volunteer Forces who are qualified to instruct in operational logistics.

c. Minimal training of Motor Transport drivers is being conducted due to political considerations.

d. No formal training in operational logistics is being conducted.

e. Aerial delivery equipment and capabilities are adequate for emergency air resupply requirements.

f. No significant shortages of equipment and material were evident. Items not in the training area were described by instructor personnel as being in the backlog of material in CONUS. There were no means by which the inspecting officer could verify this assertion.

3. Discussion

a. Cuban Volunteer Forces are now in a field bivouac situation. Supply operations within the bivouac area are satisfactory. Supply support from CONUS to the training area is by air. Recent inclement weather caused a backlog of supplies to build up in CONUS. Planes did not fly to the training area for over one week. Airlift has been resumed, however supplies delivered from backlog stocks are not responsive to immediate needs. It appears that planes are loaded with material available and receiving units are unaware of items delivered until they open boxes after delivery. No action was being taken to designate priorities since all items were so considered. There was a lack of logistic coordination in this instance.

b. Personnel are receiving limited logistic training due to the on-the-job situation in bivouac. Preparation of meals, break-down and issue of supplies, and repair and maintenance of equipment are being conducted in camp. No training is being conducted in the amphibious aspects of logistics. No shore party organization has been formed nor is training being conducted in shore party operations. No training is being conducted in the assault aspects of logistics to include: establishment and operation of supply point, inventory control, movement and distribution of supplies to deployed units, or field messing operations. The logistic concept of instructor personnel was that tonnages of supplies could be deposited in the objective area and units could help themselves to fulfill their requirements.

c. The motor transport officer is receiving adequate training in convoy and general operational procedures. Local laws require that vehicles be operated by citizens of that country or by instructor personnel. Cuban Volunteer Force Motor Transport drivers receive no training in night and blackout driving. Actual driver training is extremely limited. In view of the complicated process of backing vehicles over sand and beach matting in to LCUʼs, this deficiency is considered of major importance.

d. Facilities in the training area for the preparation and packaging of supplies for air drop were inspected. The capability is adequate for operations of an emergency resupply nature. Delivery is limited to parachute delivery or air landing of supplies.

e. The medical organization of the force is well organized and equipped. The planning and procedures to be employed during the operation are simple, clear, concrete, and appear to be understood by all personnel involved. Equipment is adequate, clean, well cared for and properly packed. Personnel appear competent and adequate.

f. Service functions are adequate. Enough trained personnel are available to perform the second and limited third echelon maintenance required. Tools and equipment are adequate.

g. Clothing, weapons, individual, and organizational equipment are in good condition and well cared for. Vehicles utilized in the training area will be replaced for the operation. Rough terrain and maximum utilization have resulted in inordinate wear to tie-rods, springs, and various organic parts of the vehicles. This is understandable since the vehicles are standard, commercial types and are being utilized under field conditions.

h. Morale appears excellent. There was some indication in remarks made by individuals that they were anxious to enter the objective area. Instructors indicated anxiety over the fact that delay in definitely indicating D-day would result in deterioration of morale. Many troops have been confined within the camp area on a rigorous training schedule for six months or more and are living under austere conditions. Their primary incentive is the prospect of moving to the objective area.

i. A decision as to whether or not the operation will take place is necessary in the near future due to the impending rainy season. It is considered that operations during the rainy season would present unsurmountable difficulties in view of the limited equipment available. Logistic requirements for the shipment of supplies by railroad to POE; loading and sailing time for ships; etc., necessitate approximately a three-week leadtime. The estimation of time involved was provided by CIA since they are handling shipping arrangements.

4. Conclusions

a. The Cuban Volunteer Force is not presently able to sustain itself logistically for an extended operation. It has a marginal capability of operating for a period of thirty days with its present logistic organization.

b. The logistic organization within the Cuban Volunteer Force is not well defined, solidly constituted, nor adequately trained. It needs emphasis to provide a cohesive, effective logistic support capability.

c. It is imperative that an instructor experienced in operational logistics be provided to the training unit at the earliest practicable date.

d. An organized shore party unit needs to be formed and trained as soon as possible.

e. More vigorous action is needed in training motor transport drivers to handle vehicles. This could be partially accomplished by night operations within the camp areas.

f. The Cuban Volunteer Force is adequately supported medically for operational functions well in excess of 30 days.

g. The service capabilities of the Cuban Volunteer Force are adequate for the operation.

5. Action Recommended

a. That a military instructor experienced in operational logistics be assigned to the training unit as soon as practicable.

Logistic Evaluator—Lt Col R.B. Wall, USMC

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret; Limited Distribution.
1. Document 35.
2. Printed from a copy on which all the evaluatorsʼ names are typed.