Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

421. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for the Executive Director⁰

Washington, September 10, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Genesis of White House Meeting on 10 September¹

1. Mr. McGeorge Bundy called a meeting in his office at approximately 5:45 on 10 September to allow the Secretary of State to express his concern over the Agencyʼs overflight program for Cuba. Attending were Secretary Rusk, the Attorney General, Mr. Bundy, General Carter, General Lansdale, Dr. Scoville, Mr. Reber, and Mr. Cunningham.

2. Mr. Bundy opened the meeting by turning to the Secretary and saying, “Dean has some points he wants to raise because of the incidents” (the 30 August SAC-U2 overflight of Sakhalin Island, which the USSR protested on 4 September, and the loss of Mission GRC-127 over Communist China). Secretary Rusk, nodding toward General Carter, half joshingly said, “Pat, donʼt you ever let me up? How do you expect me to negotiate on Berlin with all these incidents?” The Attorney Generalʼs riposte: “Whatʼs the matter, Dean, no guts!”

3. Secretary Rusk quickly went into the risk standpoint of the Agencyʼs proposal for two extended overflights covering the remainder of the island not covered in the 29 August and 5 September missions. He asserted that although we need this information we must minimize the risk element and avoid a third incident. He insisted that photographic coverage should be designed so that peripheral flights over international waters would not be combined with overflights of Cuban territory. To meet his wishes, the program was divided into four flights—two overflights and two peripheral—all geared for maximum safety.

4. General Carter cautioned that this program, while satisfactory for the moment, was not enough and added, “I want to put you people on notice that it remains our intention to fly right up over those SAMs to see what is there.” To this, there was no response—positive or negative. With adjournment of the meeting implied and with the attendees starting for the doors, General Carter is reported to have said, “There they all go again and no decisions.”

5. The above information was provided by Messrs. Reber and Cunningham and to some extent the Lehman report. Dr. Scoville, who was on the Coast, was not reached.

Ernest deM. Berkaw, Jr. ²

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Dulles) Files: Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Walter Elder Recop. No classification marking. Prepared on February 28, 1963.
1. The only other record of this September 10 meeting which has been found is a brief, one-paragraph summary prepared by General Carter on September 10. Carter noted that the meeting was generated by Secretary Ruskʼs concern over Cuban overflights and his desire to avoid any incidents. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.