39. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy0
When you have your meeting this afternoon on Cuba, I think you will find that there is a divergence of view between State on the one hand and CIA and Defense on the other. Defense and CIA now feel quite enthusiastic about the invasion from Guatemala—at the worst they think the invaders would get into the mountains, and at the best they think they might get a full-fledged civil war in which we could then back the anti-Castro forces openly. State Department takes a much cooler view, primarily because of its belief that the political consequences would be very grave both in the United Nations and in Latin America. I think they will urge careful and extended diplomatic discussions with other American states, looking toward an increasing diplomatic isolation of Cuba and the Dominican Republic before any drastic action is taken. This divergence of view has not been openly and plainly considered in recent task force discussions, as I understand it. Therefore, you are quite likely to hear it in quite fresh form this afternoon.
Dick Goodwin has been in on most of the Cuban discussions, and he and I join in believing that there should certainly not be an invasion adventure without careful diplomatic soundings. We also think it almost certain that such soundings would confirm the judgment you are likely to hear from State.