362. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)0

SUBJECT

  • Contingency Plan

Transmitted herewith is a copy of “United States Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S),” which is submitted for your consideration. The plan has been approved by the Secretary of Defense and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This plan was developed as a result of reports in mid-June 1962 that the Cuban people were about to revolt against the Castro-Communist regime, without U.S. sponsorship, and the desire expressed by the Special Group that the U.S. be ready for such a contingency. The DOD/JCS representative was tasked by me to develop a plan with the assistance of Operation Mongoose representatives from participating departments and agencies. The DOD/JCS representative did so, and the attached plan is the result.

Attachment

UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

REFERENCE

  • Memorandum for Representatives of State, Defense, CIA and USIA, from Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, subject: “Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning”, dated 14 June 19621

TASK AGENCIES

Department of State

Department of Defense

Central Intelligence Agency

US Information Agency

[Page 887]

1. Situation.

a.
The purpose of this plan is to define the courses of action to be pursued by affected agencies of the US Government in the event that a decision is made that the United States undertake military intervention in Cuba.
b.
The assumed situation in Cuba is open, wide-spread revolt. This contingency may be a non-US initiated situation, similar to that rumored as being activated for mid-June 1962. US actions to exploit the situation include the use of US military force.
c.
It is assumed that this plan would be implemented under the following conditions, and would be considered for implementation under situations less severe. An internal revolt has created a chaotic situation in Cuba where:
(1)
The revolution is open and threatens the Communist regime;
(2)
Areas are taken and held by the revolutionaries, and;
(3)
Leadership of the revolt, unable to overthrow the government or sustain the revolution indefinitely requests assistance from the United States and/or the Organization of American States (OAS).
d.
The United States may, or may not, be able to determine that a rebellion is imminent before actual outbreak. However, it is unlikely that the assumed situation will occur all at once and without notice. More probably it will evolve from a localized revolt which will provide some advance notice and the opportunity to initiate necessary diplomatic, propaganda, covert and military preparations.
e.
The strength, morale, disposition and equipage of unfriendly forces will be assumed to be as described in current estimates of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

2. Mission.

The United States will support and sustain the rebellion in Cuba through all its resources including the use of US military force to assure replacement of the Communist regime with a new Cuban government acceptable to the United States.

3. Execution.

a.
Concept of Operations.
(1)
When the likelihood or emergence of a Cuban revolt becomes apparent to the US intelligence community it will be immediately brought to the attention of the 5412 Special Group (Augmented) through the Officer of the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose. Evaluation of the situation by the Special Group will determine whether or not the Presidentʼs decision should be sought to implement this plan.
(2)
The initial stages of a spontaneous revolt will be supported by the United States through propaganda, covert operations and other [Page 888] actions as necessary, but maintaining the appearance of non-US involvement should the revolt fail. In the event that the revolt spreads as a popular movement against the Communist regime, the United States should be capable of rapid military action to forestall a concerted and drastic reprisal program in the interest of humanity and the mission of this plan.
(3)
US Military Reaction.
(a)
With no prior warning and with eighteen (18) days of preparation a coordinated airborne-amphibious assault could be executed which, it is anticipated, would gain control of key military installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba within ten (10) days and result in minimum US and Cuban casualties.
(b)
A requirement to reduce significantly the pre-assault period would necessitate incremental commitment of US forces as they could be assembled and employed. Under this circumstance the time required to gain essential US military control of Cuba could be appreciably extended. However, reduction of US military reaction time may be of overriding importance. [8 lines of source text not declassified]
(4)
Execution of this plan will be in two (2) phases:
(a)
Phase I. After Presidential decision, this phase will be undertaken by the Department of Defense supported by other agencies of the government. It will be initiated by overt US military assault on Cuba under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will be terminated at such time as essential military control is gained over the island. The operation is to be conducted as rapidly as possible, quickly to confront Cuban forces with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond enemy capability to resist and to reduce risk to US units initially deployed, with a view toward early capitulation of Cuban military units and avoidance of needless loss of life.
(b)
Phase II. Following the establishment of essential US military control of the island, this phase will be primarily concerned with the restoration of law and order and the establishment of a new Cuban government friendly to the US. US military efforts will be directed primarily to matters of civil affairs and military government in accordance with policy established by the Department of State. Military operations essential for the elimination of small pockets of resistance and restoration of law and order throughout the island will continue. Major US combat forces will be withdrawn as early as security may permit. Operational responsibility of the Department of Defense will cease at the time the Department of State assumes responsibility for civil administration of Cuba.
b.
Department of Defense Operations.
(1)
When directed by higher authority, or as the situation demands, the Department of Defense will initiate preparatory actions for US military intervention in Cuba. These actions may include pre-positioning forces and equipment by execution of current cover and deception plans.
(2)
Upon final decision of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will direct execution of military intervention plans for Cuba.
(3)
In concept, initial military operations commence with a blockade, concentrated air strikes and coordinated Naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy air power and to neutralize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy tank, armor, artillery, and anti-air capability.
(a)
[12-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
(b)

[6 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (7-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

(5)
At such time as essential US military control is gained in Cuba, matters of civil affairs and military government will be given priority and undertaken in accordance with policy established by the Department of State. This includes provision for a provisional military government prepared to assume full legislative, executive, and judicial control until such functions can be turned over to other authority on direction in an expeditious and orderly manner. Remaining resistance elements of the Communist Cuban government, armed forces or other groups will be isolated, contained and destroyed or captured as rapidly as possible. US military combat units will be scheduled for early return to the United States consistent with security considerations.
c.
Department of State Operations.
(1)
Phase I. The Department of State will seek to place the United States action in as broad a multilateral context as possible.
(a)
Immediately sound out Latin American Governments to determine whether the United States can count upon a 2/3 majority decision authorizing the use of military forces under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty.
(b)
If 2/3 majority is available, request the Council of the Organization of American States to convoke immediately a meeting of foreign ministers under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and obtain Organization of American States (OAS) decision authorizing use of force.
(c)
Seek agreement from at least two Latin American nations (preferably not Nicaragua or Guatemala) to provide token forces to join United States forces.
(d)
If 2/3 majority cannot be mustered, recognize the anti-Castro forces as the Government of Cuba and, in response to its appeal for help, come to its assistance with United States military forces and whatever foreign token forces have been made available.
(e)
Keep key members of Congress informed of significant developments.
(f)
Inform all friendly governments of our actions and the reasons therefor; obtain public expressions of their support and of their sympathy for the anti-Castro forces. Warn them to expect communist directed violence and offer them assistance.
(g)
Notify the OAS and the United Nations (as appropriate) of our actions and be prepared to defend them in these international bodies.
(h)
Engage in all-out psychological warfare and propaganda stress-ing the morality of United States action designed to assist the Cuban people throw off the bonds of communist enslavement.
(2)
Phase II—(Post Invasion)
(a)
Provide immediate emergency economic and other assistance to the civil populace.
(b)
Turn over as rapidly as possible to the Cuban Government for administration the territory taken by United States troops and assist that government to the extent feasible as it requests.
(c)
Make preparations to provide the Cuban Government with long range economic assistance.
(d)
Take measures to assist the Cuban Government to control entry into and exit from Cuba.
(e)
Re-establish the United States country team in Havana.
d.
Central Intelligence Agency Operations.
(1)
CIA operations against Cuba are controlled by a component of CIA Headquarters, Washington. Operational elements are located in the vicinity of Miami, Florida, with sub elements at other Florida locations.
(2)
In the event of localized revolt, CIA will give covert support to the revolt through introduction of communications, arms, equipment and trained personnel as appropriate and feasible.
(3)
When US Military intervention is directed and contingency plans are implemented, CIA will fully support the military actions in accordance with the JCS/CIA Command Relationship Agreement,2 whether it is implemented or not.
(4)
Liaison and communications will be established prior to implementation of CINCLANT and subordinate plans.
(5)
CIA will support military operations by clandestine intelligence, counter intelligence, propaganda, political and paramilitary operations.
(6)
After the initial assault and during the subsequent consolidation and occupation phase, CIA will designate selected personnel from CIA Headquarters and/or CIA operations base, Florida, to proceed to Cuba and conduct clandestine operations in support of US forces and objectives. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
e.
United States Information Agency Operations.
(1)
The Agency will provide complete, but strictly factual and impartial informational coverage to a spontaneous revolt in its initial phase. The purpose of such coverage will be to keep the people of Cuba, and of the hemisphere, fully informed of developments, and to set the stage for possible subsequent courses of action. Extreme caution will be taken to avoid the appearance of US involvement during this phase so as to nullify possible later charges of US intervention (by Cuba or other Latin American governments) should the revolt fail. In this context, the Agency during this phase must carefully refrain from a type or tone of coverage that might be construed as incitement to riot.
(2)
In the event of direct US involvement, the Agency will:
(a)
Assign informational specialists to work with Defense Psywar units during combat operations.
(b)
Staff up a regular USIS unit to move into Havana with the Department of State contingent at the time and place to be decided on by the Department.
(c)
Prepare for immediate shipment all physical equipment and resources necessary to support a USIS operation in Cuba.
(3)
Basic considerations in Agency informational support of direct US military action:
(a)
Medium wave radio should receive priority attention for any overt combat operation in Cuba. Immediately upon securing any beachhead or other enclave on the island, and perhaps immediately prior to or concurrent with such action, massive medium wave broadcasting should begin. A beefed-up Guantanamo transmitter, leased U.S. Florida facilities, floating transmitters and, as soon as possible, captured Cuban station(s) should be assigned to this task. Short wave facilities will also be increased to provide necessary backup.
(b)
The messages of this initial phase should be simple and direct, reassuring the people of their personal safety and the protection of their individual rights, instructions on the maintenance of public order, the distribution of food and medical attention, all done hopefully in a Cuban context and with only the minimum of reference to US military forces and power necessary to maintain order and to assure credibility of the inevitability of Castroʼs rapid and complete defeat.
(c)
Care must be exercised, particularly with the anti-Castro Cubans, to avoid alienating possible support by immediate talk of vengeance, or of indications of possible loss of any gains (housing, land, social benefits) which might have accrued to the peasant and worker groups during the Castro regime.
(d)
Given the relatively high rate of literacy in Cuba, wall posters and leaflets reiterating the themes of the broadcasts should also be available and utilized as soon as practical, the leaflets by air drop ahead of military action where deemed advisable.
(e)
Any provisional military government must also have a news bulletin for factual news summaries and instructions to the civilian population.
(f)
In all psychological planning, special attention should be given to avoiding in so far as possible any indications of plans to return to the status quo ante, all information output should be designed to reassure the populace that the US supported movement is designed to carry forward the realization of the social and economic aspirations of the Cuban people.
f.

Department of the Treasury

  • Department of Justice
  • Department of Health, Education and Welfare
  • Department of Agriculture
  • Federal Aviation Agency
  • Bureau of the Budget

Supporting functions will be undertaken to assist, expedite and promote the efforts of Task Agencies:

a.
As requested by Task Agencies, prior to plan implementation, and
b.
As requested by Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, when plan is implemented.

4. Coordinating Instructions.

a.
Implementation of this plan will be as directed by the President.
b.
Military operations, including clandestine and paramilitary activities, will be conducted by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The administration of military government activities in Cuba will be conducted by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with policy established by the Secretary of State.
c.
Political, psychological and economic operations will be accomplished in accordance with policy established by the Secretary of State.
d.
Supporting plans are required from all Task Agencies. Direct coordination between agencies should be effected for planning purposes. One copy of supporting plans is to be provided Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, and maintained in current status.
e.
During implementation of the plan the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, will act as the coordinator for the 5412 Special Group (Augmented) on inter-Agency activities. The coordinating office will be established in the Pentagon, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Room 2 B 913, telephone extension 59710.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7-3162. Top Secret; Noforn; Special Handling. An attached distribution list indicates that 11 copies of the memorandum were prepared and copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris, and Murrow/Wilson. One copy was kept by Lansdale.
  2. Document 347.
  3. Not found.