Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

353. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin)⁰

Washington, July 18, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Future Courses of Action with respect to Cuba

The members of the Mongoose Operations Group have been requested to submit by July 20 the factors they think should be considered by the Special Group with respect to each of the following four possible future courses of action regarding Cuba:

a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it or

b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt U.S. military commitment, or

c. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of U.S. military force if required at the end, or

d. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro-Communist regime by U.S. military force.

General Lansdale plans to submit a composite of these factors (including, I presume, his own views) to the Special Group. He has informed me that General Taylor intends to invite Secretaries Rusk and McNamara to attend the Special Group meeting when these courses of action are to be discussed. Final recommendations would then, presumably, be submitted to the President.

Preliminary discussion of these courses of action in the Operations Group reveals that the CIA and Defense representatives favor prior commitment to employ U.S. military force; General Lansdale appears to waver, although I believe he feels his task would be greatly simplified if such a commitment could be obtained; the USIA representative thinks it important that a decision be made regarding use of military force, although he has not indicated his preference.

In my opinion, the concentration of attention upon the employment of U.S. military force against Cuba runs counter to the basic concept of Mongoose which is to bring down the Castro regime from within. In the Department, we have recognized the contingency that U.S. military force may be required, and perhaps could be feasibly employed from a political standpoint if a virtual civil war situation existed in Cuba, where anti-Castro forces held substantial territory, appealed for U.S. assistance, and we recognized these forces as the Government of Cuba.

Mr. Harvey (CIA) at the last Operation Group meeting expressed as his considered judgment that a revolt could eventually be mounted in Cuba. By revolt, however, he meant an assault upon a number of Cuban Government installations, including some in the provinces. He did not think that such assaults could be organized in a fashion where anti-Castro forces held territory for any length of time or could overthrow the regime without outside military assistance.

There is clearly a gap between the present CIA estimate of what it can accomplish and what we feel should be the minimum condition in Cuba where we might consider using U.S. military force. Nevertheless, the situation in Cuba is volatile and unpredictable and CIA may be more successful than it presently estimates to be the case. If, or as we proceed with Operation Mongoose, we should recognize that the pressure within the Executive to employ U.S. military force will become increasingly intense.

I could recommend that the course of action we follow for the indefinite future be the following modification of (b) above:

“Exert all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and other pressures to overthrow the Castro regime without prior commitment to employ U.S. military forces overtly, recognizing however that contingencies may arise where employment of U.S. military force might be considered.”

There is attached for appropriate approval, the Departmentʼs contribution that I would propose be included in the Operation Groupʼs paper regarding the four courses of action.

Attachment

Memorandum

a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it.

Comment

Cuba will probably be mis-managed for the next year or two, even if we did nothing to exacerbate the situation. The spectacle of a mis-managed Cuba with a discontented population would damage the Soviet, communist, and Castro images in the Hemisphere and elsewhere. Cuba would remain an economic and to some extent political burden for the Bloc. If course (a) were adopted, the U.S. could seek to accommodate itself to the presence in the Hemisphere of a nation closely aligned with the Bloc, at the same time attempt to persuade the regime to adopt a more neutralist course without necessarily altering its internal structure.

If this course were adopted, it should be recognized that 1) the Castro regime would be enabled to consolidate its internal position at its own pace; eventually to improve its economic situation with Bloc and perhaps other assistance, thereby enhancing its image; and to continue to engage in and eventually increase its subversive activity in the Hemisphere, which we would probably not be able to control effectively; 2) Cuba may become a base of military operations against the U.S.; 3) the morale of anti-Castro Cubans, both in and out of Cuba, would be destroyed; and 4) the possibility of the Castro regime being replaced in the foreseeable future by one less hostile to the U.S. would be very remote.

b. Exert all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without prior U.S. military commitment.

Comment

If this course were adopted, the Castro regime would be kept off balance and forced to employ some of its resources defensively. The economic situation would probably continue to deteriorate and popular discontent would probably mount. Isolated anti-Castro manifestations would occur and be repressed. Cuba under these circumstances would be an unattractive model.

Constant pressure upon the regime might produce sufficiently broad popular disaffection, active resistance and intrigue at top governmental levels to cause a change in the regime or possibly bring about a situation of virtual civil war under circumstances in which it might prove politically feasible for the U.S. to intervene with force.

If this course were adopted, it should be recognized that 1) this could be a long term program in which the overthrow of the Castro regime would not be guaranteed; 2) barring the unforeseen, further overt U.S. diplomatic and economic actions against Cuba are limited in scope; 3) Cuban recruits are reluctant to risk their lives in fomenting disorders without a commitment that U.S. military force will be employed if necessary; and 4) Cuba could still act against the Hemisphere although its effectiveness would be continually reduced.

c. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of U.S. military force if required at the end.

Comment

If this course were adopted, the overthrow of the Castro regime could probably be brought about.

If this course were adopted, it should be recognized that 1) employment of U.S. military force in Cuba under circumstances that are considered unjustified under international law would constitute intervention, would place us in violation of the UN and OAS charters, would cause grave adverse repercussions in the Hemisphere, would probably jeopardize the Alliance for Progress program and could make us the object of Rio Treaty Article 6 action; 2) the world situation may be such that it would be politically and military unfeasible for us to fulfill a commitment to employ U.S. military force; 3) such a commitment to Cuban exiles would become quickly and widely known and this could seriously complicate our relations with a number of friendly nations; 4) such a commitment could enable the Cuban exiles to “call the tune” and place the U.S. in an untenable position; 5) knowledge of a commitment to employ U.S. military force would solidify internal support for Castro at least in the short term; 6) if U.S. military force is employed, the Bloc would probably exert strong pressure in areas of the world important to the U.S. national interest and where U.S. military force may have to be made available; 7) as the phases progress, the “noise level” would increase substantially and the U.S. must be prepared to defend convincingly in international forums against charges of plotting to overthrow another government.

d. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro-Communist regime by U.S. military force.

Comment

Without a description of the provocation, it is not possible to comment intelligently. It should be noted that with respect to the employment of U.S. military force many of the considerations described in (c) above are applicable, only more so.¹

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7-1962. Top Secret. Also addressed to Goodwin.
1. On July 19 Martin passed on Hurwitchʼs memorandum to Johnson, with a covering memorandum indicating that Martin had approved the Hurwitch memorandum as the Department of State contribution to the requested policy review. Martin noted that, in his opinion: “The suggested re-statement of course (b) contained in the attached memorandum is good, I think, and ARA would hope that there might emerge from the Phase I review a policy statement such as that.” He asked Johnson to look over the Hurwitch memorandum before it was submitted to General Lansdale. (Ibid.)