Office of the Historian

324. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone0

Washington, undated.

MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION AT SPECIAL GROUPMEETING, 2:00 P.M. WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 19621

1.
Program approved. Can be implemented on the approximate timetable, although some slippage exists at the present time, but there is also some prospect to make up the lost time.
2.
The program falls short of:
(a)
Gathering all possible intelligence, and
(b)
Representing maximum effort to create internal dissension within the country.
3.
Therefore probable that even though the program as outlined is accomplished, the results attained by July-August will be disappointing.
4.
Size of effort has grown substantially—[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] CIA personnel engaged and probably equal number from other departments. The question is raised whether with this large effort a more aggressive program should not be authorized.
5.
A review of U-2 photography indicates military capabilities most recently estimated are the very maximum and probably military force less formidable because of absence of adequate support facilities, logistics, transportation, training facilities, etc., which do not appear in the photography.
6.
Monolithic structure at the top seems to be fractionated.
7.
We therefore recommend:
(a)
More aggressive action.
(b)
Large-scale training at U.S. installations.
(c)
Preparation for the introduction of guerrilla forces and their subsequent support, in addition to the authorized espionage teams.
(d)
Preparation now for necessary military action.
8.
Acceptance on the part of the United States of possible attribution for the program.
John A. McCone2
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 5, DCI (McCone), Caribbean Study Group. Secret; Eyes Only.↩
  2. The meeting was held at the Department of State. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) See Document 325.↩
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩