Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

277. Memorandum From General Edward Lansdale to Attorney General Kennedy⁰

Washington, November 30, 1961.

Friday¹ is apparently the “day of decision” for your special project. General Taylorʼs group has it scheduled as the main item for discussion.

A special Intelligence Estimate² seems to be the major evidence to be used to oppose your project. Copies have just been made available this afternoon, and one is attached.³ I have underlined key conclusions.

I suggest two points:

1. The intelligence which supports conclusions about the internal situation is far from adequate.

2. The conclusion on page 4, paragraph 9, concerning the possibility of an uprising being fomented is a “conclusion of fact” quite outside the area of intelligence. The key factor in such a conclusion must be our own ability to take action. It is the heart of our proposal that we can take effective action, if proper management is provided.

0. Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Cuban Project-1962. Secret; Eyes Only. A note on the source text indicates that a copy was sent to Goodwin.
1. December 1.
2. SNIE 85-61; see Document 271.
3. Not found attached.