Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

260. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, September 9, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Meeting in the White House on 9 September 1961 re Status of the Cuban Revolutionary Council

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Richard Goodwin, Assistant to the President for Latin American Affairs
• Mr. Robert Woodward, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs
• Mr. Park Wollam, Department of State
• Mr. Robert Hurwitch, Cuban Desk Officer, Department of State

1. Before the meeting with Dr. Miro Cardona, the head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, and his secretary, Mr. Ernesto de Aragon, at 11:30 a.m., there was a preliminary meeting held in the office of Mr. Goodwin with him, Mr. Woodward, Mr. Wollam, and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to reach agreement on the suggested statement to be made to Dr. Miro Cardona as to the United States Governmentʼs relationship to the Revolutionary Council. There is attached hereto a copy of the guidance¹ which was not to be handed to Dr. Miro but to be read to him. The only question that I had was under Section C, Paragraph 2, where it was stated that, where all groups are not willing to work with the Revolutionary Council, Dr. Miro would be kept informed “of these activities.” I suggested that this should be somewhat limited to state that he would be kept informed “in general of these activities.” Mr. Goodwin said that he did not expect to give a copy of this paper to Dr. Miro, and that he thought that we could play it so that Dr. Miro would simply have a general idea of what we were doing, sufficient to neutralize his protests.

2. At the meeting Dr. Miro was given the substance of the attached, which was translated from English as Mr. Goodwin gave it into Spanish by Mr. Aragon. The Spanish translation was followed very carefully by those in attendance who spoke Spanish and several corrections were made, so that an exact translation was the result.

3. Dr. Miro made no comments, but then stated that if he were to be informed of everything that he had one other basic requirement. He pointed out that the President of the United States had said that Cuban exiles would be accepted into the United States Army. He said that he was faced with a dilemma in that in his position he was called upon to encourage Cubans to join the Army. The question in his mind was whether he was simply encouraging them to become professional soldiers or whether they were equipping themselves for an invasion of Cuba. He recognized the fact that the United States, due to the international situation, could not afford to have a unilateral invasion of Cuba. However, he needed to be reassured that these Cubans were being recruited into the American Army for an eventual joint action with other nations and Cuban exiles to overthrow Fidel Castro. He felt that for the Cuban Revolutionary Council to participate in propaganda activities and clandestine operations aimed at sabotage within Cuba was not sufficient in itself. Likewise, he felt that he could not encourage young Cubans to enter the Army when they might instead be going to college to prepare themselves to become professional men and residents of a new country. Plus that, he objected strenuously to the fact that CIA and the United States Government would back individual groups of Cubans who refused to deal with the Cuban Revolutionary Council. He insisted that by not centralizing all authority in the Council we were creating di-versified groups, and actual gangs would muddy the future of Cuba even if Fidel Castro were overthrown.

4. Mr. Goodwin showed extreme patience and made what might be described as rather eloquent pleas to Dr. Miroʼs realism and patriotism to understand that the United States could not go so far as to commit itself at this point to armed invasion of Cuba, and to the fact that all Cubans could not be united at this point within the Cuban Revolutionary Council. In spite of these lengthy pleas on the part of Mr. Goodwin, there were rebuttals on the part of Dr. Miro, and Dr. Miro stated that he would not commit himself to continuing as head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. He said that he would retire to Baltimore to meditate until Monday,² when he would make a final decision, but that his belief was that at that point he would write an “eloquent and gracious” letter to the President thanking him for his support but declining his continuance as the director of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. Instead he would revert to the status of adviser and common soldier in the resistance to the Communist regime in Cuba.

J.D. Esterline³

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 1, Area Activity-Western Hemisphere-Cuba. Secret.
1. Not found attached but printed as Document 261.
2. September 11.
3. Printed from a copy that indicates Esterline signed for [text not declassified], Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division.