25. Memorandum for the Record0


  • Conclusions of Dean Ruskʼs 22 January Meeting on Cuba1


  • See attached list2

The meeting was long and covered the entire problem in considerable detail. It is the purpose of this memorandum mainly to record the points of significance to CIA. It might be said, however, that in general no definite conclusions were reached other than to say that within a day or two the DCI will be advised by Secretary Rusk as to the views of the present administration on how to proceed and the status of the Special Group with particular reference to the grant of authority for actions in connection with Cuba.

The actions to be taken by CIA are: [Page 53]

To continue planning with the State Department with respect to the political side of the proposed provisional government or junta, i.e. who should be selected and when, how and where should they be selected. This is already underway and will be continued.
To plan with the Pentagon with regard to specific support which might be provided by the Pentagon in the event that conditions make support necessary. Such planning with respect to the possibility of support for a pre-FRD strike landing is already underway. Other contingencies are also under consideration.
An estimate should be made of the effects of overt U.S. action in Cuba on the rest of the world with particular reference to the rest of Latin America, the OAS, close NATO allies and possible Soviet and ChiCom moves in other parts of the world, e.g., Berlin, Laos, Korea, and possibly the Congo. Sherman Kent has been alerted to this and proposes to do a memo to the Director3 which can be coordinated if the Director so desires.
To prepare a briefing for the DD/P, possibly the DCI, regarding what is being done in connection with sabotage within Cuba and what might be done to increase same.
To prepare a briefing regarding the theory underlying the selection of a landing site for the FRD strike force and some of the possible areas which would fit this theory.
To prepare a short paper4 identifying individuals either connected with the project or supporting the project who had FBI experience in Latin America during the war; also stating the present working relationships with the FBI in connection with the project. (There is nothing peculiar about this. It was asked for by the DCI in order to be ready in case Secretary Rusk again raises a question along these lines based on his own personal recollections of wartime actions.)

Nos. 4, 5 and 6 are being taken care of by WH/4.

C. Tracy Barnes5
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 3, Vol. IV (6). Secret. Drafted by Tracy Barnes on January 23.
  2. For another record of this meeting, see Document 24.
  3. Not printed. For the list of meeting participants, see Document 24.
  4. On February 11 the Board of National Estimates sent CIA Director Dulles a memorandum prepared in the Office of National Estimates, entitled “Probable International Reactions to Certain Possible US Courses of Action Against the Castro Regime.” (Central Intelligence Agency,DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI (McCone) General Maxwell Taylor Committee on Cuba, 28 Jan-21 May 1961) The text of this memorandum, which was forwarded to the U.S. Intelligence Board on the same day, is in the Supplement.
  5. Not found.
  6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.