Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

222. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, May 19, 1961, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Representatives of the Cuban Revolutionary Council

At the request of Dr. Morales Carrion, Dept. of State, a meeting of representatives of several departments of the U.S. Government with representatives of the Cuban Revolutionary Council was held at the Department of State at 4:00 p.m., 19 May 1961.

The participants for the Revolutionary Council were:

• Mr. Varona—Military Affairs
• Mr. Hevia—Foreign Affairs
• Mr. Maceo—Welfare
• Mr. Carrillo—Finances & Propaganda
• Mr. Ray—Underground Activities
• Mr. Aragon—Secretary to Mr. Miro Cardona, who is ill in Miami

On the part of the United States, in addition to Dr. Morales there were several representatives of the Department of State chiefly from the Caribbean area and the following:

• Mr. James Hennessey—Immigration and Naturalization Service, representing Dept. of Justice
• Mr. Leon Uhlmann—Office of the Attorney General
• Mr. James Quigley—Assistant Secretary, Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare
• Mr. William Mitchell—Commissioner of Social Security
• Mr. Maurice J. Mountain—Policy Planning Staff, ISA, Dept. of Defense

After introductory remarks by both Dr. Morales and Mr. Hevia to the effect that this was an initial meeting to bring the Council and the United States representatives together in order to see what needs to be and can be done from here on to establish a free and democratic Cuba, Mr. Hevia raised the first problem.

He said that extra planes were needed to get the people out of Cuba who have papers to leave, but who are daily turned away by PanAm because no space is available. PanAm carries out about 100 per day and they are booked up through October of this year. Each day, Mr. Hevia said, as many as 500 are turned away. Mr. Brown of the Department of State was assigned the task of finding out what could be done about the matter.

The second problem was that of obtaining waivers of visas for members of the underground who, for their own safety, should get out of Cuba. These people do not qualify for waivers on ordinary grounds since they have no relatives already in the U.S. When the discussion disclosed that a figure of about 40 people were involved, the problem did not appear to be insuperable to the Immigration and Naturalization Service and Mr. James Hennessey agreed to see what could be done.

The third problem was how to get those Cubans who were now living in various Embassies in Havana, where they had sought asylum, to the United States without having them travel first to the country affording them asylum. The Council was aware of the fact that a Cuban granted asylum in, for example, the Argentine Embassy could claim safe-counduct only to Argentina. They wished to know how such people could be brought to the United States without first having to go to Argentina. The Department of State will study the problem.

The fourth problem was how the Council could dispatch its representatives—teachers, workers, etc.—on official missions abroad and be sure that they would be readmitted to the U.S. on their return. The status of the Cubans as refugees and the absence of customary documentation for reentry now makes it technically impossible for them to return to the United States once they leave. Mr. Hennessey and the Department of State will try to find a solution to this problem.

The fifth problem was what to do about those persons who held four-year visas for the United States which are about to expire. Dr. Maceo explained that he personally was in that position since his four-year visa would expire in another five or six weeks. Mr. Hennessey indicated that this was related to the previous problem and that he would seek a solution for both.

The sixth problem was a question of whether the United States would bring before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights or the Organization of American States, or both, the charge against the Castro regime of inhuman treatment of its citizens. A representative of the Department of State suggested that there were a number of reasons why the United States should not bring this charge, and he suggested that the Council work with other Latin American States to have them take the initiative. He assured the Council that the United States would support such a move, provided the initiative came from some other country.

The seventh problem was a question of finances. First, the Council wanted to know about financial support for the refugees as a group; second, the special problem of survivors and families of the invasion force; and third, the financial support needed for future Council activities, particularly in the field of propaganda. They said that members of the invasion force had been paid $175 per month with $25 per month additional for each child. A total of about 2,400 fighters were involved. 1,000 are now prisoners, 200 are dead or missing, and another 1,200 have returned. They felt these payments should be continued so long as, for those who returned, they are not gainfully employed.

The Commissioner of Social Security, Mr. Mitchell, explained that the United States was now supplying cash assistance to the extent of $100 per month per family, and there were several reasons why this would have to remain the maximum. In addition, he pointed out, the United States is providing surplus foodstuffs free, is making available free education, extensive health services, and resettlement costs for those for whom employment can be found. For unaccompanied children all costs for their complete care are assumed by the United States.

In the discussion which followed, there seemed to be some confusion as to who was paying the $175 per month. The Council members said it was CIA, but it was not clear whether these payments had been cut off for all, or were continuing for some, or what their status was. It was clear, however, that both Mr. Quigley and Mr. Mitchell would take up the question of support for the survivors of those killed, missing or captured in the invasion. Mr. Varona estimated that the fighting force and their families together numbered about 10,000 people. In response to a question by Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Varona stated that he was not asking for support for those Cubans, resident in the United States, who travelled, sometimes from as far away as California, to join the invasion army. He had in mind only those Cuban refugees who had no other means of support. At this point in the discussion there was no further reference to support of the Councilʼs activities.

The eighth problem was brought up by Mr. Ray who suggested a program should be set up at once and carried out vigorously to train doctors, engineers, public administration personnel. It became apparent that he was talking about a morale problem and that such training would be a morale booster to the extent that these people would feel they were training for a post-Castro Cuba. Mr. Mitchell responded to this question by pointing out the efforts that were being made to find employment for exiles who wished to utilize their skills and training in the United States. The Council reiterated their belief that a vigorous program to train people of this sort was needed and that it should be promoted in such a way as to improve the morale of the Cuban exiles.

The ninth problem was posed by Mr. Varona and was addressed to the representative of the Department of Defense. Mr. Varona stated that it was the firm purpose of the exile group to continue the fight to free Cuba and to bring about the downfall of the Castro regime. He delivered an increasingly impassioned statement ending it with the following question which, he said, was the most important of all with which they were concerned. In accomplishing their objective of ridding Cuba and the world of the Castro government, what help, when, where and in what form could they expect from the United States?

Mr. Mountain responded by saying that the question Mr. Varona had asked was a most serious one. He said that he believed there was no American who did not share the desire of the Council to see the establishment of a free and democratic Cuba. The answer to Mr. Varonaʼs question, however, could only come from the highest levels of the U.S. Government, by which he meant the President and his principal advisers. He wished to assure Mr. Varona that the Department of Defense would do whatever the President and the high councils of the U.S. Government demanded of it. However, it was not a question which the Department of Defense, alone, could answer.

Mr. Varona replied saying that he did not expect to get an answer, but that he wanted to bring this matter up at this initial meeting to emphasize the importance that they attach to this matter. Mr. Mountain answered that he understood Mr. Varonaʼs purpose and that Mr. Varona could be assured that his question and the seriousness with which he raised it would be made known to the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Mountain then went on to say that the Department of Defense was now working on the development of a program along the lines of Mr. Rayʼs suggestion about further training for Cuban exiles. He explained that for those among the exile group who would like to receive military training, a program by which they could be trained as individuals within the U.S. armed forces was being worked out. Mr. Hevia asked whether the trainees would be separated and scattered or whether they would train as a group. Mr. Mountain replied that it was the view of the Department of Defense that their training would be helped most by being placed within the established units of the U.S. armed forces.¹ The Council as a group took a dim view of any arrangement which would tend to split up the exile group. Mr. Ray said that the psychology of the Cuban group was more important than the efficiency of their training. He said it was absolutely necessary to keep them together, to keep their spirits up, to give them hope for the future, and to give some sense of purpose to their pursuits. He was against any program which would split them up. Dr. Morales entered the conversation by saying that we had apparently identified an area where there was an important difference of views and he was glad to see the Council express itself frankly and openly on the matter. He suggested that perhaps this was a matter which, having been identified, could now be taken up in another forum where the alternatives could be explored. The Council agreed. Mr. Varona said that if it was publicity that the Department of Defense was worried about, the same problem would exist if an attempt were made to train Cuban soldiers scattered throughout the U.S. forces.

Mr. Maceo asked if the Defense program could make provision for keeping Cuban officers in training, and Mr. Hevia asked what provision could be made for military personnel in the age group over 26 but perhaps not older than 35 or 36. Mr. Maceo also asked what provision could be made for doctors in the armed forces.

Mr. Mountain said that the problem of training Cuban officers posed some special difficulties which were not easily solved; that the defense program dealt only with the 17 to 26 age group; and as for the training of doctors, that was a problem which was not specifically a Defense matter. If some such program as Mr. Ray had proposed were worked out perhaps the doctors could be trained in that way. Mr. Maceo, however, repeated that it was training in the armed forces for doctors as well that he thought was important. He pointed out that many of them had been soldiers as well as doctors and he felt that training in military medicine or in medicine within a military organization would be highly desirable. Mr. Mountain agreed that Defense would explore these matters further.

Mr. Carrillo then read a prepared paper on the Councilʼs plans for a world-wide propaganda effort. The paper itself was turned over to Dr. Morales. In effect, it proposes to make of the exile group an activist anti-Communist organization which will engage in propaganda, mobilization of public opinion, and popular agitation principally in the Western Hemisphere, but also in Europe and Asia. They will seek the integration of different local groups in each country, principally against Communists, and will employ for the purpose Cuban exiles and people native-born in the country of their operations. They intend to operate not only in South and Central America, but also in the United States and Canada. They visualize this effort not only as directed toward the overthrow of Castro, but also as a movement to destroy communism. They expect within the next two to three months to have committees established in all Latin American countries and to have enlisted some 50,000 people in their work.

The immediate need, however, they said—and all the Council emphatically agreed—was to construct at Key West a long-wave radio station which could overcome the jamming effect of Castroʼs device of having 500 ham radio operators in Cuba go on the air to prevent reception of long-wave radio programs from the U.S. They said he had confiscated all short-wave radios, and it was necessary for the people of Cuba to get encouragement and hope from the exile group, but this was not possible without a radio station which could cut through the Castro jamming system.

Dr. Morales said that he felt this whole area of propaganda activities was an important one, and that it should be taken up in an appropriate forum. The Department of State would be the agency to which the Council should look for further exploration of these possibilities.

One of the Council members mentioned that before the invasion the passports of about 400 of the fighters in the invasion force had been collected, he did not know by whom, but that he would like to have them returned to the individuals to whom they had been issued. A representative of the visa section of the Department of State said he would look into the matter.

Mr. Ray brought up the question of some 13 Cubans still being held in Camp McClelland and wanted to know what could be done about their release. Mr. Uhlmann and Mr. Hennessey promised to look into the matter.

Dr. Morales suggested, and it was agreed, that a similar meeting be scheduled on a regular basis, initially every two weeks in Washington to canvass whatever major and pressing problems existed and to receive reports on progress made in solving them. He suggested that he be kept informed of actions taken, but that the Council consult with the representatives of the Departments on specific matters without clearance through him. This was agreed, but Mr. Mountain noted that the questions addressed to the Department of Defense had implications extending beyond the competence of the Department of Defense. He, therefore, suggested that more fruitful discussion of some of these problems might be possible if Dr. Morales was present at least for the first few meetings with Department of Defense representatives. This was readily agreed to and the Council will, for the present time, contact the Department of Defense through Dr. Morales.

Maurice J. Mountain
Director, Policy Planning Staff

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files, Cuban Volunteer Program. Secret. Drafted by Mountain on May 22.
1. On May 26 Yarmolinsky, acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, circulated a plan for “Service of Cuban Volunteers in the U.S. Armed Forces” to the various branches of the armed services for comment. The plan was based on the assumption that the Cuban volunteers inducted would be spread throughout the services for training and incorporated into existing military formations. (Ibid.)