Attachment
As indicated by the combined INR/ONE
estimate,3
anti-Castro activity within
Cuba will probably be muted at least for the next several months. Most
individuals whose loyalty is in any way suspect have been arrested. A
recent report from the Swiss Ambassador indicated that political
prisoners now number 100,000. All internal services will continue to
work on a theory of repression plus undoubtedly swift and brutal
penalties. Consequently, it will be very difficult to carry on any
clandestine operations and it is doubtful that such operations can have
any significant impact in weakening the Castro regime.
In spite of this, evidence is still available that there is opposition to
the regime among individuals still at large and that such opposition is
prepared to undertake action despite the risks involved. Moreover, there
are still agents distributed through most of the six provinces and
communications can still be had either directly or indirectly with these
individuals. At the very least these agents can and will continue to
collect information and to transmit it to the Agency. In addition,
certain of these individuals, plus some additional ones who might be
infiltrated, could attempt to carry out some sabotage. Individual acts
of sabotage are possible with relatively few men and small amounts of
material. Successive acts of sabotage or extensive sabotage operations
are more difficult and inevitably more costly in terms of loss of men.
Nevertheless, it would be possible, starting in the near future, to
attempt limited sabotage with a view to determining its feasibility and
with the hope that gradually an increased program might be
developed.
A capability also exists for types of maritime operations including
infiltration and exfiltration of individuals, landing and caching of
arms, [Page 430] under-water sabotage of
shipping and small raider operations. Under present circumstances it
would seem wrong to attempt these except on a very limited scale and in
all likelihood, raider operations should not be attempted until more
information regarding feasibility has been obtained.
The Agency also has a small air arm including some transport aircraft
(C-54 and C-46 types) plus attack bomber aircraft (B-26). Although it is
not absolutely certain, there is reason to suppose that Cuban crews also
are available for operational flights. At the moment, air operations
should be substantially eliminated with the possible exception of supply
flights to support opposition elements unable to survive without such
support. Even with respect to such operations, however, it should be
remembered that the percentage of successful night drops is extremely
limited so that the urgency should be great to justify the risk. B-26
strikes could, of course, be flown against chosen targets (e.g.
refineries, power plants, tire plants) and, if successful, might have
the effect of extensive sabotage. In view of the risks involved,
however, and the poor deniability of U.S. support where aircraft are
involved, it is recommended that such operations be avoided at least for
the present.
Manolo Ray of the MRP has asserted an
independent MRP capability to conduct
infiltration, intelligence collection, sabotage and defection operations
into Cuba. He recognizes a need for U.S. support but is very firm in his
desire to operate as independently as possible of any official U.S.
connection. His initial request is for five boats, some materiel and
some money. He admits, however, that, looking ahead, additional support
such as real estate, some help with training and communications will be
required. He offers to share his information with the U.S. Government,
seek U.S. advice and, at least for a period of time, be willing to
operate with the Revolutionary Council. The Councilʼs views are being
canvassed and Ray has been asked to prepare a prospectus giving in some
detail his needs for U.S. support for the immediate future and the
step-up required over a period of time should his efforts prove
successful.
The Ray proposal should certainly be examined and given support within
reasonable limits if the relationships proposed both with the Council
and with the U.S. are satisfactory.
In addition to the activities described above, propaganda activities such
as radio broadcasts and publication of magazines and newspapers can be
continued independently by the Agency or in support of Ray or the
Revolutionary Council. Moreover, limited political action operations are
possible. As to both propaganda and political action, however, the
amount of effort and the type of activity undertaken will depend to a
large extent on the decisions with respect to the operations described
above. Consequently, these will be noted here as mere possibilities.
