321. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)0

MEMORANDUM ON CIVIL AVIATION POLICY TOWARDSINO-SOVIET BLOC

It is necessary to bring up-to-date our policy statement on bilateral civil aviation relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc in view of developments since the previous policy statement adopted in 1957 by the National Security Council was withdrawn last year.1 While we assume that in the foreseeable future there is unlikely to be an improvement in our relations with the Bloc of sufficient importance to warrant consideration of a bilateral civil aviation agreement, we should be ready for such a contingency. The attached policy statement (Tab A) provides for that contingency and incorporates considerations militating for and against an agreement on our side and on the Bloc side.2

The second draft policy statement (Tab B) has been developed because NSC 5726/1 has been withdrawn and we need comprehensive policy guidance in the area of Bloc civil air activities abroad. Our experience with the Congo, the Sudan, and Cuba suggests strongly to me that we need a basic policy statement against which to measure and develop programs of action, particularly in Africa and Latin America, related to Bloc civil air activities in the Free World.

It is felt that such a policy must rest on the following premises and rationale:

(1)
That Bloc inroads in the civil aviation area are undesirable because they can enhance, sometimes in substantial measure, the Bloc’s capabilities to attain its military and political objectives in the developing countries, and
(2)
For both political and economic reasons, our capabilities to prevent such inroads are limited and therefore must be applied with circumspection on the basis of a carefully defined system of priorities.

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While the dangers from Bloc moves in this field can be indiscriminately exaggerated, our experience amply demonstrates that they can afford opportunities for Bloc political gains beyond those provided by other forms of Bloc presence. In a crisis situation such as occurred in the Congo and in Cuba, the lack of air traffic rights handicapped the Bloc in supporting footholds it had gained through other means. Equally serious is the possibility that Bloc influence in, and control over, air facilities within a country could enable it to act quickly and decisively at a time of internal political crisis.

Beyond these critical potentialities, civil air access to the LDC’s tends to enhance the Bloc’s prestige and to facilitate its over-all program to develop close political and economic bonds with specific developing countries. Bloc experience in Guinea and Ghana, however, indicates that civil aviation activities can boomerang. When the Bloc undertakes to support a civil aviation program that is uneconomic to begin with, it runs the risk of being saddled with the costs and the onus of responsibility when the program fails and disillusionment sets in. More generally, in any attempt to establish a broad international civil aviation network in competition with the West, the Bloc operates under the considerable disabilities of its relatively inferior equipment and of prospectively thin traffic routes.

In regard to our own limitations, we must recognize first that among the non-aligned developing countries the negotiation of an exchange of air rights with the Bloc frequently is viewed as an assertion of their recently won sovereignty and an evidence of balanced neutrality. Additionally, an offer of Bloc civil aviation assistance can appeal to a strongly felt need irrespective of its justification for improved transport facilities within and through these countries. We could attempt to consider such offers whenever they are made but such an across-the-board effort would be politically burdensome and would create serious distortions in our economic assistance programs.

These circumstances point to the need for flexible and carefully modulated measures in this field. Our civil aviation program in developing countries will be most successful in limiting Bloc penetration to the degree that they are consistent with over-all economic assistance criteria. We cannot, however, limit our actions in this field solely to measures justified by these criteria. Our approach should be based on the following principles:

1.
We should use diplomatic means to discourage other Governments from entering into civil aviation agreements with the Bloc, stress-ing the dangers involved and our unfavorable view of such actions. At the same time, we should make sure that the developing countries have a clear understanding of where their self-interest in fact lies and an accurate measure of their bargaining strength in any negotiation with the Bloc.
2.
Through our own programs and through actions developed jointly with our allies, we should seek to encourage the development of national air services that meet the transportation development needs of the country concerned and fit into feasible regional services. Such programs would tend to fill vacuums that Bloc civil aviation offers seek to exploit and thus would provide the developing countries with effective self-interest grounds for rejecting civil aviation ties with the Bloc.
3.
We should limit our preemptive efforts to those countries where such programs would be politically feasible and strategically dictated.

Concurrent with the process of obtaining the concurrences of the other interested agencies, work will be started to formulate action programs designed to achieve our objectives in anticipating and in contravening Sino-Soviet Bloc civil air activities.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AV 1 Com Bloc-US. Secret. On May 1, Harriman sent this memorandum and two statements on civil air transport relations between the United States and the Soviet bloc and on U.S. policy toward bloc civil aviation activities in the free world with a covering letter requesting comments to the Departments of Commerce and Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Aviation Administration, Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Bureau of the Budget. The replies, May 14 (Department of Commerce), undated (Central Intelligence Agency), May 20 (Bureau of the Budget), May 24 (Civil Aeronautics Board), and June 21 (Federal Aviation Administration and Department of Defense), are ibid.
  2. Reference is to NSC 5726/1, “U.S. Civil Aviation Policy toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc,” December 9, 1957, printed in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. IX, pp. 490503.
  3. Tabs A and B are not printed.