Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IX, Foreign Economic Policy

24. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, April 24, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with the President, April 18, 1963, 10:00 A.M., to 12 Noon—Balance of Payments

The President opened the meeting by asking Secretary Dillon what was the basis for the assumption that our balance of payments would be in good shape in 1965. He referred to the different view that Mr. Acheson’s paper suggested.¹ Secretary Dillon responded that it was the general opinion that there would be a substantial improvement in evidence by 1965 or perhaps late 1964, although it was not expected that our accounts would be in balance by then. This opinion had been expressed in the Brookings report.² It was shared by the staff of the IMF, the IMF officers and most of the important European central bankers with whom he was in touch. Secretary Dillon then listed the major developments which were prospectively favorable. As far as trade went, European prices could be expected to increase relative to those of the U.S. The possibilities of the continued squeezing of European business profits between rising costs and less rapidly rising prices were about exhausted, and this and other forces would continue to drive European prices up. We could also expect improvements in the investment account. Much of the U.S. investment in Western Europe has been a one-time matter in response to the new political stability in Western Europe and the reappearance of convertibility for European currencies. This was already beginning to decline. Further, higher rate of economic activity in the U.S. would make investment here more attractive. On the other side of the ledger, income from assets held abroad was rising and would continue to rise. Each of the years 1961 and 1962 had shown a $300 million increase in net income from foreign investments over its predecessors. The basic deficit which had been less than a billion dollars in 1961 and was a little over a billion dollars in 1962 could thus be expected to decline. On the other hand, short term capital movements were unpredictable and still presented a problem. Our out-flows on short term capital account had been $2 billion in 1961 and $1.7 billion by last year. Here the question of interest rates was important, but even in the short-term accounts there were countervailing factors. For instance, there had been in the last year a return of flight capital to Europe, much of which was probably concealed in the “errors and omissions” category. It was Secretary Dillon’s judgment that this too was coming to an end. These optimistic forecasts were based on the assumption that U.S. foreign expenditures in the military and foreign aid fields continued to be held down. In sum, daylight some time in the period 1965-66-67 was perfectly visible, and accordingly there was no reason for drastic actions now which would upset the dollar and have an adverse reaction on the whole international payments situation. On the other hand, if by the end of 1964 progress was not in accord-ance with expectations, we would have another look at the problem. It had clearly been a mistake to fix on 1963 as a definite target year in which balance would come.

The President then turned to Secretary Ball and asked him to summarize the State Department paper on restricting the access to our capital market for foreign security quotations.³ Secretary Ball opened by saying that the notion of restricting foreign security sales was not one in which he saw any positive merit. For example, he thought it should be much lower on the priority list than either an IMF drawing or a political negotiation for substantial government loans. However, if these are not possible, then the proposal should be given serious consideration. Secretary Ball reviewed the factual situation as set forth in his memorandum, with emphasis on the increasing use of the U.S. market, especially by Canadians. It was clear that we could not make a blanket prohibition and would have to find some way of dealing with genuine Japanese and Canadian needs. What was needed was some machinery for selective control. In his judgment, this could be accomplished without legislation; and simultaneously, informal talks could be had with the Canadians on what their needs were, but rigorous standards applied to the Europeans. On this basis he thought we might save something between $400-$600 million annually on the investment account. Secretary Ball noted that the next Finance Minister of Canada, Walter Gordon, was in favor of “buying back Canada” and therefore might well be sympathetic to the program. He was confident that if we had the control machinery to back up our position, we could come to an understanding with the Canadians.

While he recognized the dangers of any restrictive action, Secretary Ball gave his judgment that it would be much better to restrict foreign securities flotation than to make any large troop redeployments or to impose regressive taxes on tourism. Responding to the President’s question, he said that foreign securities sales amounted to about ten per cent of total flotations in our markets.

Secretary Dillon, responding to the President’s request for criticism of the proposal, made two chief points. First, he does not share the State Department estimate of the savings the proposed measure would yield. Second, the risk that any restriction would provoke a general capital flight was simply not worth taking. He then went on to develop his points in further detail. Most of the potential yield was in Canada. Canadian loans last year were exceptional in volume and character, and he did not expect they would be repeated on a similar scale. If we restricted Canadian borrowing, there would be an adverse affect on U.S. exports to Canada, since Canada itself had anything but an easy balance of payments situation and we were their major supplier. Further, the Canadians did not demand gold, but held their dollar balances cheerfully. The Japanese situation was similar. As for the rest, other than Canada and Japan, there was little in it. With respect to international institutions, we already had controls. Last year’s European borrowings of $200 million will decline. Secretary Dillon has already made informal representations to some European governments and he will make further representations. Of the rest, Israel took $50 million, and thus would be politically difficult to cut down. Australia and New Zealand, which had taken $80 or $90 million last year were already reaching the limitation of their capacity to carry external debt. Further, the New York insurance companies who were the chief buyers of this kind of security were nearing their own limitations on further holdings. In sum, the whole enterprise would yield at most $200 million a year. Since he thought the chances were 100 to 1 that this activity would trigger a mass capital out-flow in which we could lose $1 or $2 billion in assets, and in turn force us to an IMF drawing with all that it implies, he could not see why we should consider it seriously. Further, there was a legal problem. We might need a proclamation of a new emergency which in itself would have an effect on confidence. The classification of our allies as “enemies” to be dealt with under the Trading With the Enemy Act was troublesome.

Secretary Dillon then asked Chairman Martin for his view. Chairman Martin talked about the evanescent character of business confidence. We were facing the real possibility of a crisis. While he did not want to be a Cassandra, he thought it was necessary to warn of what could happen. Liberal policies in trade and in investment matters have been our tradition. We should have the strength and the courage to follow them. If that tradition were impaired, we would start undermining the entire fabric of our liberal policy and all that goes with it, and the confidence which rests on that policy. His own experience with operating voluntary credit controls during the Korean War made him aware of the great difficulties that the operation of a Capital Issues Committee would involve. If this were a dramatic move which added to our resources, Chairman Martin could see some argument for it. But since the forces of the market are working with us we should cooperate rather than oppose them. We should not show the white feather unless we are against the wall.

The President asked what happens when our gold reserves get down to $13 billion. Of course we can suspend the reserve requirement but what effect will that have on confidence? Chairman Martin said that we had to hold clearly to our 1961 policy statement: no embargo on gold movements; no direct controls. There was virtue in maintaining a strong line; as soon as we weaken foreign speculators and central banks would doubt our determination and confidence would drop. Liberal trade policies were, after all, our ultimate goal. If foreign countries had different trade and investment policies, we should not by any means follow their bad example. If necessary, we may have to take the risks of putting deflationary pressure on the economy through monetary policies. But since the favorable forces of expansion were operating to make investment in the U.S. more attractive, it seemed unwise to interfere with them by imposing direct controls. In sum, we should hold the line on our liberal policies. We need the courage and guts to stick to our policy and not allow ourselves to be put on the defensive.

At this point, the President asked Secretary Ball for his comments. Secretary Ball said that his chief difference with the Secretary of the Treasury was with respect to the amount of risk we should be prepared to accept. He shared Secretary Dillon’s assumptions as to the favorable outlook for the future. However, we need a prudent policy which guards against the possibility of a worse outcome. It is clear that we have been too optimistic since 1961. If we are forced to take measures to defend the dollar under pressure it will be dangerous from the point of view of the national interest. We need to act now so as to provide a greater margin within which we can rely on the long range forces to improve our position. Further, we had to look to the future of the international payments system, especially in relation to the situation when we move into surplus. An American surplus might well aggravate liquidity problems. As far as the issue of confidence and leadership went, he thought that departure from the strict fidelity to free capital movement was much less of a threat than the possibility that we might deflate our domestic economy. Secretary Ball stressed that he was not in any way suggesting restriction on foreign flotations in the U.S. as a matter of first priority, and repeated his concern that the policies advocated by the Secretary of the Treasury involved an unnecessarily large measure of risk.

Secretary Dillon agreed that the margin on which we were operating was narrow. However, it was he and the Treasury who were conservative, and Secretary Ball’s proposal which was reckless. He and Secretary Ball, however, agreed that the issue was really one of priority. In his view once we start down the road of exchange controls and the like, it would be very difficult to stop and the effects on confidence would be clear.

The President then turned to the question of a possible drawing on the IMF. He read from paragraph A. of the Council paper⁴ and noted the assumptions contained therein that we would face a gross deficit of $6 billion in the period 1963-64 and that we had to manage our affairs so that we financed no more than $1 billion of this deficit each year through gold losses. Secretary Dillon commented that the figure of $6 billion was inaccurate. We proposed to reduce the out-flow as the Cabinet Committee paper showed, so that the deficit was in fact less than that. If we were successful in reducing the out-flow we could finance the deficits on the present basis for as long a period in the future as necessary. He called on Under Secretary Roosa to comment on this point. Secretary Roosa defined our problem as that of any other borrower—how to keep our credit standing good. This meant primarily two things. First, general confidence in our financial policy and second, clear evidence that the government is doing a comprehensive job in reducing unnecessary expenditures abroad. While he professed no expertise in these matters, Secretary Roosa thought it was highly desirable that if there was any excess fat in our military abroad, we should trim it off. This would have a favorable effect on the opinion of the European financial community. A reduction in tourist expenditures would likewise have a favorable effect on the European financial community. The President asked if this would also be true of U.S. foreign investment. Secretary Roosa replied that it would, but this was a matter on which the Europeans will be taking action. He then stressed the importance of interest rates and quoted Van Lennep (the Director General of the Dutch Ministry of Finance and the Chairman of Working Party #3) to the effect that a half percent rise in the U.S. short rates would be a very important demonstration of our determination to deal with the balance of payments problems. Secretary Roosa went on to talk about the difficulties of estimating what gold sales would be and how undependable the figure was on the distribution of deficits and surpluses in Europe. The Swedes, for example, had just told him that they were willing to hold their dollar balances without asking for gold, and as long as confidence in our policy existed, it was clear they would continue to do so. The President asked Secretary Roosa what was his estimate of the gold loss for 1963-64. Secretary Roosa responded that he thought it would be of the same order of magnitude as in the last two years—about $850 million per year or perhaps less. However, he did not wish to promise that the figure would not exceed this, because there were so many variables involved. He reported on his recent favorable discussions with the French, but pointed out that a change in French political attitudes in respect to financial questions might lead to a change in French behavior and a corresponding increase in our loss of gold. Nonetheless, we could sustain gold losses up to $1 billion per year with no strongly adverse effects. Secretary Roosa stressed the crucial importance of avoiding in any way the suggestion that we had lost our nerve. He said that the efforts of the last two years have saved us at least $3 billion in gold in a direct sense. If we had lost the extra $3 billion we would have in fact lost much more because of the alarm that this would have created.

Secretary Dillon observed that the program of action that the Committee was presenting to the President would take effect primarily in Calendar year 1964 because of the lags involved. The same thing would be true of the change in monetary policy which was proposed for the fall of 1963. Thus his estimate was that while the gold loss would be between $800 million and $1 billion in 1963, it would drop off to something between $500 million and $600 million in 1964.

The President returned to the question of an IMF drawing. Secretary Roosa said we should certainly bear the possibility in mind but at present he would like to save it. We have already worked out the arrangements with Per Jacobsson of the IMF for making a drawing. His own soundings in Europe on the advisability of a drawing were still producing negative results. It would take more time to prepare the Europeans. The Italians, in particular, have bluntly warned us against making a drawing on the grounds that it would shock Europe if the U.S. and UK drew at the same time. All the Europeans expected the UK would be forced to draw. Secretary Dillon distinguished between the notion of any large drawing either up to our gold tranche of approximately $1 billion or up to our first credit tranche of approximately another $1 billion, and the idea of an ice-breaking small technical drawing in relation to Canadian repayment. He was strongly against a big drawing. The Council’s analysis of the resources of the Fund was incorrect. The UK must draw and will probably draw $1 billion since the Fund’s assets are $2.2 billion in gold and $1.2 billion in hard European currencies. The reserves of hard currencies after a UK drawing would be small. The Fund could sell some gold but if we came in for a drawing on top of a British drawing the Fund would have to sell substantial amounts of gold or activate special borrowing arrangements. If so, our whole financial program would have to be examined at greater detail under the terms of the special arrangements. If the Fund sold gold in any substantial amounts, it would almost certainly ask for the return of the $800 million in Fund gold on deposit with the U.S. This would cancel the gain to us of the drawing. The Canadian situation has changed and the Canadians are not planning to make any repayment this year except for $25 million in gold. Therefore, the occasion for a technical drawing will not present itself now. However, if the British make a drawing we could then examine the situation and see whether a technical drawing was possible. None of this, of course, was a substitute for the action program. In this respect Secretary Dillon called attention to the fact that the $6 billion in the Council memo assumed that there was no action program.

Chairman Heller reminded the group that our basic goal was not merely to save gold, but to do it in a way that kept domestic expansion going and our liberal international policies intact as well. We are all assuming that what we are faced with is a transitional problem rather than a permanent one. In this case it is wise to take the easy measures first and to be sure that the more distasteful measures are available and arranged in order of priority. In his view there was no easier way to get $1 to $2 billion additional in foreign resources than to make a drawing on the IMF, at least up to our gold tranche. His analysis of the IMF reserves was different than the Treasury’s. There was $4.4 billion in gold and hard currency: $1 billion drawn by the UK and $1 billion drawn by the U.S. would still leave $2.4 billion in ready IMF reserves in addition to the $3 billion which the standby agreement would provide if necessary. Thus both we and the UK could draw and still leave an emergency reserve of nearly $5.5 billion. The President asked what advantage there would be in an IMF drawing. Secretary Dillon interrupted to remark again on the futility of drawing $1 billion if the result was that the IMF withdrew its deposit with the U.S. of $800 million in gold. Chairman Heller responded that this was an unrealistic view. Per Jacobsson favored active use of the Fund, and he would not act so as stand in the way of it. Secretary Dillon said that a technical drawing on the Fund was acceptable. Any big drawing, however, must wait on the actions of the UK. In the meantime we must continue to talk to the Europeans and the New York financial community to prepare them for the possibility of drawing. After all, we could not take actions which would lead to headlines of the “U.S. Admits Bankruptcy; Goes to IMF” sort.

Chairman Heller pointed out that we could draw European currency and at the same time the Fund could sell gold to the Europeans. This would have the double advantage of increasing our supply of European currencies at the same time that their hunger for gold was appeased. Secretary Roosa responded that the IMF does not think that their present gold stock is large. Furthermore, since they don’t expect any further payments in gold they want to hang on to their present holdings. He again raised the question of what must sooner or later happen to the $800 million in gold that the Fund has on deposit with the U.S. Mr. Tobin pointed out that it is hard to believe that the IMF would be acting against us at the same moment that we make a drawing. This simply was not sensible. Further, he was not proposing that the U.S. draw $1 billion all at once, but rather that we make drawings over a period of time, in installments which would total between $1 and $2 billion in the course of the next two years.

The President asked Mr. Tobin whether he was in favor of a drawing. Mr. Tobin responded yes, of course. Our ability to make use of the Fund in a technical way as we did in the past is now at an end because the Fund’s holdings of dollars are up to its limit. Drawings in small amounts as a regular routine matter would simply represent a continuation of our past policies in the new technical situation. Mr. Jacobsson and Secretary Dillon could make it perfectly clear to the financial community what was happening, and the whole operation could be carried on in a way that would not shake confidence any more than it has done in the past.

The President then moved to the question of political loans. He asked Secretary Roosa what the prospects were for funding existing dollar holdings and for additional five-year loans along the lines suggested in Secretary Ball’s paper. Was there a parliamentary problem? Secretary Ball interrupted to remark that the proposal envisioned financing that would be done by central banks and not through government budgets. The basic question, however, was the necessity for a political decision by governments to ask their central banks to go beyond existing practices with respect to financing U.S. deficits. He said this was something which we obviously would start with the Germans and then the Italians. He sketched the plan further, along the lines of his paper. Secretary Dillon pointed out that in his judgment it would be very difficult to achieve these arrangements, and further, with all the difficulty, it would accomplish nothing beyond what we already have done. The present two year loans will be rolled over and renewed as long as necessary. In fact, the amounts we now have outstanding and the agreements for further amounts up to our needs go to the full extent of the future surpluses of the Germans, Italians, French and Belgians. Thus the $1.2 billion mentioned in the Cabinet Committee paper as the available magnitude of financing of this nature does not accurately reflect the maximum amount that will in fact be available.

Secretary Ball noted that the Treasury was addressing itself to the easy case of the financing which would be available if the U.S. balance of payments was moving in a favorable way. The problem was, however, what would happen if we did not do well. It was in these circumstances that advance agreement was important and it was precisely in these circumstances that the arrangements we now have might prove unreliable. Secretary Dillon responded that it would undoubtedly be desirable to get the kind of commitments of which Mr. Ball had spoken, but he did not think it possible. We now have oral, informal understandings. Any formal contracts were much more difficult to achieve, and if achieved, they would probably involve much harder terms. The Bundesbank was at least as independent as the Federal Reserve System. (Laughter.) Secretary Roosa noted that the Bundesbank and the subsidiary of the Italian central bank which deals with foreign exchange have full authority in the foreign fields and are not subject to instruction by the government. In particular, the head of the Italian activity was independent of the government. He had pointed out to Mr. Roosa in conversation that he was satisfied with the present arrangements, but if the politicians got into it there would be no money.

The President asked whether it was clearly the Treasury’s position that we could not go in any formal way beyond what we now have in either standstill understanding and lines of credit? Under Secretary Roosa responded affirmatively. The President asked whether this statement applied to 5 year loans. Under Secretary Roosa responded that we could edge up toward 5 year loans slowly and in one country at a time, but we could not get there in one or a few large leaps.

Secretary Ball called attention to page 5 of the Cabinet Committee report and stated again that this was a good financing scheme if things went well. What if they did not? Messrs. Dillon and Roosa said we would call on the IMF. Chairman Heller remarked that they pictured this as an extreme emergency measure. What was in between the emergency measure and the favorable situation anticipated in the Cabinet Committee report? Roosa responded that what we are now doing can handle such a situation.

Secretary Ball asked what would happen if in the middle of 1964 the situation was no better than it is now. Wouldn’t it then be harder to try to make any new arrangements? Wouldn’t it be more difficult to go to the Fund then than it is now? We have been talking about a great catastrophe, but this is unlikely. What is likely is the continuation of our past experience of over-optimism and failure to be able to take measures unilaterally which meet the deficit in the next short period. Secretary Dillon said that world opinion was favorable to the United States. We had either to take advantage of this and continue what we are doing or immediately do a handful of major operations at the risk of changing the favorable opinion abroad. The President observed that this was precisely the central point. He then referred to the very difficult experiences of the fall of 1960 and asked whether the fall of 1964 and the discussion incident to another campaign might not bring a similar experience. Do we have the groundwork laid in the London gold market to avoid this? Secretary Dillon responded affirmatively. In 1960 we were totally unprepared to deal with gold speculation. We now have an understanding with all the major countries, and we could and would keep prices in the London gold market down so that another speculative burst like that of the fall of 1960 will not recur.

The President then asked Secretary McNamara what his plans were with respect to Defense outlays on foreign account. What was the present situation and what did he have in mind? Secretary McNamara responded that as of FY 1963 he expected to be losing about $1.6 to $1.7 billion on foreign account. With present programs, and on the assumptions that the Germans continue to buy about $600 million a year under the offset agreement, this figure would be constant for the next two or three years. However, he was doubtful whether in fact the Germans would continue to purchase at this rate for more than another year, and we must be prepared to meet the contingency of decreased income from that source. The only way to improve our position was to reduce troop deployments. It was his judgment that this can be done without reducing our effective military strength; the problem was largely political rather than military. In response to the President’s question, he said that half of the expenditures were for NATO; the other half all around the rest of the world with Japan being one of the major areas. The President asked how we could put the political issue to the Europeans. He then referred to the conversations that he, the Secretary of Defense and the Chiefs had had on troop deployments in December. Secretary McNamara responded that it was not the time to raise the issue that was then discussed. What we can do now is thin out our deployments in Europe in terms of troops per combat unit, without reducing the number or strength of our combat units. Thus we would reduce the supporting forces and accompanying dependents. On this basis he expects to be able to reduce the annual rate of net foreign outlays by $300-$400 million below the current one by the end of Calendar year 1964. These reductions will take place mainly in the UK, Germany, France, Spain and Japan.

The President then asked Mr. Bell about AID’s plans. Mr. Bell responded that in the same period their net outlays would be reduced to an annual rate of $500 million or below.

The President turned to the question of the future growth in our export trade. What were the prospects for agriculture and for exports of aircraft? Secretary Dillon commented on our cotton sales, and the loss in market share over the last several years due to a poor pricing method which had made us the residual supplier. The Department of Agriculture was now moving to selling on an auction basis, in an attempt to get back to our previous position of 5 million bales from our present sales of 4 million bales per year. The President asked whether this was enough and what the broader prospects for agricultural trade were. Governor Herter spoke of the Japanese commitments to increase their imports of U.S. agricultural products as the only cheery note in an otherwise not very encouraging picture of the agricultural scene. In response to the President’s question, Secretary Ball said that the change in cotton marketing practices would go into effect this year.

The President remarked that the Treasury has certainly done an excellent job to date. As far as the weapons we had against adversity, they seem to boil down chiefly to a change in interest rate with the difficulties that this might bring for the domestic economy and Chairman Heller. The President remarked that we seem to be faced with a screwy system, in which we had to squeeze important public activities in the spheres of defense and aid in order to let the private activities of tourism and foreign investment go forward untouched. However, that was how life was, and how the system operated.

Secretary Dillon observed that it was important for us to organize a promotional campaign for Americans to see America first, and for more foreign travel in the United States. There was then an exchange between Secretary Ball and Secretary Dillon on the relative merits of restricting tourist expenditures and the flow of investment capital. Ball thought the former an undesirable and regressive policy which no Democratic administration should undertake. Secretary Dillon considered that restriction of tourism, especially by taxes, would be much less a blow to confidence and therefore much more desirable than restrictions on the sale of foreign securities.

The President observed that the Treasury was very skillful in shooting down, every three months or so, the balloons which other departments had floated. Secretary Dillon observed that this reflected the Treasury’s realism, its understanding that there were no panaceas and its cool assessment of the facts. As for the reductions in defense expenditures which must form the major part of our forward program, he considered that selling the Europeans on it would not be difficult.

The President asked what else we had beyond the reductions in defense and aid expenditures abroad and the possibility of raising interest rates later in the year. What about a tax on the use of capital markets by foreigners? Secretary Roosa indicated that the Treasury was exploring this possibility but was encountering many difficult technical problems. Secretary Dillon said that a tax did not have the selectivity of the kind of control system which Secretary Ball had proposed. In his judgment, if we do anything to restrict foreign securities sales, controls are better than taxes. He added a last word on the need for a citizens committee to promote foreign investment in the United States and said that he would send a proposal along to the President on this.

Secretary Hodges spoke of the need for being tough abroad and for pushing in a number of areas including more competitive agricultural prices, the reduction of petroleum imports, a general export drive, providing tax advantages to importers, an examination of what could be done to implement a revised Webb-Pomerene Act,⁵ and what impact a change in our ocean shipping rate policies would have on the competitiveness of domestic production against certain imports such as Canadian lumber. In response to the President’s request, Secretary Hodges promised a memorandum on this last point.⁶

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Balance of Payments, Cabinet Committee. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Attached to an April 17 memorandum from Kaysen to President Kennedy are four papers the President requested for discussion with the Cabinet Committee at the April 18 meeting: Council of Economic Advisers’ proposal for an IMF drawing of up to $2 billion from the Fund, Ball’s discussion of possible negotiations with the major European countries to raise up to $4 billion from 5-year loans from them, a Department of State examination of the possibility of restricting the sale of foreign currencies in the U.S. market, and a Treasury examination of possible taxes on foreign travel. (Ibid., President’s Office Files, Treasury) John C. Bullitt submitted copies of these four papers under cover of an April 17 memorandum to members of the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments: Secretary Rusk, Ball, McNamara, David Bell, Christian Herter, Walter Heller, and Kaysen. (Ibid., Herter Papers, Balance of Payments)
1. See footnote 3, Document 20.
2. Not further identified.
3. Not further identified.
4. Not further identified.
5. The Webb-Pomerene Act was a law to promote the export trade; P.L. 65-126, approved April 10, 1918. (40 Stat. 516)
6. Hodges’ undated memorandum to the President, transmitted under cover of an April 19 memorandum from Hodges to the President, urged the Cabinet Committee to conduct the studies it recommended in its April 6 report (see Document 23), particularly those that would lead to increased U.S. exports and decreased imports. He suggested that these studies might cover ocean shipping rates, agricultural support policy, petroleum policy, rapid depreciation based on export sales, and anti-trust legislation. (Washington National Records Center, RG 40, Secretary of Commerce Files: FRC 69 A 6828, Balance of Payments)