90. Editorial Note

On June 6, 1962, the Policy Planning Council circulated a revised, 182-page draft of the paper “Basic National Security Policy.” Once again, the paper’s fundamental structure remained unchanged, while numerous passages were rewritten or amended. Among the changes are the following:

In Part One, “Principles and Purposes,” new language calls for accelerating “constructive changes in the character and policies of the Communist regimes, to erode the grip of Communism on peoples under its rule and to facilitate their absorption into the community of free nations.” In a brief segment concerning U.S. regional objectives, there is renewed emphasis on the special importance of Iran and language on the need to make resolution of South Asian issues such as the Kashmir and Pushtu questions “a major objective of our diplomacy.”

In Part Two, “A Strategy,” under “Military Policy,” a new sentence states that a major mission of U.S. forces is, in the event of war, “to bring about a conclusion of hostilities on terms acceptable to the U.S. and its allies.” A section on general war notes that while precise plans for the conduct of operations in such a conflict cannot be drawn up in advance, preparations against that possibility should aim at: reducing enemy strategic offensive capabilities, particularly ability to “mount repetitive attacks against U.S. population centers;” retaining forces for use against enemy population centers and other “major elements of enemy strength;” and “facilitating the conduct of negotiations designed to bring the war to an end on terms which are consistent with U.S. interests, as set forth in this paper.” A very similar paragraph appears in the March 26 draft but is missing from the May 7 draft.

A section on covert operations contains the added language, with respect to such actions, that the United States “cannot accept an asymmetry which allows Communist probes into the free community without possibility of riposte.”

In a paragraph on current policy, also under “Military Policy,” a new sentence is added to the paragraph (see Document 70) stating that the United States should not set an absolute requirement that its strategic forces be able to destroy substantially all Soviet nuclear delivery systems in a first strike. “Such an objective does not appear practical.” New introductory material appears in the section on tactical nuclear weapons. It is unchanged in the portion of the June 22 draft printed as Document 93.

The paper states, still under “Military Policy,” that U.S. arms control planning should be integrated with military planning. New language in the June 6 draft expands this idea: “On the one hand, in proposing an arms control measure, we must take into account its effect on relative [Page 305] military capabilities and support of national strategy. At the same time, military contingency plans, research and development, and programming of armed forces and armaments should reflect an awareness of the extent to which they affect stability in the military environment, the evolution of weapons and doctrine, and the likelihood of unauthorized use of weapons.” (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP 6/6/62)