Office of the Historian

88. Memorandum From Major William Y. Smith to the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)0

Washington, May 31, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • NIE on Soviet Nuclear Weapons Stockpile 1962-641
1.
The “billboard” effect of this NIE is that the Soviets, in the US estimate, are about 4-5 years behind us in their thinking on a suitable nuclear strategy, but their planning may not evolve along the same lines that ours has.
2.
The major divergency in US and USSR thinking concerns tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviets apparently will not have, by 1964, incorporated low yield (fractional kiloton) nuclear weapons into their inventory; the lowest yield we credit them with is 3 KT. (Chart, p 32). Since 1958 the Soviets nevertheless have emphasized more the use of nuclear weapons in support of field forces (p 13). Furthermore, the indications are that this emphasis will increase in the future (p 27). Thus at a time in which US planning calls for a decreased emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons, Soviet thinking is calling for an increased one. The implications of these divergent trends have not yet been fully explored. They should be; hopefully the study on tactical nuclear weapons2 will do so. Also, if the Soviets find they cannot fight using large yield tactical weapons because of fear of self-inflicted damage on USSR troops, our possession of low yield weapons could possibly give us a step in escalation not open to the Soviets. This also should be looked at.
3.
Other points of interest in the NIE are:
a.
Soviet military policy places a high priority on preparedness for general war, which the USSR planners assume would commence in most cases with massive nuclear attacks on the homelands of the opponents. They do not conclude that this exchange would necessarily decide the outcome of the war (p 6).
b.
By mid 1962 it is estimated the Soviets will have 800-1200 aircraft delivered nuclear weapons; 35-50 operational ICBM launchers (100 ICBMs); 350 MRBM and IRBM launchers (1000 IRBMs and MRBMs); and 35 missile launching submarines (100 SLBMs) (p 11).
c.
Considering all factors, the Soviets will have between 2000 and 3000 nuclear weapons to support theater forces, with a total yield between 70 and 130 MT (p 17).
d.
The general trend in yields of weapons for Soviet offensive delivery systems will be upwards (p 22).
e.
By mid 1964 the Soviets are estimated to have 150-275 operational ICBM launchers; 450 IRBM/MRBM launchers; 35 SLBM submarines. About 700 missiles for long range attack thus will be added to the Soviet forces (p 25). (Note: This means evidently that the Soviets will have some 1900-2000 ICBMs, IRBM/MRBMs, and SLBMs by mid 1964 plus 800-1200 aircraft delivered weapons.)
f.
Soviet nuclear testing indicates continued interest in the development of nuclear weapons for air defense purposes. It is estimated that the Soviets could deploy an AICBM for defense against missiles of 50-500 n.m. in 1963-64, and against ICBMs 1963-66. Both systems will almost certainly employ nuclear warheads (p 28).
g.
The NIE makes one reference to the Soviet planned use of CW weapons (p 13).
4.
Soviet use of nuclear weapons for defense against missiles and aircraft—as well as our own—raises the real possibility that the first use of nuclear weapons in any limited conflict may be in an air defense role. Would the US be willing to have its conventional missile and aircraft offensive capabilities rendered ineffective by nuclear weapons without using such weapons in return? Would the Soviets? The effects of these possible developments on possible escalation of the conflict is another area worthy of exploration.
W.Y.S.
3
  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, WYS Chronological File April-June 1962. Top Secret.↩
  2. Reference is to NIE 11-2A-62, “The Soviet Atomic Energy Program,” dated May 16. (Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-62)↩
  3. see Document 86.↩
  4. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩