Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy

63. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy ⁰

Washington, December 9, 1961.

1. The final decisions on the Defense budget are now before you. In making these decisions, you will bear in mind that you are making a choice which will determine expenditures not only in FY 63, but for the whole of the rest of your administration. These decisions thus will shape the availability of budget resources for non-military programs for this whole period of time, as well as for next year. For this reason, I recommend that you not concur in the suggestion of Secretary McNamara’s memorandum of December 7 (attached)¹ with respect to his currently revised force structure. Instead I suggest that you examine carefully the possibility of a lower strategic striking force for the reasons set forth at some length in my memorandum to you of November 22.² Briefly, these reasons are that we do not need as large a force as the DOD proposes to do the military job; and that any error on the side of generosity has the undesirable consequence of stepping up the arms race. In a world of missiles and thermonuclear warheads more arms do not in any simple way add more security. This is not an argument for a smaller force than military need requires, but an argument against adding any substantial margin to what a careful examination of the military situation shows to be necessary.

2. I suggest that you consider two alternative programs; one for hardened and dispersed Minuteman and one for Polaris.

The alternative Minuteman program would provide for the following force structure:

	FY 63	FY 64	FY 65	FY 66	FY 67
Minuteman Program	150	300	450	600	750

as compared with Secretary McNamara’s current and original recommendations as shown in the table below:³

Current	150	600	800	950	1100
Original	150	600	700	800	900

If this appears too drastic a cut for Secretary McNamara to accept, it might be preferable to propose an alternate program which achieved his original goal of 900 hardened and dispersed Minutemen in 1967, but followed the same rate of buildup as the lower program. I propose in the three fiscal years 63, 64 and 65, i.e., a force structure as follows:

FY 63	FY 64	FY 65	FY 66	FY 67
150	300	450	700	900

of military needs without too great a risk as we would become aware of an increase of Soviet missile site construction before their deployment was complete.

A slowdown in the rate of procurement and employment of Minuteman forces would bring other significant positive advantages. The missiles now being produced have a number of important technical shortcomings. The goal of 600 in FY 64 can be achieved only by a crash program which permits no time for modifications that can deal with some of these shortcomings. It is expected that after these missiles are in place, a fairly expensive retrofit program will be required to bring them up to desirable standards of performance. The slower the rate of buildup now, the less will be the retrofit requirements later, since the missiles deployed later will be able to incorporate improvements in range and penetration aids from the start. Thus, the present program involves a faster buildup on paper than real capability, and a hidden future cost in expensive retrofitting programs.

On Polaris, I suggest that the additional procurement rate for FY 63 be cut to 3 instead of the 6 now proposed and be maintained at 3 per year thereafter. This would cut the 1967 force from 41 to 35, but there would be no change in the number of submarines available before 1965. This change would save $75 million of expenditures in FY 63.

All the proposed changes are slow downs in the rate of buildup in our strategic forces, not in any sense reductions in them. They would not affect the prospective strategic balance between U.S. and USSR. Annex I shows the effect of the proposed changes on the total strategic force.

3. In addition to these major problems of force structure, there are several other lesser but still important changes from the Secretary’s recommendations which ought to be considered.

• First is the Nike Zeus Program—The case for the Nike Zeus is dubious. If long leadtime production items are funded now, it may be very difficult to resist going ahead with procurement and deployment of this system. It appears desirable to avoid this. Eliminating these items would save $50 million in FY 63.
• Second, in view of the political problems involved in the future deployment of MRBMs, it would seem desirable to defer the beginnings of development of a specific system until next year. Studies on the comparative merits of land- and sea-based systems, as well as research on command and control, and research and development on stellar guidance will continue at high priority. Postponing the development commitment would save $60 million in FY 63.
• Finally, the Skybolt will probably fall considerably behind its development schedule. If we recognize this and defer the production, this would save $100 million in FY 63.⁴

4. The total savings in FY 63 expenditures over the Secretary’s program involved in these recommendations are thus:

On items in paragraph 3	$210 million
On Polaris	75 million
On Minuteman	500 million
Total	$785 million5

Carl Kaysen

Annex I⁶

SELECTED STRATEGIC STRIKING FORCES

	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Original DOD Proposal:
B-52	630	630	630	630	630
Missiles
Atlas	135	135	135	125	117
Titan	78	114	114	114	114
Minuteman	150	600	700	800	900
Polaris	144	288	480	560	656
Total Missiles	507	1137	1479	1700	1887
Alert Force Megatons	3300	4350	4740	5130	5450
DOD Proposal Increased Minuteman:
Minuteman	150	600	800	950	1100
Total Missiles	507	1137	1579	1850	2087
Alert Force Megatons	3300	4350	4840	5280	5650
Staff Proposal:
Minuteman (1st Alternative)	150	300	450	600	750
Minuteman (2nd Alternative)	150	300	450	700	900
Polaris	144	288	464	512	560
Total Missiles (1st Alternative)	507	837	1313	1452	1621
Total Missiles (2nd Alternative)	507	837	1313	1552	1771
Alert Force Megatons (1st Alternative)	3300	4050	4570	4880	5180
Alert Force Megatons (2nd Alternative)	3300	4050	4570	4980	5330

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, DOD FY 1963 Defense Budget. Top Secret.
1. Not found attached. In it McNamara stated that he had that day submitted the FY 1963 defense budget to the Bureau of the Budget and that Director Bell had concurred in his recommendations with a few exceptions. “As we discussed briefly at Hyannis Port, I am proposing to start the funding of 200 fixed Minutemen in FY 1963, an increase of 100 missiles to compensate for the elimination of the mobile Minuteman from the program. Dave would prefer to eliminate mobile Minuteman with no compensating increase.” (Ibid.)
2. Document 57.
3. In Document 46, McNamara projected 900 fixed and 100 mobile Minutemen by 1967.
4. In another memorandum to Kennedy dated December 9, Kaysen stated that a discussion among the President, Sorensen, Bell, and himself had resulted in decisions to defer the decision on long-lead procurement for Nike-Zeus until after the next nuclear test series, continue on Skybolt “if Douglas [aircraft company] can perform,” reduce Polaris submarine procurement from six to three a year, and accept “McNamara’s original target of 900 Minutemen” but procure them at the rate suggested in the memorandum printed here. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense, Volume II, 11/6-12/61)
5. In his memorandum for the record of the White House daily staff meeting on December 11, Ewell reported that the defense budget had been “put to bed with approval of FY 1963 funding of the 100 extra fixed Minutemen,” for a total of 200. Nike-Zeus would remain in the “R & D” stage. “The President is not convinced that there is any evidence we want to deploy this system.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings 9-12/61)As presented to Congress, the budget proposed FY 1963 funding of 200 fixed Minutemen with the objective of a total of 1,100 by FY 1967, tentatively 1,200 by FY 1968, and procurement of 6 additional Polaris submarines. (“McNamara Testimony Before Senate Armed Services Committee, January 19, 1963”; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense, Volume III, McNamara Testimony)
6. Top Secret.