I have given Bob McNamara certain comments on his excellent Memorandum to the
President of September 30, 1961,1 dealing with
FY ’63 defense budgetary requirements. As
I pointed out to Bob, though his memorandum adequately provides for a
considerable portion of the requirements which I can foresee arising out of
projected foreign policy developments, and which I referred to in my letter
to him of February 4, 1961,2 there are still a number of questions
which trouble me. I think it would be useful for you to have copies of the
comments I am providing him (Attachment A), so that we might all have the
opportunity to consider them further.
I am sending identical letters to Mac Bundy and Dave Bell.
Attachment3
General
We fully support the proposition that the U.S. should seek improvements
in its strategic force which would increase its survivability, its
flexibility, and its ability to be used in a controlled and deliberate
way under a wide range of contingencies. This has been assured by the
planned Defense program. If there is any imbalance, it would appear to
be weighted on the side of strategic needs as compared with likely
requirements for conventional forces arising out of potential foreign
policy developments during the period covered by the budget.
If a reallocation of resources between these alternative needs seems
militarily inadvisable consideration should be given to some increase in
the total planned Defense budget.
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Program I: General War Offensive
Forces
1. Command and Control. It is strongly in our
foreign policy interest that the plans and capabilities of our strategic
forces be sufficiently flexible so that they could be used with
discrimination in any one of a number of alternative ways, as
circumstances may dictate. To this end, it is of vital importance that
our command and control arrangements be sufficiently effective and well
protected to permit continuous civilian control over the use of these
forces during grave crises and during actual hostilities.
It is also desirable that use of tactical nuclear forces be subject to
centralized effective control, both because limited use of these forces
may be a significant form of political bargaining and pressure short of
general war and because any such use would clearly involve a very high
risk of general war. We will want to ensure that use of these weapons is
not initiated without a political decision and that any such use is
subject to constant and specific political control if it is begun.
We are especially interested, from this standpoint, in ensuring effective
control of such front-line weapons as the Davy Crockett which we
understand are to be deployed to Europe. Our concern is the greater
since we doubt it will be possible to deploy these weapons to U.S.
forces there, without also generating European demands for these weapons
which it would be difficult to resist. (We have never been able to
resist such pressures in the past.) We would suggest that you appraise
the military significance of delaying deployment of these weapons to
Europe until the institution of effective arrangements for their
control, e.g., by means of the “permissive link,” to ensure that these
weapons will not be used without proper authorization by U.S. or allied
front-line units.
Program II: General War Defensive
Forces
2. Need to limit Soviet opportunity for exertion of
diplomatic pressure by enhancing our defenses against strategic
attack. As the program indicates, all available information
suggests that the “Soviet efforts in the field of ballistic missile
defense appear to be more ambitious than our own.”4 Current intelligence estimates predict that
this high level of Soviet effort will result in an initial operational
anti-missile capability during the 63-66 period. Should the Soviets
achieve an effective operational system by that time, it would afford
them an opportunity for exerting immense pressures on the Western
Alliance. The initial psychological impact on allies and even
conceivably on the U.S. public of claiming a defense against U.S.
strategic striking power would be adverse.
Of even greater importance, such a capability, if not offset by U.S.
technological advances, could provide a military advantage to the Soviet
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Union sufficient to
encourage it into launching increasingly aggressive policies. Under such
circumstances, the ability of U.S. foreign policy to maneuver
successfully and with the necessary flexibility required to keep the
U.S. out of a war while at the same time protecting U.S. vital
interests, would be limited.
- (a)
-
Anti-Missile-Missile Program. As set
forth at considerable length in Appendix II to the DOD Budget,5
Defense has decided on a limited program of Nike-Zeus production
which will provide 12 batteries of such weapons, enough to
defend six or seven cities, by 1967. A program of such limited
size seems largely to result from serious reservations
concerning the weapon’s effectiveness. Despite these
reservations the program is justified at least in part on the
grounds that “the existence of a deployed defense may
substantially increase the uncertainty at the Soviet decision
making level.”
We seriously doubt that so limited a program, coming into
operation as much as four years after the Soviets may have their
own much more ambitious program operational, satisfactorily
meets our objective. Either a substantial increase in this
program should be decided upon or other alternatives explored. A
much larger program, such as the 70 battery program recommended
by NORAD, might considerably
enhance the possibility of sowing uncertainty in the Soviet
mind. Whether so ambitious a program is warranted given the
added expense, largely revolves around the question of the
weapon’s effectiveness. The judgment as to the effectiveness of
the weapon system is of course one for the Department of Defense
to make. However, if the weapon is deemed not militarily
effective we would seriously question the advisability of
investing some $3.6 billion in the limited program of 12
batteries on the assumption this will have any appreciable
effect of creating uncertainty at the Soviet decision making
level. In fact I fear, quite to the contrary, the limited,
time-lagging effort cannot help but be viewed as a clear
indication of U.S. impotence in this field.
As to whether other avenues are open to us to offset this serious
potential Soviet advantage, we take it that all current
alternative missile systems are being fully explored with no
current prospect of a more reliable system in sight. We would
hope that no reasonable effort in this field is being restricted
by virtue of budgetary unavailability.
- (b)
- Civil Defense. There is one area, other
than in the development of an effective U.S. anti-missile-missile,
where we could achieve a significant neutralizing impact on any
Soviet anti-missile successes. The Defense budget recognizes that an
effective anti-missile system presupposes an effective civil
defense, fallout shelter program. For this purpose
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$400 million is included in the
budget. If our objective, as in the case of the
anti-missile-missile, is at least in part designed to impress the
Soviets with our ability for a second-strike effort in the event of
a general nuclear war our effort must be large enough manifestly to
provide for the survivability of significant portions of our
population, war-making potential and second-strike force.
Though we are aware that a rapid increase in our previous level of civil
defense activity would pose practical problems of ability to obligate
funds effectively, we strongly suggest that we consider whether it is
not possible to step up the level of our efforts substantially beyond
the modest increase proposed in the FY
’63 DOD budget. For the reasons
previously stated, having an effective offset to Soviet strategic
attack, will become an increasingly vital requirement for a successful
future pursuance of our foreign policy objectives.
Program III: General Purpose
Forces
3. Need for building an adequate level of military forces to deter
non-strategic attack. U.S. preparedness efforts of prior years appear to
have been inadequate in deterring limited and ambiguous Communist
pressures. The prospects for the future suggest a continuance and even
intensification of these limited pressures. From a foreign policy
standpoint, therefore, it is desirable to remedy the past imbalance in
our defense preparedness: to increase the level of resources going to
deter Bloc non-strategic attack, while maintaining the present
sufficiency of our strategic forces. We need readily available military
force which can not only cope with actual hostilities but also serve as
a clear and positive deterrent to limited aggression. In this
connection, the DOD budget raises
certain serious questions.
- (a)
- Adequacy of force levels. The DOD budget actually projects a cutback
in force levels, principally in the Army, below those currently
approved. This is presumably based on the assumption that the Berlin
crisis will have eased thereby permitting such a cutback. While not
unmindful of the qualitative and even to some extent quantitative
improvements which will result from the current buildup and which
are maintained in the FY ’63 DOD budget, we would argue that the
surest method for preventing further Berlin crises, if indeed our
current effort is successful, is to maintain no less than the
present level. As we noted in our letter to the Secretary of Defense
of June 27, 1961,6 the Communists have entered on a period of
over-confidence. We must disabuse them, if there is not to be a risk
of serious miscalculation on their part. An increase in the levels
of our non-strategic forces would surely impress the Soviet
government, particularly given its traditional preoccupation with
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ground strength. This
would be due not only to the actual increase in U.S. military
capability which would result but equally because it would create
doubts as to the validity of Communist dogma concerning the
unwillingness of democracies to shoulder long-term burdens and to
accept risks as Communist states are prepared to do. Finally, and
equally important, the higher the level of U.S. force capability
which the crises leaves the Soviets to cope with, the more likely
the Soviets are to be impressed with the disadvantages of stirring
up crises, in the future.
- (b)
- Dependence on Reservists. To some extent
reliance upon call up of reservists in the event of emergency is
inevitable. However, it is entirely likely that the Soviets,
appreciating the difficulties inherent in the democratic process of
raising forces and marshalling public opinion to meet emergencies,
will periodically create crises which will present the U.S.
government with increasing political difficulties in attempting to
effect large-scale reserve call-ups. From a foreign policy
standpoint, we must count on a continuing series of such pressures.
It, therefore, seems important to plan for a higher level of
available general purpose forces. It is strongly urged that
consideration be given to this course of action, which would have
important implications for our tactical air—as well as
ground—forces.
- (c)
- Capability to conduct Guerrilla and
Counter-Guerrilla Operations. We have been concerned for
some time over the need to develop a U.S. capability (i) to give
advice and training and assistance to indigenous elements and (ii)
to conduct guerrilla operations. Progress in this area has suffered
in the past from inadequate funds as well as from a reluctance to
accord a sufficient priority to such unconventional type of military
activity. We are therefore delighted to see that the Department of
Defense has included a special allocation of $100 million for such
operations in the 63 budget. This is a move in the right direction
but it leaves open the question of whether this amount, primarily to
be devoted to research, is sufficient to meet the need. Our current
experience in Southeast Asia demonstrates, at least in part, our
inability to cope effectively with the type of ambiguous guerrilla
military threat presented. We must expect an increase in such
Communist activity, not only there but elsewhere—Latin America, the
Middle East and Africa—and the need to combat these efforts rapidly
and effectively should be given a high priority. We suggest that the
Department of Defense reassess this item in light of the above with
a view to substantially increasing the priority and funds accorded
to it.
Program IV: Sealift and
Airlift
3. Need for a Flexible and Highly Mobile Troop Delivery
Capability. As suggested in our letter of February 4, 1961,
increasing opportunities for the Soviets to exert military pressure
along the extensive periphery of free-world borders have created the
necessity for a military posture
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capable of rapid response to such threats. Only with such a
capability can we conduct effective political negotiations without the
threat of the Communists being able to bring overriding military force
to bear as a means of resolving any issue in their favor. The DOD budget attempts to improve our ability
to more forces rapidly to any trouble spot. However, the resultant
capability, on the surface, still appears to be quite modest:
- (1)
- one airborne brigade to employment area in 3 days,
- (2)
- one division (including the brigade) within 7 to 10
days,
- (3)
- a second division in 4 weeks, and,
- (4)
- the complete equipment for this 2 division force in 45
days.
The questions we have are three-fold. First, in terms of the magnitude of
force which could quickly be brought to bear by the enemy in remote
areas, e.g., Southeast Asia, Korea and Iran, are we making sufficient
provision to provide us with an alternative to the immediate employment
of nuclear weapons (or acceptance of defeat)? Second, as we mentioned in
our letter to the Secretary of Defense of June 27, 1961, assuming that
the Communists choose to exert pressure in two places simultaneously,
e.g., Iran and Southeast Asia, do our plans provide sufficient
conventional force to meet such a contingency? Third, will it be
possible to commit forces to distant, underdeveloped areas even in the
magnitude contemplated by DOD almost
solely through airlift? For example, will not the paucity of adequate
airfields in the less-developed areas of the world limit our ability to
respond effectively?
All these questions raise questions about the adequacy of projected
sealift. For example, we note that Defense plans to build only one of
the newly developed, and we gather highly efficient, roll-on/roll-off
ships a year. In light of the importance of having an effective and
flexible force available for deployment to remote areas, we suggest that
the Department of Defense reexamine its lift plan to assure that within
the limits of production feasibility they provide adequately for our
needs.
Program VI: Research and
Development
6. MRBM’s. It is highly desirable that
the proposed $500 million MRBM
development program explore possibilities for sea-based, as well as
land-based, deployment.
Sea-based deployment could more readily be reconciled with the April 21
NSC policy toward NATO and the Atlantic nations7 than land-based deployment.
That policy precludes deployment of MRBM’s to the forces of individual European countries (whether
or not these forces are committed to SACEUR), calls for commitment of U.S. sea-based missiles to
NATO, and
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holds out the long-term possibility of a
multilaterally owned and controlled sea-borne NATO missile force, such as the President discussed in his
Ottawa speech.
It is in the U.S. interest to hold to this policy. Deployment of MRBM’s to the forces of individual
countries would be a major step toward creation of de facto national
strategic nuclear capabilities. This would create peacetime tensions and
divisions within the alliance, as well as greatly lessen our ability to
follow a non-nuclear strategy or a centrally controlled nuclear strategy
in event of hostilities. On the other hand, deployment of MRBM’s to U.S. forces only would probably
be politically infeasible. The NSC
policy of initial deployment to U.S. forces while holding out the
possibility of a multilateral force thus seems the most useful
course.
It is difficult, however, to conceive of carrying out this policy with
land-based MRBM deployment.
Multilateral deployment would be clearly less feasible on land than at
sea, since missiles would be vulnerable to seizure by the countries on
whose territory they were to be deployed. And, as for deployment to U.S.
forces only, the European countries on whose soil the U.S. MRBM’s were to be deployed would insist on
securing some of these missiles for their own forces as a pre-condition
to giving us deployment rights.
These considerations suggest that sea-based deployment is greatly
preferable from a foreign policy standpoint. At a minimum, they make it
desirable to avoid allowing the question of land-based vs. sea-based
deployment to be foreclosed by the nature of development work which is
planned within the DOD
FY ’63 budget.8
