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  4. Document 49

49. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to President Kennedy 0

JCSM-697-61
Washington, October 5, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • Comparison of Nuclear Delivery Forces of the US Vis-à-Vis the Soviet Union (U)

1. In response to your request, a comparison of nuclear delivery forces of the US vis-à-vis those of the Soviet Union has been accomplished. This comparison has been limited to two time periods, viz., 1 October 1961 and 1 July 1963. US forces in this comparison include those forces based in the CONUS and those deployed overseas which have the capability of striking the Sino-Soviet Bloc. No Allied forces have been included. Soviet forces include those capable of striking the US and US forces overseas.

2. Listed below is a comparison of the combat ready forces available to the US and USSR for the two time periods. In the attached Appendix1 are detailed explanations of the forces immediately available to both sides.

FORCES

[Page 157]
1961 1963
US USSR US USSR
a. Long Range Aircraft—Note 1*
(1) Heavy Bombers 574 150 630 145
(2) Medium Bombers 788 975 575 850
Total 1362 1125 1205 995
b. ICBM—Note 2* 42 #10-25 382 ##75-125
c. Submarine Launched Missiles—Note 3*
(1) Ballistic 1200 NM 80 0 128 0
(2) Ballistic 500-1000 NM 0 0 0 6
(3) Ballistic 150 or 350 NM 0 78 0 102
(4) Cruise 17 0 17 0
Total 97 78 145 108
d. Other nuclear delivery Forces—Note 4*
(1) Light Bombers 236 250 160 250
(2) Fighter Bombers 2231 ###0 2381 ###0
(3) Cruise Missiles 178 0 144 0
Total 2645 250 2685 250
(4) MRBM/IRBM On Launchers
(a) 700nm
1100nm		 0 250-300 0 (7-11 & 2000 nm Total)
(b) 2000 nm 0 0 0
Total 0 250-300 0 350-400

3. A comprehensive evaluation of the relative posture of the US vis-a-vis the Soviet Union requires that many factors be considered. One of these factors, and probably the most difficult to assess, is the intention of the USSR. Critical to the Soviet judgment is the number of ICBM’s they possess. Their three to five fold increase in this category during this period will materially improve their capability to inflict serious damage upon the US. However, based on the above intelligence estimates of Soviet nuclear delivery assets, the US enjoys a military superiority over the USSR in both 1961 and 1963. Relatively speaking, the superiority is not as great in 1961 as it will be in 1963 because of the increased build-up of hardened US missile sites beginning in late 1961. In the critical period of decision between the present and mid 1963, the decisive superiority of US nuclear delivery capability would strongly influence the Soviet Union not to deliberately initiate general war. After this time, the increasing nuclear delivery capability including additional US hardened and mobile missiles will further decrease the likelihood of a deliberate Soviet nuclear attack.

4. In summary, as of 1 October 1961, despite a strong Soviet military posture, the relative strategic balance of forces is in favor of the US, and it is doubtful, except through miscalculation or misadventure, that the Soviets would initiate general war. In 1962, our strategic force levels and our relatively secure strategic weapon systems assure for the US a decisive retaliatory capability that makes it even less likely that the USSR would risk initiating general war. However, there is good evidence that the Soviets in recognition of the above imbalance are striving for weapon systems that will, in the future, provide them with a distinct military [Page 158] advantage. It is estimated that these research and development efforts will be in the AICBM defense system and in the military application of space vehicles.2

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L. L. Lemnitzer
3
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 2210 (27 Sep 61). Top Secret; Restricted Data.↩
  2. Not printed.↩
  3. Notes 1, 2, 3 and 4—See Appendix.↩
  4. Notes 1, 2, 3 and 4—See Appendix.↩
  5. CSAF believes 65 is the correct figure as of 1 October 1961.↩
  6. CSAF believes 250 is the correct figure.↩
  7. Notes 1, 2, 3 and 4—See Appendix.↩
  8. Notes 1, 2, 3 and 4—See Appendix.↩
  9. There is some evidence, not yet conclusive, that the USSR is showing activity toward acquiring a nuclear delivery capability for tactical fighters. USCINCEUR has expressed a belief, although he has no positive proof, that about one-half of the Soviet fighter-bombers possess a nuclear delivery capability.↩
  10. There is some evidence, not yet conclusive, that the USSR is showing activity toward acquiring a nuclear delivery capability for tactical fighters. USCINCEUR has expressed a belief, although he has no positive proof, that about one-half of the Soviet fighter-bombers possess a nuclear delivery capability.↩
  11. In a memorandum to McNamara dated April 24, 1962, Lemnitzer referred to this memorandum and stated that there had been no significant changes to “alter the conclusions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the short term.” It was “highly probable,” however, that recent Soviet nuclear tests had advanced Soviet “confidence and competence in the area of nuclear systems development.” Any relaxation in the U.S. effort “to maintain a nuclear superiority could result in a deterioration of capability with time to a point where irreparable damage could be done.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 2210 (27 Sep 61)) A memorandum from the JCS to McNamara, dated July 28, 1962, contains a detailed comparison of U.S. and estimated Soviet nuclear stockpiles. (Ibid., JMF 2210 (3 April 62) Sec. 3)↩
  12. Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.↩