39. Editorial Note
In a memorandum to U. Alexis Johnson dated July 21, 1961, Kitchen discussed Gilpatric’s letter to Rusk (Document 38) and commented that the Secretary of Defense had “set aside, at least temporarily,” the BNSP review “partly because of the Berlin situation and party because the interagency clearance process had resulted in the document being filled with old and familiar clichés.” Kitchen noted that the Department of State was not “guilty of encumbering the document as indicated since most of our comments were encouraging and imaginative.” (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/7-1461)
Activity on the project at the Department of Defense ceased for the remainder of 1961 shortly but not immediately after McNamara’s decision. On July 5, the Joint Chiefs of Staff circulated a draft emphasizing retention of “free world” military superiority. In general war, U.S. forces should in the short term be “capable of emerging from a nuclear exchange with a clear military advantage,” and for the longer term should “possess the highest practicable degree of alert and be capable of a range of options, including those made possible by a secure reserve, to increase control of response and enhance military flexibility.” Limited war forces were to be sufficient, “in conjunction with available local forces, [to] retard aggression” long enough to permit reinforcement, “making every feasible effort to keep the war at a non-nuclear level, but being prepared to use nuclear weapons when required.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, 381 BNSP 18 Apr 61)
In a memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara, dated July 28, William Bundy enclosed an ISA draft of the same date. Bundy commented that the draft “had been extensively changed from previous ISA versions to embody much thinking from the JCS draft.” It did, however, “retain the fundamental concepts of previous ISA versions: the stress on non-nuclear warfare and the requirement for discriminate and flexible general war operations under tight central control.” Bundy concluded by requesting that McNamara recommend NSC approval of military sections of a BNSP in accordance with the ISA draft.
Regarding the outcome of a general war, the draft stated that the United States should “conduct general war so as to obtain the best achievable outcome” and that “consistent with over-all objectives, the U.S. will conduct general war so as to facilitate the conduct of negotiations to bring the war to an end.” Regarding overall defense posture, the draft spoke of “the capacity to meet any military situation discriminately with sufficient, but not excessive, measures” and of having the “option to engage substantial non-nuclear forces before having to decide to initiate the use of nuclear weapons.” The draft stressed that the desired flexibility, [Page 122] while not in being, was to be “progressively and rapidly created.” (Ibid.; copies of the JCS and ISA drafts also available as JCS 2101/436 and JCS 2101/440, respectively, at National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 3001 (14 Apr 61) Sec 3)
In a July 28 note to the JCS, the Joint Strategic Survey Council recommended that the JCS “should not be drawn into discussion of what is specifically wrong with ISA draft of BNSP in manner which would place JCS draft in competition with it,” or which would preclude the JCS giving a copy of their position to the President or to members of the NSC. The JCS disagreed and at their request the Joint Strategic Survey Council submitted to them on August 5 a “talking paper” in support of the positions taken in the July 5 JCS draft. The talking paper stated that the ISA draft was “negative and inhibiting in nature and tended to over-emphasize control of military forces, avoidance of casualties and damage, defense, survival, without comparable concern for combat effectiveness, the offensive, or the will to succeed.” The paper further noted: “An overly inhibited BNSP could permeate the whole structure of a people and government to the point where the all-important will to win disappears.” The BNSP “should reflect confidence, determination, combat effectiveness, and the offensive spirit, if the United States is to survive and prosper.” The JCS believed in “control of military operations by constituted authority” but believed “that it [control] should be covered broadly and succinctly in BNSP with specific details left to technical plans and policies.” The ISA draft tended “to emphasize non-nuclear weapons even more than current policy emphasizes nuclear weapons.” The covering note to the talking paper recommended the Secretary’s adoption of the July 5 JCS draft as the position of the Department of Defense. (Ibid.) Available records do not indicate whether McNamara saw or was briefed on the talking paper.