17. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy1

Dear Mr. President: I have now completed my initial review of the Eisenhower Administration FY 1961 and FY 1962 budgets for the Department of Defense. The attached memorandum explains the basis on which the review has been made and summarizes the changes I am recommending for your consideration. In reaching these recommendations, I have been aided in the definition of national security objectives by the advice of Secretary Rusk and members of your staff. The proposed budget changes have been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose individual opinions on specific recommendations are recorded in Annex C.2

The task of thinking through the implications of national security objectives for military force structure is a tremendously complex and necessarily a continuing one. This review of the current budget has been able to deal with only the most urgent and obvious problems. Existing analyses on some of the central issues of general nuclear war made it possible to penetrate most deeply into this area. However, here, as with limited war, much more study is required, and will be undertaken as a matter of urgency before the FY 1963 budget is presented.

My recommendations relating to the expansion or contraction of our domestic and foreign bases and installations are not included in this paper. A separate report on this subject will be submitted approximately March 1.3 I believe the report will indicate that such action as might be taken in FY 1962 to terminate operations at unneeded facilities will have little effect on FY 1962 expenditures, although the savings which would result in future years may be substantial.


Robert S. McNamara
[Page 36]



Summary of Proposed Changes

The proposed changes in the FY 1961 and FY 1962 military budgets are summarized below in the conventional budget categories.

The Eisenhower FY 1961 and FY 1962 Budgets
and the Proposed Changes
(New Obligational Authority in Millions of Dollars)

FY 1961
FY 1962 Proposed Changes
FY 1961
FY 1962
Personnel 11,855 12,266 +66
O&M 10,714 10,842 +270
Procurement 13,453 13,378 +1,186
RDT&E 4,261 4,349 +433
Construction 995 985 +53
Revolving Funds 30 20
Total 41,308 41,840 +2,008

We estimate that these changes alone, without taking into account action already taken to accelerate expenditures within the limits of existing obligational authority, would increase defense expenditures during FY 1961 by $60 million and during FY 1962 by $740 million.

The proposed net additions to the budgets can be restated in the three major categories reflecting the task force studies:

Resources going into forces whose mission is primarily associated with general nuclear war;
Resources going into forces whose mission would primarily be limited war; and,
Resources going to research and development not included in (1) and (2) above.

Proposed Net Changes

Proposed Net Changes
FY 1961 FY 1962
Strategic and Continental Air Defense 1,088
Limited War 806
Research & Development, not included above 114
Total 2,008
[Page 37]

Detailed proposals are explained in the attachments under these three headings.

National Security Objectives

Our review of the defense budget has focused on the adequacy of our present and planned military forces to accomplish major national security objectives. Task Forces were appointed in the areas of Strategic and Continental Air Defense, Limited War, and Research and Development to carry out this review and to examine the need for additional forces in each of these areas.

The following are the national security objectives in terms of which we believe the adequacy of our defenses should be examined:

Deter Deliberate Attack

We must deter deliberate nuclear attack on the United States and our major allies by making it clear to potential enemies that, in all circumstances, such an attack would result in unacceptable losses to the attacker. This deterrence depends critically upon our ability to strike back after a direct Soviet attack designed to destroy our retaliatory forces. It does not depend upon a pre-attack comparison of numbers of missiles, or of forces in general, except in a most indirect way. We must have survivable retaliatory power.

The reality of our power to strike back must be clear to the Communists, to our allies, and to ourselves. The success of our deterrent should not depend merely upon enemy caution in the face of uncertainties about our retaliatory power. Such a dependence upon uncertainties could undermine our resolve in time of crisis, and is dangerous because enemy leaders may not be cautious.

Stability and Safety

Also of great concern, and perhaps more likely, is the chance that war could come in an irrational or unpremeditated fashion—possibly by the mistaken triggering of alert forces, by miscalculation by one side of the opponent’s intentions, by irrational or pathological actions by individuals, by spread and escalation of local wars, or by nuclear attack by a minor power.

Our posture should be designed to avoid these dangers. This can be done (1) by reducing the probability that individual triggering incidents can occur, and (2) even more important, by reducing the probability that such incidents would lead to war. Decisions, not incidents, cause war. For this reason also we must avoid exposed strategic systems that depend for their survival on quick decisions that might have to be made in ambiguous circumstances.

We are therefore taking steps to reduce the dependence of our retaliatory power on quick decisions. We want to reassure our allies and our [Page 38] enemies that we do not need to act hastily or preemptively in order to be able to retaliate. We must not be forced in a crisis to take “crash” actions for the protection of our forces that might be interpreted as evidence of impending attack.

Improved War Outcome

The conduct and outcome of a big nuclear war is worth caring about, more than any war in history. The success of deterrence cannot be guaranteed. If nuclear war comes and is unlimited and uncontrolled, it would be suicidal. We must do what we can to prevent this disaster, to improve the war’s outcome, to terminate it under favorable military conditions, and to limit damage to our allies and ourselves.

One of the most effective ways of limiting damage to this country if nuclear war comes, although admittedly we cannot place great confidence in it, is for us to use our nuclear force in a careful and discriminating way. This may be a necessary condition for inducing the enemy not to attack our civil society in wholesale fashion.

But for this strategy to be feasible, our forces must be well protected not only against a sudden attack, but also against re-attack. A long wartime endurance capability is necessary if we are to use our forces with deliberation and discrimination. In short, our nuclear forces must be controllable not only in peacetime, but in war. This means making the command and control of our forces so well protected that we can maintain responsiveness to Presidential authority.

Beyond this, we require a combination of active air defense, civil defense, and the ability to attack vulnerable parts of the enemy’s military forces. The best balance among these at any particular time will of course depend on the costs and effectiveness of each in the light of choices made by the Sino-Soviet Bloc. We should maintain broad flexibility to shift the emphasis of our strategy as conditions change.

Reassure and Protect Major Allies

If we provide strategic capabilities that meet all the above objectives, we shall satisfy an essential prerequisite for successful local defense and diplomacy elsewhere in the world. In the case of our NATO allies, we must have a strategy for their protection in which they can have confidence. Our common strategy must be one which is clearly in their interest as well as ours. The U.S. must maintain substantial forces in Europe; we must also persuade our allies of their responsibility to increase their own forces. Moreover, an increased emphasis should be placed on non-nuclear capabilities.

Reassure and Protect the Rest of the Free World

In most other areas of the world, the main burden of local defense against overt attack must be borne by indigenous forces, reinforced by [Page 39] strong highly mobile U.S. forces, some of which must be deployed in forward areas. This means having a substantial airlift and sealift capacity and prestocked overseas bases. The main responsibility against subversion and guerrilla warfare must rest on indigenous populations and forces, but given the great likelihood and seriousness of this threat, we must be prepared to make a substantial contribution in the form of forces trained in this type of warfare.

A Broadly Flexible Posture

While it is implicit in the above objectives, a broadly flexible posture that can serve us well in a wide range of contingencies deserves so much emphasis as to be listed as a separate objective. We are not required to make many decisions in the face of major uncertainties about future enemy objectives and capabilities and about our own. These factors interact to compound the uncertainty. In these circumstances, it is essential that we adopt an insurance philosophy and hedge against uncertainty by buying alternative future options for our military capabilities. We must procure “lead time” reduction, making decisions now to buy particular kinds of productive capability that we may never use. We must start development programs in the full realization that, because of changed and unforeseen circumstances, some may not be needed by the time they are completed. We must try to design our posture so that its effectiveness will not be seriously degraded by changes in objectives or circumstances. Our recommended changes in the budget reflect this philosophy.

Major Weaknesses in Existing Posture

(1) Strategic and Continental Air Defense

In our review of the currently planned posture for general war, we have found major vulnerabilities or deficiencies in the following areas:

Command and Control of Forces

The chain of command from the President down to our strategic offensive and defensive weapon systems is highly vulnerable in almost every link. The destruction of about a dozen sites, most of which are soft, none of which is adequately hardened, would deprive U.S. forces of all high-level command and control. Moreover, the communications connecting the various headquarters with each other and with the forces are soft, concentrated, and highly vulnerable to missile attack.

Without the survival of at least some of these sites (including the one containing the President, his successor, or designated replacement) with their communications, there can be no authorized response in the event of a nuclear attack on the U.S. Moreover, destruction of these sites would deprive our forces of essential orders for self-protection and for subsequent [Page 40] conduct of the war, as well as the order to execute retaliatory action. We should not count on the enemy being deterred by the belief that some of our forces may attack without authorization in the event our control is knocked out. Moreover, the vulnerability of the U.S. high-level command undermines the positive control system, making our forces both more accident prone and less likely to respond when they should.

The programs we propose now are intended to provide simultaneously for engineering development and an interim capability for survivable command and control of forces. We intend in the future to emphasize the development of command and control systems with greater endurance and flexibility under conditions of thermonuclear attack.

However, these programs do not provide a high-confidence solution to the problem of the survival of the President (or his successor or designated replacement) in the face of a surprise missile attack. This problem requires the urgent attention of the President and the National Security Council.

The Bomber Force

Today our strategic deterrence is almost totally dependent on our bomber force. This force is soft and concentrated on about 60 bases. Its current mode of protection is warning and alert response. About one-third of the bomber force is kept on a 15-minute ground alert. The two-thirds of the bombers which are not on alert are completely unprotected, except in periods of tension, or after strategic warning has been received. However, both the programmed warning systems and the decision-making part of the alert response are unreliable. Moreover, this posture contributes to the kind of instability which it is one of our objectives to avoid.

Active Bomber and Missile Defenses

The U.S. anti-bomber defense system is highly vulnerable to ballistic missile attack. Its control is centralized in a few soft vulnerable SAGE centers, without which the operation of the system would be seriously degraded. The BOMARC missile is completely, and the interceptors are almost completely, dependent on SAGE. The destruction of the SAGE centers would give enemy bombers essentially a free ride over the U.S. to the hardened ICBM sites. This would make it possible for the enemy to destroy U.S. hardened ICBM’s with bombers when it cannot do so with missiles (if the bombers arrive prior to the launching of the U.S. missiles).

Over the next few years we intend to reorient the anti-bomber component of the air defense system. Changing circumstances will make the massive bomber attack a less likely and less important threat than before. Nevertheless, we do believe that we must continue to possess a defense against attack by small numbers of bombers.

[Page 41]

We do not now have, nor can we have until the late 1960’s, if then, an effective active defense against ballistic missiles. This is a serious and undesirable deficiency. Moreover, the cost of the Nike-Zeus system, the only system we can now expect to be able to deploy before 1970, appears to be very high. A 70 battery program, which would protect about 40% of our population, would cost, all told, about $14 billion, possibly more. Further, it is far from clear that the system would be effective during the period when it could be operational, the late 1960’s. Therefore, we are recommending only a small expenditure on long lead time production items in order to buy about a year during which to reconsider this difficult problem.

However, our civil society does not need to be completely defenseless against missile attack. In some circumstances we could drastically reduce the casualties we would suffer in a thermonuclear war by a civil defense program. Although protecting people in cities from the direct blast, thermal and radiation effects would be extremely expensive and uncertain in outcome, it may be neither in our interest nor the enemy’s to engage in wholesale city attack. And protection against fallout, which could cause most of the casualties, does appear feasible. While civil defense is not a Defense Department responsibility, the success of many of our programs depends on some expansion in civil defense.

Missile Reliability

The reliability of the U.S. strategic missile systems under operational conditions is uncertain and may be less than anticipated. There has been no systematic approach to a determination of missile reliability. Additional test firings are required for both the determination and improvement of missile system operational reliability.

Protected Missiles

The retaliatory power of the United States is now very dependent on soft or poorly protected bombers and missiles and will remain so for the next year or two. It is very important that we bring this period to an end as soon as possible. Therefore, we are recommending acceleration of the Polaris program and authorization of construction of the industrial base required to double Minuteman production should this later appear necessary.


Perhaps our most fundamental weakness in the strategic area is the lack of flexibility in our ability to respond. With a vulnerable strategic force, with the expectation that the tempo of actions in nuclear war would be incredibly fast, we have been forced into a single strategy for retaliation. At the present time we have little ability to make decisions in the event of an attack. Our forces might have to be committed at a point when little is known of the extent of damage to our military forces or civil society or the size of force the enemy has left. The possibilities of a catastrophic [Page 42] mistake loom large. Our response would be a reflex action varying in scale only as determined by the size of our surviving force. We must move as rapidly as possible not only to create the survivable forces and control systems necessary to give us a range of choice, but also to develop strategies at the highest level for a wide range of general war contingencies.

(2) Forces for Limited War

The analysis of our capabilities for limited war reveals weaknesses in the following areas:

Over-emphasis on General War in Tactical Forces

Our forces designed to fight overseas, those we would call on to fight in limited conflict, are, in fact, strongly oriented in their war plans, current capabilities, materiel procurement, and research and development, towards general nuclear war. This is at the expense of their ability to wage limited and especially non-nuclear war. Yet because of their vulnerability these forces make only a modest contribution to the deterrence of general nuclear war. And survival abroad depends even more on fast and therefore risky decisions than survival of forces in the U.S. The problems of stability with our strategic forces discussed above are even more acute with nuclear forces overseas. This is not to say that these forces have no contribution to make to a big nuclear war. They can help. And because some ability to deliver nuclear weapons from within a local theater could have important tactical advantages (e.g., timeliness of delivery, choice of targets, warhead yield) the ability to deliver nuclear weapons with limited war forces should be retained. However, their major job lies elsewhere and we should make sharper division of labor between long-range nuclear and shorter range non-nuclear capabilities.

In concentrating on nuclear war, we have in recent years neglected our ability to wage non-nuclear war and have severely limited our range of policy choices. We cannot hope successfully to meet local Communist aggression at all conceivable points. But we can raise the threshold of our local non-nuclear defense capability, and reduce our dependence on nuclear war, a type of warfare which it will increasingly be in our interest to avoid. In sum, the primary mission of our overseas forces should be made non-nuclear warfare.

Sub-limited War Capabilities

The free world is faced in some parts of the world with a political-military threat that our military forces and those we support are not well designed to combat. We have too little ability to deal with guerrilla forces, insurrections, subversion. Much of our past effort to create guerrilla and anti-guerrilla capabilities, and it is a useful effort, has been aimed at general war. A greater effort in sub-limited war capabilities oriented [Page 43] towards Southeast Asia, the Mid-East, Africa and Latin America is needed.

Research and Development

We are doing too little research and development on non-nuclear weapons. The favored subjects: strategic systems, air defense, space, have received an overwhelming proportion of our research effort. However, technology promises great improvements in non-nuclear armaments as well, and it is important to be in the forefront of these developments. Accordingly, a substantial increase in this kind of research and development is recommended.

Transporting and Supporting Forces Abroad

Our capacity to move forces in sizeable numbers on short notice and to be able to support them is too small. The timely arrival of a modest U.S. and Allied force to crisis areas could avoid the need for a much larger commitment later. More sea and air transport is needed, but transport is not enough. The prestocking of heavy matériel and fuel and the availability of bases abroad is equally important and a greater effort is recommended. Although some of the bases used by our strategic force have lost most of their former value for general war, we and our Allies will remain critically dependent on overseas bases for limited war, and in some regions (Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Africa), more may be needed.

Training and Readiness

Many of our limited war forces are inadequately trained for non-nuclear war. We need more large scale deployment exercises for all Services, but especially joint Army-Air Force training in limited war operations.


Our principal deficiencies in materiel for limited war also stem from focusing on nuclear capabilities. Most of the equipment is nominally designed for dual nuclear and non-nuclear war but in many instances the non-nuclear capabilities are small. This is notably true with our tactical aircraft. In addition, some important new advances in ammunition and bombs need much more vigorous development and procurement. Here we can make a sizeable qualitative jump in our limited war capabilities.

In general our recommendations are directed toward removal of current dangerous inflexibilities and vulnerabilities in our posture. It is imperative that adequate strategic retaliatory power be made secure. Beyond this indispensable requirement, we seek a responsible, controlled power of selective response that can appropriately meet a wide range of possible threats. The recommended improvements will permit us to lessen greatly our dangerous dependence upon blunt and indiscriminate [Page 44] nuclear responses to attacks directed either against the United States or our Allies.

Annex “A”6


Changes in Strategic Offensive Force Structure Implied by FY 1961
and FY 1962 Budget Proposals

Table 1

Total U.S. Forces Currently Programmed
(Operational Bombers, Missiles on Launcher, End FY)

1961 1962 1963 1964
B-47 900 720 675 450
B-58 36 72 72 72
B-52 (w/o GAM-77) 360 255 195 195
B-52(+ GAM-77) 195 375 435 435
Atlas (36) (72) (129) (129)
Titan (—) (45) (81) (126)
Minuteman (—) (—) (130) (540)
Total ICBM’s 36 117 340 795
Polaris 80 144 176 256
Snark 30 26 20

Table 2

Total U.S. Forces as Proposed
(Operational Bombers, Missiles on Launcher, End FY)

1961 1962 1963 1964
B-47 900 585 360 180
B-58 36 72 72 72
B-52 (w/o GAM-77) 195 360 255 195 195
B-52(+ GAM-77) 195 375 435 435
Atlas (36) (72) (129) (129)
Titan (—) (45) (81) (126)
Minuteman (—) (—) (130) (540)
Total ICBM’s 36 117 340 795
Polaris 80 144 192 384
Snark 30
[Page 45]

Moreover, the action proposed to double the Minuteman production capacity and to procure the long-lead items for additional production and deployment gives us the flexibility, should it become desirable to do so, to increase the force deployed by the end of Calendar Year 1964 by about 50%.

Of these forces, the alert bombers, hardened or mobile ICBM’s, and Polaris at sea have much greater survival potential in the face of attack than the rest of the force. The comparison in terms of these elements is shown in the two following tables:

Table 3

U.S. Alert Forces Currently Programmed
(Alert Bombers, Hardened or Mobile ICBM’s, Polaris on Station, End FY)

1961* 1962 1963 1964
B-47 300 240 225 150
B-58 12 24 24 24
B-52 (w/o GAM-77) 120 85 65 65
B-52 (+ GAM-77) 65 125 145 145
Atlas (—) (39) (99) (99)
Titan (—) (45) (81) (126)
Minuteman (—) (—) (130) (540)
Total ICBM’s 84 310 765
Polaris 32 64 96 128

* These forces are loaded with nuclear weapons with a total yield of approximately [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].Since most of these weapons are in bombers on ground alert, their retaliatory capability is highly vulnerable to missile attack until our warning and control systems are much improved. But if no bombers are destroyed on the ground, weapons with a total yield of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] are expected to reach bomb release line.

Table 4

U.S. Alert Forces as Proposed
(Alert Bombers, Hardened or Mobile ICBM’s, Polaris on Station, End FY)

1961 1962 1963 1964
B-47 300 292 180 90
B-58 12 24 24 24
B-52 (w/o GAM-77) 180 128 98 98
B-52 (+GAM-77) 98 187 217 217
Atlas (—) (39) (99) (99)
Titan (—) (45) (81) (126)
Minuteman (—) (—) (130) (540)
Total ICBM’s 84 310 765
Polaris 32 64 96 192
[Page 46]

Annex “B”7


U.S.a (Atlas, Titan, Minuteman)
Mid-1960 Mid-1961 Mid-1962 Mid-1963
Production 195 287 534 858
Operational Inventory 14 45 155 390
In-Commission 12 41 142 369
Operational ICBM Launchers 3 36 117 340
U.S. (Polaris)
Production of Missiles 44 197 310 502
Number of submarines in Operation 1 5 * 9 * 11
Number of missiles in submarines in Operation 80 * 144 * 176
Number of submarines on Station 2 4 6
Number of Missiles on Station 32 64 96
U.S. (Total Operational ICBM Launchers or Polaris on Station) 3 68 181 436
Prog. “A”-Production 100 280 460 640
Operational Inventoryb 50 190 320 460
In-Commission 30-40 130-160 250-280 390-410
Operational ICBM Launchersc 30 150 270 400
“B”-Production 120 410 770 1,130
Operational Inventory 60 260 530 800
In-Commission 35-50 180-220 410-470 680-720
Operational ICBM Launchers 35 200 450 700
“C”-Production 70 170 270 370
Operational Inventory 15 90 165 240
In-Commission 9-12 60-75 125-145 200-215
Operational ICBM Launchers A few 50 125 200
[Page 47]

The Soviet Union is estimated to have a force of submarine-launched missiles during the years 1960-1963 approximately equal to our own.d

The number of ICBM missiles launched (successful and unsuccessful) as of 14 February 1961 is estimated to be:

U.S. Soviet
ICBMs (ex-Polaris) 96 33
Space Shots 10 17
Total 106 50
Polarise 15 0
[Page 48]

Note: The difference in the approach to missile development in the two countries may explain, in part, the difference in test firings.

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Defense Volume I, Review FY 1961 & 1962 Mil Prog and Budgets, 2/21/61. Top Secret.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Not further identified.
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
  5. Top Secret. Attachments entitled “Strategic and Continental Air Defense Proposals” (24 pages), “Limited War Proposals” (9 pages), and “Research and Development Proposals” (18 pages) are not printed. No later version of this memorandum, which is marked “Draft,” has been found. It was Secretary McNamara’s practice to label many memoranda to the President on budgetary proposals as “drafts.” Regarding draft Presidential memoranda, or “DPMs,” see footnote 2, Document 50.
  6. Top Secret. The Annex is marked “Draft.”
  7. Top Secret. The Annex is marked “Draft.”
  8. U.S. data are before adjustment for changes in the Eisenhower program and are from the following sources (adjusted downward to reflect a realistic level of “Operational ICBM Launchers”):

    Air Force Ballistic Missile Program Status Report, 31 Dec 1960.
    Appendix E, USAF Program Guidance, June 60.
    Appendix E, USAF Program Guidance, December 60.
    OP 311 Submarine Section OPNAV.
    R&D Missile Section OPNAV.
    Special Projects Office for Polaris Program, Bureau of Weapons.

  9. Includes three SSBN’s working up and therefore not fully operational
  10. Includes three SSBN’s working up and therefore not fully operational
  11. Includes three SSBN’s working up and therefore not fully operational
  12. Includes three SSBN’s working up and therefore not fully operational
  13. Soviet data for “Production,” “Operational Inventory,” and “In-Commission” are from NIE 11-8-60, pages 29 and 30. [For partial text of NIE 11-8-60, “Soviet Capabilities for Long Range Attack Through Mid-1956,” dated August 1, 1960, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. III, Document 111.
  14. The number of Soviet “Operational ICBM Launchers” are from NIE 11-4-60, pages 52, 53 and 54, where it is stated that:

    “Since there is insufficient direct evidence to establish the scale and pace of the present Soviet ICBM production and deployment program, we have based our estimate in part on various indirect forms of evidence and on argument and analysis deduced from more general considerations. These latter include such things as the strategic ideas which appear to govern Soviet military policy, our appreciation of the strategic capabilities which Soviet military planners might expect to derive from given numbers of ICBMs, our general knowledge of Soviet military production practices, and our sense of the tempo at which the present program is being conducted.”
    “We have examined the tasks and problems involved in the production and deployment of ICBMs thru the elaboration of three illustrative Soviet programs (“A”, “B”, “C”). They represent the range of judgments based on the direct and indirect evidence available to us, regarding the scale and tempo of Soviet effort.”

    “With reference to the illustrative programs presented above, the members of the United States Intelligence Board have concluded as follows:

    “The Director of Central Intelligence considers that Program “A” should be regarded as the nearest approximation of the actual Soviet program.

    “The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that Program “B” approximates the most likely Soviet program.

    “The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, and the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, believe that the Soviet planners would regard the advantages to be gained from having a large ICBM force in the near term as justifying the effort required for a program which would be toward the high side of the range defined by illustrative programs “A” and “B”. Further, these members consider that in the light of factors discussed in paragraph (4) it will continue to grow within the “A”-“B” range during the 1962-1963 period.

    “The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, believe that illustrative program “C” most nearly approximates the actual Soviet program.”

    “The present Soviet ICBM program is, of course, subject to change as the period progresses. Soviet planning for the period beyond 1961 will be substantially affected by the actual development of US retaliatory forces, the prospects for a greatly improved Soviet ICBM, and the prospects, on each side, for an effective defense against ICBM’s, as well as the general development of the world situation and of relations between the US and the USSR. Our estimates for future years must be reviewed in the light of such developments and of such additional evidence as we may obtain regarding the actual progress of the Soviet program. They must therefore be regarded as highly tentative. For these reasons, we have not projected even a tentative estimate beyond 1963.” [NIE 11-4-60, dated December 1, 1960, entitled “Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1960-1965,” is in Department of State, INR-NIE Files.]
  15. NIE 11-8-60, pages 22 and 23.
  16. From the submarine. There have been 61 other firings in the R&D program.