144. National Intelligence Estimate0

NIE 11-8-63


The Problem

To estimate probable trends in the strength and deployment of Soviet weapon systems suitable for strategic attack, and in Soviet capabilities for such attack, projecting forward for about six years.1

[Page 514]

Summary and Conclusions

Trends in Strategic Attack Forces to Mid-1965

The Soviet leaders look upon long range strike forces as a major element of their strategic position, intended to support their political objectives, to deter the West from resort to military action, and to fight a war should one occur. The available evidence supports the view that they are attempting to build forces which they regard as appropriate to these objectives rather than forces with which they could launch a deliberate attack on the West and count on reducing retaliation to levels that would be in any sense tolerable. (Paragraph 34)
Current Soviet military doctrine holds that a general war could begin with little or no warning, stresses the critical importance of the initial period in determining its outcome, and asserts that enormous advantages accrue to the side striking the first blow. However, the official doctrine also holds that the initial nuclear exchange might not determine the outcome, and that in any event large theater forces are necessary to prosecute a general war successfully. These views, when related to the strategic capabilities now deployed and programmed by the West, impose high and complex requirements upon the Soviet military establishment. Among the chief constraints in meeting these requirements are cost and skilled manpower. The Soviet strategic posture has also been heavily influenced by a concentration on the Eurasian theater, and by an apparent lag in military thinking on the implications of advanced weapons. Soviet military policy and doctrine have been considerably modified in recent years, and the process of change is continuing. However, for the immediate future, Soviet forces for long range attack will be characterized by capabilities against Eurasia far exceeding those against North America. (Paragraphs 35-37)
ICBM Forces. Evidence acquired during the past year has led us to modify our estimates as to the size and composition of the Soviet ICBM force in the near term. The most important single development was the interruption of the deployment program during the summer and fall of 1962. The primary reasons for this interruption appear to have been technical, including a probable modification to the second-generation SS-7 ICBM system and persisting difficulties in development of the SS-8. Whatever the reason, however, it is clear that 1962 was a year of reappraisal, in which Soviet planners apparently made important new decisions with respect to their ICBM program. Some of these, for example curtailment of SS-8 deployment, are already evident. For the near term, the result is a somewhat smaller force than previously estimated. (Paragraphs 39-40)
We have now identified a total of 18 ICBM complexes, all of which were begun before December 1961. The complexes now contain a total of [Page 515] about 220 launchers in various stages of construction. We estimate that 105-120 ICBM launchers, including about 20 hard silos, were operational as of 1 October 1963.2 An additional 15 launchers were probably operational at Tyuratam.
Of the three Soviet ICBM systems now in the field, the SS-7 has been the most successful in development and is the most widely deployed. Deployment of the large, first generation SS-6 was limited to four launchers at one complex. Deployment of the SS-8 had extended to four complexes before the program was interrupted. However, SS-8 deployment has now been curtailed, and it is believed that expansion of the ICBM force over the next year or so will be primarily in terms of the SS-7.
We estimate the number of Soviet ICBM launchers operational in mid-1964 at 205-235, and in mid-1965 at 250-350 (these totals include some 20-25 launchers at Tyuratam).3 The force in this period will consist almost entirely of second-generation ICBMs; a few new type ICBMs could be operational by about mid-1965. We now believe that the SS-8 which we previously considered might be a very large missile, is comparable to the SS-7 in payload capacity.4 At present, both of these ICBMs probably carry [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] warheads; initial deployment of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] warheads with these ICBMs could begin in 1964. If new nosecones are developed, improved second generation missiles armed with higher yield warheads [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]could enter service by 1965, and the few SS-6’s in the field could be retrofitted to carry [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Thus, it is probable that the great bulk of the Soviet ICBM force through mid-1965 will carry warheads in the 3-6 MT range. By mid-1965, the accuracy of the bulk of the force can probably be improved to about 1.0 n.m. CEP; if new guidance systems are introduced, some portion could achieve CEP’s of 0.5-1.0 n.m.
The Soviet ICBM force represents a formidable nuclear delivery capability, but cannot maintain a constant readiness state approaching its US counterpart, and is vulnerable since about 80-85 percent of the present force is in soft sites. Successive modifications of soft sites have [Page 516] probably brought some improvement in reaction time, but procedures are still relatively slow, cumbersome, and complicated. We estimate that by mid-1965, about one-third of the ICBMs will be in hard silos, enhancing both the survivability and the reaction time of the force.
MRBM/IRBM Forces. We have now identified about 675 launch positions for the 1,050 n.m. (SS-4) MRBMs and 2,200 n.m. (SS-5) IRBMs, of which almost 600 are soft and the remainder are deployed in hard silos. Considering the target coverage and geographic disposition of the force, together with evidence of a cessation or slowdown in site construction, we believe that deployment of MRBMs and IRBMs in the USSR is about complete. We therefore estimate that by mid-1964 this force will have levelled off at about 700-750 launch positions, including 90-110 in hard silos. Soviet MRBMs and IRBMs can presently carry warheads with maximum yields of 2-3 MT.
We continue to have difficulty in understanding the Soviet rationale for building such a massive capability to attack European targets. One factor influencing Soviet decisions was undoubtedly the strategic emphasis on Europe, and the concept of a hostage Europe probably played a part. Soviet planning to strike a wide variety of targets, including some in support of the theater forces, may also have exerted an upward pressure on the size of the force, particularly if most of these missiles were to be equipped with kiloton warheads. Finally, a contributing military factor may have been a desire to attain survivability through numbers. (Paragraph 65)
We now believe that virtually all MRBM and IRBM launch sites are primary firing positions, i.e., positions which are manned and equipped to participate in an initial salvo. There has been much evidence that the Soviets intend to provide a substantial refire capability for this force, and our evidence on missile production indicates that, by mid-1965, each soft site could have a second-salvo missile available. The same operational deficiencies which characterize the Soviet ICBM force—vulnerability, slow reaction time, and cumbersome procedures—appear in Soviet MRBM and IRBM forces. These have been alleviated somewhat by deployment of a part of the force in hard silos. A further improvement may be made by introduction of an improved missile system. We believe that a new MRBM could be operational in small numbers by mid-1965. (Paragraphs 68-73)
Submarine Missile Forces. Current Soviet submarine missile forces are the outgrowth of decisions taken in the middle 1950’s to develop quickly a fairly extensive but unsophisticated capability. The USSR now has about 50 ballistic missile submarines, including 11 of the nuclear-powered H class; all are equipped with short range (350 n.m.) missiles capable of delivering warheads [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The mission originally envisaged for these submarines probably [Page 517] included participation in initial strategic attacks. However, they have now evidently been assigned to second-strike roles, partly because of the growth in numbers of ground-launched systems, but probably also because of Soviet recognition of their limitations. Although this force represents a considerable potential threat, its operational effectiveness is limited by the small number of missiles per submarine (2 or 3), the short range of the missiles, the need to surface before launching, the operational limitations of the diesel-powered units, and the unreliability of some nuclear powered units. These shortcomings probably account for the continued absence of essential operational training cruises to likely combat areas. (Paragraphs 74-76)
There is evidence that the Soviets recognize these deficiencies and that improved missiles and submarines will become operational in the near future. Development is far advanced on a new 700 n.m. ballistic missile designed for submerged launching. This missile will almost certainly be incorporated in any new class of ballistic missile submarine which appears in the near future; it could possibly be retrofitted into existing types as well. While we have no direct evidence, it seems probable that at least one new submarine class (either nuclear or diesel-powered) is under development to employ the new missile and that the first units could enter service in the near future. It is likely that new designs will incorporate more than the three missile tubes carried by the older classes. We estimate that by mid-1965 the Soviet force of ballistic missile submarines will have grown to a total of 55-65, including some 15-20 nuclear-powered submarines. (Paragraphs 86-87, 88-89)
In addition to ballistic missile submarines, the USSR now has operational some 19 submarines capable of surface launching 300 n.m. cruise missiles. Six of these are nuclear-powered E class, each equipped with six launchers; the rest are diesel-powered units equipped with two or four launchers each. This system was designed primarily for low altitude (1,000-3,000 feet) attack on ships at sea, but it can also be employed against land targets. We believe that the Soviets may now be placing additional emphasis on the cruise missile submarine program. We estimate that by mid-1965 this force will have grown to 25-30 submarines, including 10-12 nuclear-powered. (Paragraphs 82-85, 88-89)
Thus, we believe that in the near future the Soviets will bring into service submarine weapon systems better suited to attacks on Eurasian and North American land targets as well as Western naval forces at sea. Further, we continue to believe that by the mid-1960’s at least some Soviet missile submarines will be engaging in routine patrols in open ocean areas. (Paragraphs 75, 90- 93)
Long Range Bomber Forces. Continued investment in improving Long Range Aviation indicates that the USSR plans to maintain sizable bomber forces for at least the near term. Improvements over the past few [Page 518] years include introduction of a new medium bomber, introduction of air-to-surface missiles, and improved aerial refueling capabilities. Maritime reconnaissance is a secondary role of Long Range Aviation, and the use of both heavy and medium bombers in this role has been increasing. (Paragraph 94)
We estimate that Long Range Aviation comprises about 180-205 heavy bombers and tankers and 940-975 medium bombers and tankers. The heavy bomber force includes 95-105 Bison jet bombers and 85-100 Bear turbo prop bombers. Of the medium bombers, about 40-50 are Blinders, with supersonic dash capability, and the remainder are Badgers. There are an additional 360-370 Badgers and 10-20 Blinders in Naval Aviation. Blinder is the only bomber known to be in current production, but there are indications that there may be some new production of Bear in addition to modification. Although research and development on heavy aircraft is under way, no replacement for Bear or Bison is in sight, and we consider it highly unlikely that a new heavy bomber could enter inventory before 1966. We estimate that in mid-1965 Long Range Aviation will comprise 170-200 heavy bombers and tankers and 825-925 medium bombers and tankers.5
Soviet Long Range Aviation, by reason of its equipment, basing, and deployment, is much better suited for Eurasian operations than for intercontinental attack. The capabilities of the Bison and Badger aircraft which make up the bulk of the force are restricted by their limited range. The emphasis on aerial refueling and Arctic training of the past several years reflect Soviet efforts to overcome this limitation on capabilities for intercontinental attack. (Paragraphs 99-104)
In view of the training patterns of recent years, the capacity of the principal Arctic staging bases, and the range capabilities of Soviet bombers, we believe that an aircraft attack against the US (except Alaska) would involve heavy bombers almost exclusively. Considering the requirements for Arctic staging and refueling, and allowing for non-combat attrition, we estimate that, by committing their entire heavy bomber force to this mission, the Soviets could put 90-115 of these aircraft over the US on two-way missions. The scale of an initial intercontinental attack could be increased by the use of refueled Badgers on two-way missions. Considering all operational factors, we estimate that the Soviets could put up to 150 of these medium bombers over target areas in Greenland, Canada, Alaska and portions of northwestern US. [Page 519] Initial attacks would probably be mounted in successive waves and extend over a considerable number of hours.6

Trends in Strategic Attack Forces, 1966-1969

No well-defined strategic concept appears to have governed the long range strike forces which the Soviets have deployed to date, but a number of characteristics can be discerned in the building of these forces. Research and development programs have been vigorous. In contrast, the scale and pace of deployment programs have been uneven. This behavior has reflected, in part, technical problems and economic constraints, but it also suggests that the USSR is willing to tolerate a condition of limited intercontinental capabilities and considerable vulnerability over a long period of time. (Paragraph 125)
Perhaps the most consistent patterns apparent in Soviet policy toward long range strike forces over the past several years are to be found in the increased allocation of resources to this mission, the numerical expansion of these forces, the improvement of various weapon systems for long range attack, emphasis on high yield weapons, and continuing interest in diversified capabilities. During this period, emphasis has shifted from weapon systems best suited for Eurasian use to intercontinental systems. Our estimates for the next two years suggest, in the main, a continuation of these broad trends. The forces which we project for mid-1965 are stronger, both numerically and qualitatively, but they represent no substantial change in the overall strategic posture of the USSR vis-à-vis the West. (Paragraphs 126-128)
The prospects for the later 1960’s are far less clear. We believe that the desire for an effective deterrent will remain one of the primary concerns of Soviet policy. None of the evidence available to us suggests, however, that the USSR contemplates forces designed to neutralize US strike forces in a single blow, nor do the Soviets appear to be seeking to match the US in numbers of delivery vehicles. Other programs, particularly strategic defense and space, will continue to compete with strategic attack programs, not only for resources but for scarce skills and quality materials. In general, we believe that the USSR would have great economic difficulty in pursuing a policy which called for antimissile defenses of major cities, competition with the US in space, and the higher [Page 520] sides of our estimates for long range strike forces which appear below. (Paragraphs 130-135)
Soviet long-range strike forces could also be heavily affected by political factors. In the present and prospective strategic situation which confronts the USSR, there is much which argues for a policy of safeguarding national security through some fairly moderate level of military strength or even, more radically, through international agreements to limit or reverse the arms race. Moreover, Khrushchev’s advocacy of higher priority for certain civilian economic programs appears to be growing stronger. These political and military considerations suggest, not that the Soviets will cut back on their strategic programs, but rather that they are unlikely to undertake large-scale programs on a crash basis. Indeed, current trends in development and deployment indicate that in the absence of an arms limitation agreement, the Soviets will continue improving their capabilities, but at a moderate pace. In framing the estimates which follow, we have attempted to take into consideration the various factors—strategic, economic, military, political, and technical—which could influence the size and composition of Soviet long range strike forces deployed by mid-1969. (Paragraphs 136-138)
The ICBM Force. Our analysis of Soviet programming to date, and of the possible impact of new systems as well as other factors, indicates that by mid-1969 the USSR probably will have acquired a force of some 400-700 operational ICBM launchers.7 8 Currently operational systems will still make up the largest part of the force, but it will probably also include significant numbers of follow-on or improved ICBMs. In general, any new ICBM systems to be deployed in quantity during the 1960’s would need to be under development already or to begin development shortly. (Paragraphs 139-141, 151, 155, 164)
We believe that the Soviets are most certainly engaged in both improvement of existing ICBM systems and development of new systems, as well as to a continuing space effort. However, the available evidence does not indicate the specific nature of planned improvements to existing ICBMs or of follow-on systems. Our views on the Soviet need to correct current deficiencies, on tendencies in Soviet missile design, and on Soviet technical capabilities heavily affect our judgments about likely new and improved systems. [Page 521]
Very Large ICBMs. We continue to believe that the Soviets are developing a large vehicle (with a million or more pounds of thrust), which could be used as a space booster, as a “global” rocket, or as a carrier for warheads yielding up to 100 MT. If test firings begin within the next few months, such a large vehicle could probably have an initial operational capability as an ICBM in the period mid-1965 to mid-1966. Initial deployed sites would probably be soft, but the Soviets might find it feasible to incorporate hardening at some stage in the program. (Paragraph 144)
Standard-Size Follow-on ICBMs. We believe the Soviets would consider the primary qualitative improvements needed in the bulk of the ICBM force to be increased survivability, shorter reaction time, higher accuracy, and decreased logistic and personnel support. These requirements can probably be met almost as well, and at much lower cost, by improvement to the SS-7 as by a follow-on system in its general weight class. Improved SS-7’s may be deployed in new configurations, possibly including semi-hard or single-silo hard sites. (Paragraphs 145-146)
Smaller Follow-on ICBMs. Soviet development of an ICBM system similar to the US Minuteman would run counter to trends thus far discernible in Soviet long range missile systems, and Soviet technology necessary for large grain solid propellants is weak. However, some of the operational attributes of the Minuteman concept would reduce the main deficiency in the Soviet force—namely its vulnerability to US attack—and might also reduce maintenance requirements. A new missile somewhat smaller than SS-7 and using improved propellants could reach operational status during the period. We believe it likely that such a new smaller missile would be deployed in hard sites. We believe that test firings of such a new smaller missile would not start for about a year and that operational launchers would not exist at deployed sites until 1966-1967. Should the Soviets elect to deploy a new missile in soft or semi-hard sites, test firings could begin in the near future, with an initial operational capability occurring in about mid-1965. (Paragraphs 147-148)
We believe that deployment of currently operational missiles in soft launch sites will cease by the mid-1960s. The low side of our estimate for 1969 (400 launchers) assumes that, in addition to deployment of a few very large ICBMs which begin to enter operational inventory in mid-1966, the Soviets will at about the same time introduce either a new, somewhat smaller ICBM or an improved SS-7, possibly in single-launcher hard sites. A moderate buildup of this sort, with emphasis on hardening, would in our view be consistent with a Soviet effort to maintain and improve the credibility of its deterrent. The reasons why the Soviet force might develop in this manner include such economic considerations as the need to devote more resources to the civilian economy [Page 522] or to antimissile and space programs as well as political factors. (Paragraph 151)
The high side of our estimate for mid-1969 (700 launchers), takes into account the possibility that the deployment of soft launchers, perhaps including some semi-hardened sites, is carried somewhat further than in the preceding alternative; that a very large system is introduced somewhat earlier than 1966; and that over 200 launchers of a new type—an improved SS-7 or a new, somewhat smaller hard system, possible in single silo sites—are deployed. Such a buildup might reflect not only a Soviet concern for deterrence, but also an effort to put the USSR in a somewhat better position to undertake a preemptive attack if a Western strike appeared imminent and unavoidable. (Paragraph 152)
Although the force levels indicated by the upper and lower limits of the range are derived from technical and strategic considerations, other force compositions and force levels within this general range are equally possible. The Soviets would recognize that forces within this range fell far short of those required for a preemptive attack which might reduce devastation of the USSR to an acceptable level, but in any case, the force would include a protected component capable of devastating retaliatory blows if it survived. (Paragraph 153)
MRBM and IRBM Forces. We believe that Soviet MRBM/IRBM force levels will remain fairly constant in the 1966-1969 period at about 700-750 launchers. The developments which we can foresee in Western forces are not likely to add to potential Soviet MRBM/IRBM targets in a major way, although we do not exclude the possibility that a general strengthening of NATO forces would result in some incremental expansion. Improvements in Soviet MRBM/IRBM capabilities in this period are more likely to be qualitative than quantitative. The Soviets may be developing a new MRBM, and it is possible that they also contemplate a new IRBM. If two separate systems are developed, the IRBM would probably phase in a year or so after the MRBM, i.e., in about 1966-1967. It is also possible that the Soviets have elected to work toward a single follow-on system which could cover all MRBM and IRBM ranges. In either event, follow-on systems are likely to feature hard or possibly mobile deployment. If, as we estimate, the size of the force remains fairly stable, improved systems will be deployed to supersede present systems, and may have largely replaced currently operational MRBMs by 1969. (Paragraphs 154-158)
Submarine Missile Forces. We think that the Soviets will continue to consider missile submarines an important adjunct to their ground-launched missile capabilities, and we expect the requirement for capabilities to attack surface naval formations to continue. Thus we estimate continued construction of both ballistic missile and cruise missile submarines in this period. Although we have no specific evidence, we [Page 523] believe that longer range submarine-launched ballistic missile systems could become operational in about the 1966-1967 period. We do not anticipate significant technical changes in the cruise missile submarine force. (Paragraphs 159- 163)
The size of Soviet missile submarine forces will depend upon a number of factors including the availability of militarily competitive but less expensive delivery systems (especially hardened ICBMs), construction capabilities, and allocation of nuclear submarines to other naval missions. Considering all factors, including estimated construction programs, and the possibilities for improved systems, we believe that by 1969 the Soviets will have 65-80 ballistic missile submarines operational, of which 25-35 will be nuclear-powered. At that time, we estimate a cruise missile submarine force of 40-60 of which 20-30 will be nuclear-powered. (Paragraph 164)
Long Range Bombers. We estimate that by 1969 Long Range Aviation will have gradually declined in total strength to about 130-175 heavy bombers and tankers and 400-650 medium bombers and tankers. We believe that it will still consist of aircraft types now in service: Bisons, Bears, Badgers, and Blinders, with the last of these comprising about half of the medium bomber force. Considering the types and quantities of missile delivery systems they are likely to have, as well as the probable continued availability of existing heavy bomber types, we think it unlikely that the Soviets will bring any follow-on heavy bomber to operational service in the period of this estimate. However, the Soviets have the technical capability of developing and producing new, high-performance military aircraft of intercontinental range for operational use in the 1966-1969 period, should they come to consider this necessary or worthwhile. In the later 1960s they would probably employ bomber forces in follow-on, rather than initial attacks and for increasingly specialized missions.9 (Paragraphs 165-166)
Space Weapons. On the basis of evidence presently available, we are unable to determine the existence of Soviet plans or programs for the military use of space. However, we believe that the USSR almost certainly is investigating the feasibility of space systems for military support and offensive and defensive weapons. For accomplishing military missions, we think that during the 1966-1969 period, orbital weapons w[Page 524]ill not compare favorably with ICBMs in terms of cost and effectiveness. Based on these considerations as we now understand them, it would appear unlikely that the Soviets will during this decade deploy orbital bombardment systems of military significance. Moreover, we believe that the USSR would probably recognize that a Soviet deployment of nuclear weapons in space would produce an unfavorable reaction in other countries and strong US counteractions. Further, if the Soviets enter into a formal obligation to refrain from orbiting nuclear weapons, this will constitute still another factor inhibiting such deployment. (Paragraphs 168-171)
We recognize, however, that the Soviets might reach different conclusions as to cost and effectiveness, and in some future phase of East-West relations, political inhibitions might lose their effectiveness. Moreover, considering the pace of developments in the weapons field in general, it is extremely hazardous to estimate Soviet decisions for a period many years ahead. For these reasons, a firm estimate as to whether the Soviets will deploy an orbital bombardment system within the 1966-1969 period cannot be made at this time. (Paragraphs 172-173)


I. Soviet Policy Toward Strategic Attack Forces

The Soviet leaders look upon long range strike forces as a major element of their strategic position, intended to support their political objectives, to deter the West from resort to military action, and to fight a war should one occur. The available evidence supports the view that they are attempting to build forces which they regard as appropriate to these objectives, rather than aiming at forces with which they could launch a deliberate attack on the West and count on reducing retaliation to levels that would be in any sense tolerable.
Soviet policy toward long range strike forces is heavily affected by the Soviet view of the character of future war. This Soviet view has become increasingly complicated in the last several years as the result of a continuing debate over the implication of modern weaponry for military doctrine. This debate persists, and may lead to further important changes, but at the present state it has produced several official conclusions which bear on long range capabilities:
General war might begin in a variety of ways, including circumstances which provided very short warning times.
The initial period is of critical importance and might determine the outcome.
Enormous advantages accrue to the side striking the first blow.
But the initial nuclear exchange might not determine the outcome, and in any event large ground campaigns would follow.
These propositions, when related to the strategic capabilities now deployed and programmed by the West, impose high and complex requirements upon Soviet long range strike forces. Among the chief constraints in meeting these requirements are cost and skilled manpower, which pose distinct problems to Soviet decision-makers. One of these problems is the proper balance of expenditure among military needs, the space program, and the civil economy. Another is the proper allocation of military funds among the various force components. This problem is made particularly acute by the insistence of the military leadership that all arms of service, including large theater forces, are necessary to prosecute a general war successfully and to provide the USSR with flexibility in a variety of possible circumstances.
Two other main factors have been involved in the past decisions which have determined present Soviet capabilities for long range attack. One is a concentration on the Eurasian theater, which is traceable to traditional Soviet preoccupation with this area as well as to the higher costs and greater technical complexity of intercontinental weapon systems. The other is an apparent lag in military thinking, which seems to have been relatively slow in working out some of the more sophisticated implications of advanced weapons. Both these factors are now changing, but for the immediate future Soviet forces for long range attack will be characterized by capabilities against Eurasia far exceeding those against North America, and by a considerable deficiency in certain performance characteristics—chiefly survivability and reaction times—relative to corresponding US forces.
A continuing Soviet emphasis on high yield weapons for long range striking forces was indicated by the 1961-1962 nuclear test series. The USSR’s nuclear testing program has provided it with a wide variety of weapons for strategic delivery, with yields up to 100 MT. As new weapons enter the inventory they will progressively improve the total nuclear delivery capabilities of the strategic striking forces.

[Here follow the body of the paper and two annexes, totaling 41 additional pages. See the Supplement.]

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry. Top Secret; Restricted Data; Controlled Dissemination. A more highly classified version of this document is ibid. A table of contents is not printed. For complete text, see the Supplement. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, AEC, and NSA.” The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred, except the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
  2. The weapon systems considered are ground-launched missiles with ranges of 600 nautical miles or more, submarine-launched missiles, heavy and medium bombers, air-to-surface missiles, and advanced delivery and support systems such as orbital and suborbital vehicles. [Footnote in the source text.]
  3. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, estimates that 145-160 ICBM launchers were operational as of 1 October 1963. See his footnote on page 15 at paragraph 60. [Footnote in the source text.]
  4. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, estimates 215-250 operational ICBM launchers by mid-1964, and 300-350 by mid-1965. See footnote, page 15. [Footnote in the source text.]
  5. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believe that a confident selection between possible SS-8 delivery capabilities cannot be made at this time. In their opinion, available evidence and analysis do not permit excluding the possibility that the SS-8 may carry a nosecone of 10,000 lbs or a little more. [3 lines of source text not declassified. [Footnote in the source text.]
  6. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, estimates the medium bomber/tanker force level for mid-1965 at 925-1025 aircraft. He considers the heavy bomber/tanker force will remain at approximately 200 aircraft although the Bear/Bison mix may vary somewhat. Introduction of a longer endurance aircraft based on the Bear could begin in late 1964 or early 1965. See his footnote to page 23, paragraph 98 of the Discussion. [Footnote in the source text.]
  7. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, considers this paragraph seriously underestimates the manned aircraft threat to the continental United States. In the event war should eventuate and the USSR attacks the United States with nuclear weapons, he believes this will be an all-out effort aimed at putting a maximum number of weapons on US targets. He would therefore estimate that the number of aircraft, including Badgers on one-way missions, could exceed 500. See his footnote to pages 22, 23, paragraph 102 of the Discussion. [Footnote in the source text.]
  8. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, believes the force level is likely to be toward the low side (400) of the estimate presented here. See his footnote to paragraph 153, page 33, of the Discussion. [Footnote in the source text.]
  9. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, considers the Soviet ICBM force by mid-1969 could range from 600 to as high as 1,000 operational ICBM launchers, depending on whether a new, small, easily-deployed system is introduced in the 1965-1966 period. See his footnote to the Table on page 33, paragraph 153 of the Discussion. [Footnote in the source text.]
  10. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, disagrees with this paragraph since he thinks that the Soviets will continue to consider manned strategic aircraft an important adjunct to their ground launched missile capabilities. He estimates that the USSR will introduce a follow-on heavy bomber. He further estimates the heavy bomber force will remain at about 200 or somewhat larger, depending on the timing of an expected follow-on bomber, and that by mid-1969 the medium bomber/tanker force probably still will include about 900 aircraft. See his footnote to the Table on page 36 and to paragraph 167. [Footnote in the source text.]