114. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara
0
Washington, November 28,
1962.
Dear Bob: I greatly appreciated having the
opportunity to review the series of memoranda which you have prepared for
the President of the FY ‘64 (and forward)
Defense Programs. The quality of these memoranda is most impressive and I
think the forces, which implementation of the proposals contained therein
would produce, are generally consistent with our basic national security
policy. In particular, I wish to underline the point which you make in the
memorandum on General Purpose Forces1 on the need for strategic
lift in the face of the difficulties attending the acquisition of bases in
troubled parts of the world.
[Page 417]
I also note that the study of forces required for non-nuclear defense in
Europe was predicated on defense of the Rhine.2 In accordance with the conclusion which we
reached at the first Defense Policy Conference,3 a study
of requirements for a more forward and therefore more politically acceptable
defense of the Central Front is under way. I think this is a point well
worth mentioning to the President since it could presumably support the need
for a subsequent adjustment in General Purpose Force requirements.
Of all of the highly important matters touched upon in your memoranda, to my
mind the issue which stands out above all others is that relating to the
question of the advisability of deploying an anti-ballistic missile defense.
One can only be impressed by the technical complexity of the problem.
However, what seems to emerge in this discussion is that a system, having
considerable operational uncertainties but, nevertheless, promising
significant defensive capabilities under certain conditions, could be
deployed beginning as early as 1967, were the decision made at this time to
do so. Obviously your technical review, which I gather includes a heavy
emphasis on alternative trade-off advantages as between investment in
ballistic missile defense and competing weapon systems, inclines you to
recommend against a decision to deploy at this time. I gather, however, that
this is by no means a black and white issue and, in fact, may represent a
rather close balance.
I would have no independent judgment on the technical feasibility/cost
consideration factors. If, however, these have led to a negative decision,
but only in close balance, then I would think that the decision warrants
further review in light of the immense political and psychological
implications for our entire security posture over the next decade of a
negative decision on deployment. Though undoubtedly taken into account in
your decision, the extent to which these implications were weighed is not
clear from your memorandum. For that reason, I have set out in a separate
enclosure to this letter my own views as to the significance which I attach
to the development and deployment by the US of an anti-ballistic missile
system in the shorter, rather than the longer, time period. It is my feeling
that if such a system, having a reasonable degree of technological
effectiveness can be deployed beginning as early as 1967, we should
carefully consider the advisability of doing so.
[Page 418]
Since this is a matter of highest importance, you undoubtedly contemplate it
as a principal item for discussion with the President. I am prepared to
enter into such discussions whenever the President deems it appropriate.
With warm regards,
Sincerely,
Dean
Enclosure4
SIGNIFICANCE OF AN ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM AS A PART OF US
NATIONAL SECURITY UNDERTAKINGS OVER THE NEXT DECADE
- 1.
- If the Soviet Union were to deploy an anti-ballistic missile
defense system substantially before the United States, such an
action could adversely affect the current delicate world power
equilibrium and seriously impair the effectiveness with which the US
would be able to pursue its national security policy. The basis for
this conclusion will be developed in the succeeding
paragraphs.
- 2.
-
In order to explain the basis for the preceding conclusion, it
is necessary to clarify a few assumptions which we make.
We accept the obvious fact that any system of ballistic missile
defense which we might choose to develop and deploy is at this
point in time fraught with great uncertainties and immense
technical complexities. From the memorandum prepared by the
Secretary of Defense to the President,5 we would gather that of the two possible
systems, Nike Zeus or Nike X, the latter has greater
potentialities than the former. Both, however, would seem to
embody considerable uncertainties, with perhaps Nike X being
more uncertain if only because it is a newer concept having been
subjected to a lesser degree of research and development. In any
event, however, accepting the current best estimates of system
limitations and reliabilities, we would gather that there is a
good likelihood that an anti-ballistic missile system could be
developed and deployed having a considerable degree of military
effectiveness under certain [Page 419] assumptions. (We gather that it is
estimated that deployment of 26 batteries might result in
survival of as much as 30 to 40% of our population and
production base.)
- 3.
- Proceeding from the foregoing, with full recognition of all
existing uncertainties, if such a system could be deployed, even
accepting its operational limitations, it could have an immense
impact on our relations with (a) the Soviets and (b) our
Allies.
- 4.
- We do not ignore the significance of the tremendous cost
implication. But this is a matter which must be placed in the
perspective of the value of what it is we are buying. In this
connection, we think we need to re-look at, and perhaps somewhat
alter our thinking about, the military exchange ratio problem. It
seems to us in considering the value of this weapon system to US
security, we must go well beyond the weighing of the technical
advantages and disadvantages of investment in alternative weapon
systems. Though it is difficult, if not impossible, to precisely
quantify, we must introduce political and psychological
considerations which will weigh so heavily over the future decade.
This is particularly significant in terms of the ability of the US
to mobilize public will, both within the US and amongst our Allies,
to accept the risks inherent in living in a world of such sharply
competing ideologies. Thus, while we appreciate the logic which lies
behind the thought that the procurement of offensive ballistic
weapons may for sometime to come continue to be far less expensive
than procurement of an adequate ballistic missile defense system,
this is clearly not the whole story. The essential issue is whether
the availability of such a system to the Soviets at a time when the
West does not have an equal capability will adversely affect the
willingness and, therefore, in a very real sense, the capability of
the Western Alliance to effectively contest with the Communists. Or
to put the question in another and more positive way, whether the
availability of a system to the West, even one having admitted
technological limitations, will support and, conceivably, even
greatly strengthen our willingness to accept difficult, costly and
dangerous undertakings so necessary if we are to preserve and
succeed in the contest with the Communists.
- 5.
- From the DOD memorandum it would
appear that the Soviets are now in process of deploying an
anti-ballistic missile system around Leningrad. While this program
may be limited in its present capabilities, we gather that we have
no full understanding of its present capabilities or of its ultimate
potentialities. It does, however, seem significant that with a
stringency on resources which in any real sense is greater than that
under which the US labors, the Soviets have chosen to make the
beginning which presumably could, if they project and expand their
present effort, result in a sizeable Soviet deployment over the next
several years. The Soviets are notable for their determination to
make military undertakings serve a political end. It would be
surprising if their policy in connection [Page 420] with deployment of an anti-ballistic missile
system fails to take account of this relationship.
- 6.
- The danger, of course, is that the deployment by the Soviets of an
anti-ballistic missile system, during a period when our own
defensive posture did not involve such an undertaking, could result
in a serious unbalancing of the present power structure, an effort
which the Soviets have desperately been trying to accomplish even at
the expense of such a risky undertaking as the recent Cuban
experience. The change in power balance could occur either because
(a) the Soviet system as actually developed proved to be better than
we now predict and even conceivably better than the performance
which we attribute to our own system (a possibility which however
unlikely cannot be overlooked), or (b) because even if the system,
in fact, is not as technologically excellent as the preceding
assumptions suggest, the Soviets may over-estimate its importance
and attempt to use it as a part of a grand political ploy designed
to achieve through political means what might not be attainable
through actual military means. Either of these two reasons might
support a Soviet policy far more active and belligerent than would
otherwise be the case. This is not something to be accepted with
equanimity.
- 7.
- At the same time, the effect upon our Allies, especially in
Europe, of a Soviet attainment of ABM defense in the absence of an equal Western effort,
must be carefully assessed. It seems entirely likely that the
psychological and political impact would be immense, if not
immediately, then ultimately, on peoples living under the daily
threat of a massive attack as have our European Allies. Presumably
the adverse impact can to some extent be mitigated by explaining the
limitations of the Soviet system and pointing up our own immense
offensive capabilities (the offense-defense trade argument), but
this is unlikely to carry the day. It is well worth remembering,
that to the people living under the threat of a massive nuclear
missile attack, the fact that it may be sounder economics to buy
more offensive missiles than defensive ones, will be vitiated if not
entirely lost when it is recognized that only defensive missiles
offer the possibility of saving lives.
- 8.
- In view of the foregoing, it is necessary that we consider not
only how important it is that we make a decision to deploy an
anti-ballistic missile system, but that we also consider the
importance of an earlier, rather than a later, deployment. Were the
factor of cost not so heavy the answer would be self-evident, viz.,
that we should proceed with all speed to deploy the first reasonably
technically adequate system which is available, namely the Nike
Zeus. However, the cost factor is important and in this connection
we are struck by the following factors:
- a.
- That the cost differential between the Nike Zeus and the
Nike X, while significant, is not overwhelming. I gather
that the former system would cost a total of 15% more than
the latter.
- b.
- That the deployment of the Zeus would apparently not
represent a total waste in the sense that the Nike X would
be built upon and would in some measure be a logical
extension of the Nike Zeus. If this is true, this would seem
to me a factor of very great significance. To some extent,
especially from the political point of view, it would appear
that here is a case where we may be able to have at least
some of our cake and eat it too.
- c.
- If, as is undoubtedly the case, the Nike Zeus has
uncertainties as to its performance, presumably the Nike X
must be considered a system of even greater uncertainly. If
we understand correctly the normal evolution of weapon
systems, they invariably demonstrate problems as they move
from development through production, problems which are
never fully predictable in advance. The further away from
completion of development and from initial production, the
greater are the uncertainties likely to be. By this standard
one might question whether reliance upon the Nike X might
not result in even further delay in achieving actual
deployment than the two years beyond Nike Zeus estimated for
this system’s availability.
- 9.
- Consideration of all of the foregoing factors as they bear upon
the conduct of our national security policy over the next several
years, gives rise to concern over the prospect of a Soviet
deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system in the absence of a
similar US action. Even if each of the systems have some
technological limitations as the DOD
studies contemplate to be the case, the political and psychological
impact of having, or not having, a system to offset that of the
Soviets, would be immense. Thus, even if the Sputniks had no
military significance whatsoever, the mere fact that the Soviets
were able to orbit their vessel in space before we were, created a
serious liability under which we labored for sometime and under
which we still labor to some extent even today. Indeed in such
circumstances the tendency of the US is to try to overcome lost time
through an accelerated effort which may not always result in the
most economical use of funds and which can never fully regain lost
political ground. This is a prospect which cannot be ignored when
considering the anti-ballistic missile problem. It is possible that
with the availability to the Soviets of an ABM defense the political and psychological pressures
will become so great that we will have no alternative other than to
launch an emergency deployment of a system having thereby sacrificed
the opportunity to gain a favorable impact through an earlier
voluntary undertaking and at the same time having to accept what may
be a less economical solution to the problem.
- 10.
- There is one last aspect to the problem which, so far as we are
aware, has not received any prior consideration. This has to do with
the possibility and utility of considering the eventual extension of
an anti-ballistic missile system to Europe. As previously indicated,
as Soviet [Page 422] capabilities in
this field are developed and begin to grow, the pressures upon our
European Allies to have a missile defense will mount. The political
pressure within the countries will unquestionably be reflected in
the make-up of governments and in the manner and extent to which
governments can function effectively in support of policies which
the US believes important. Even if we are ourselves convinced of the
limitations of a ballistic missile defense it is the advantages and
virtues of such a system which the Europeans will emphasize. As with
the problem of the lack of European knowledge about nuclear weapons
and the effects of their employment which now plagues us in our
efforts to gain a common strategic concept with our Allies, so too a
failure to hold open the promise of a ballistic missile defense may
have an analogous effect. While the tremendous cost involved will
always represent a practical inhibition to active European interests
in this area, we do not think we can exclude or downgrade that
interest solely on those grounds. To the contrary, particularly if
the US were to encourage the notion that a considerable degree of
defense could be bought through deployment of an anti-ballistic
missile system, it seems not improbable that the Europeans might
well be inclined to invest considerable resources to this end. We
recognize, of course, that to some extent this could be
counter-productive insofar as it drains away European resources from
other defense expenditures, which, from our point of view, we would
prefer to see them make. It might, however, have a contrary effect
by draining away resources from low priority defense programs.
Whether we like it or not, however, the pressures are quite likely
to exist. Either we will be able to satisfy them at least to some
extent, or we will have to pay the possible serious political price
of not being able to meet what the Europeans will probably consider
to be a legitimate requirement.
