Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

44. Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, July 28, 1961, 11 p.m.

323. McCloy met with Khrushchev at latter’s dacha in Putsunda, south of Sochi, July 26 and morning 27th. Most of conversation centered on Berlin although McCloy repeatedly emphasized he not in position discuss officially any subject except disarmament and could express views on Berlin only as private citizen. Khrushchev generally in good humor, displaying fits of temper only when he referred to what he called US threat of war over German peace treaty and to President’s speech.¹ Fol highlights discussion both days. Memcon will follow as soon as available.²

[Here follows discussion of Berlin, Germany, and Laos; for text, see volume XIV, pages 231–234.]

4. Disarmament (July 26 and 27). McCloy stressed strongly his personal and United States desire get to practical disarmament. Described background his appointment as President’s Adviser on Disarmament and recalled his efforts develop such US position on test ban as would be acceptable to Soviets and his deep disappointment when negotiations assumed negative form primarily as result introduction troika proposal. Stated as result Geneva deadlock possibility resumption tests being discussed in US. No widespread enthusiasm for resumption discernible although present situation unverified moratorium and possible courses of action being seriously studied. Stressed if one side testing clandestinely and the other is not, point would be reached where national security involved; therefore wondered what could be done this area so that efforts made in Geneva would not be completely lost. Mentioned possibility ban atmospheric and under-water tests with extension ban when means of detecting tests underground and outer space improved. Emphasized significance reaching test ban agreement as first step toward agreement in broader disarmament areas. Said he searching for way to assure both sides no clandestine testing going on now. Referred to pressure exerted by some quarters on President to resume testing and said he assumed Khrushchev under similar pressure. Rejected Sov contention French testing for US and we assisting them. Wondered whether present Sov reluctance have test ban perhaps due Chinese pressure. Re general disarmament expressed concern how reality could be introduced in disarmament in light present Berlin situation. Congress asking questions why money should be appropriated for proposed new disarmament agency when President asking money for armaments. (Khrushchev interjected this logical question.) However, perhaps we should continue our efforts until sun shines again and attempt work out program for relieving ourselves of armaments and for bringing better life to world. Noted value contacts between two sides in spite fact some of our friends nervous about them and expressed belief contacts on this most important question should be left open. Re controls, emphasized strongly unacceptability troika and explained requirement verification levels remaining after reduction. Pointed out necessity arrangements impartial arbitrament disputes and some restriction sovereignty if horrors of war to be avoided and total disarmament achieved. Recalled US/USSR differences re purpose bilateral talks but stated discussions nevertheless useful.

Re tests, Khrushchev asserted Sovs not testing clandestinely and assured McCloy would not do it in future either. Said strong pressure on him to resume tests because many inventions and discoveries had accumulated and designers want test them This pressure now stronger in view Berlin situation and threat of war if peace treaty signed. Said he had been successful in resisting pressure so far but if US intensified its threats of war over peace treaty it would assist those in Soviet Union who want resumption. Stated Sov scientists believed 100 megaton bomb would be most economical cost-wise. Sovs have rocket capable of lifting such bomb. However, such bomb would require testing. Asserted he had told his scientists perhaps US would resume testing and thus help them test their bomb. Conceded no agreement in Geneva in sight since US would not agree to troika and Sovs could not abandon it. Reiterated Sov arguments re espionage and lessons of Congo events, as well as Sov position test ban would not resolve disarmament problem. Likewise, recited standard Sov line on French testing. Contended present Sov position test ban not due Chinese pressure and claimed no pressure on part anybody possible in socialist camp. Stated Chinese would of course eventually develop nuclear bomb but claimed ignorance when that would be.

Stated under general and complete disarmament troika would be dropped and would not be acceptable even if US should propose it. No troika would exist even in course process of GCD and control and inspection would not be subject to veto or any restriction. Comprehensive control must correspond to staged disarmament program because establishment control prior actual disarmament would mean control without disarmament; i.e., intelligence. After completion GCD process unrestricted and vetoless control established earlier would be permanently institutionalized. Sovs completely flexible as to what measures disarmament program should be started with; US should take its choice and Sovs would agree. Referred to elimination of means of delivery as possible first stage measure, although said perhaps it would be well start with conventional armaments so that both sides could retain rockets as deterrent. Also listed as possible first stage measures elimination foreign bases and complete withdrawal of foreign troops; gradual withdrawal of troops by stages with inspection to reduce danger of surprise attack; atom free zone along lines Rapacki Plan; establishment of observers at strategic points (major railroad stations, highway junctions, airfields and ports, but not launching sites because this would be possible only if rockets destroyed); non-aggression pact; and dissolution all military pacts. Stressed Sovs regard rockets and nuclear weapons their main weapon and expressed belief air force receding in history. Recent Sov air show may have been swan song of air force. Said President’s intention increase orders military aircraft would result merely in good business for aircraft manufacturers. Asserted military bases have lost value with advent missiles.³

Thompson

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2861. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.
1. Reference is to the President’s speech on Berlin delivered the evening of July 25. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 535-540.
2. This 25-page memorandum, dated July 31, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 7/11/61-7/31/61.
3. In telegram 304 from Moscow, July 27, the Embassy reported that at the end of his conversation with McCloy, Khrushchev stated that he had seen the text of a Soviet draft of a joint U.S.-Soviet statement on “Basic Principles of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament” and that it reflected his views. Telegram 304 transmitted a translation of this draft, which Zorin handed to McCloy on his return flight to Moscow. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-2761) A sightly different translation, dated July 28, is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 267-269.