Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

130. Memorandum From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, February 21, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Resumption of Atmospheric Tests

Without more information than I have it is not possible to hazard an opinion as to whether atmospheric testing should be resumed. From what I have heard I assume a decision has been reached, however, to resume tests for legitimate reasons of military security, and not for political and psychological considerations.

The political price of test resumption will be paid most directly in the United Nations and in terms of public opinion around the world. The immediate problem, therefore, is to cushion the shock and moderate the adverse political effects of such testing. There are the following possibilities:

(1) Assuming that it is not realistically possible to delay the announcement on March 1 that the United States will resume atmospheric testing, every effort should be made to channel the controversy out of the United Nations and into the Geneva 18-nation Conference. We should press there for immediate consideration of a test ban treaty together with an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as specified in the present U.S. disarmament program, but without prejudice to more general disarmament discussions.

(2) A new test ban agreement, to be most negotiable, should not involve elaborate international controls or inspection arrangements. One possibility would be a comprehensive ban on all testing, with a limited number of inspection challenges by each side to investigate whenever national detection systems indicate that there is clandestine testing. The agreement would be temporary—perhaps of two years duration—so as to allow time to work out a definitive treaty with broader controls, in the context of other disarmament measures. To deal with the problem of clandestine test preparations, we could propose continuous observation of known testing sites and maintain our own standby preparations for resumption of tests. This is not the only type of treaty we might propose, but it has the virtue of relative simplicity. The important point is to keep pressing for a test ban agreement even as we test.

(3) Other initial steps which we could suggest at the outset of the Geneva meeting to improve our posture include:

(a) a proposal to set aside specified quantities of delivery vehicles (bombers and missiles) for eventual destruction;

(b) immediate cut-off of fissionable materials production, with sequestration of specified quantities of weapons material for ultimate peaceful use;

(c) various measures to reduce the risks of war by surprise attack or miscalculation through systems of fixed or mobile observation groups, aerial observation, and reciprocal inspection in specified zones. (We should prepare the best possible mix of regional security arrangements: area to be covered; limitations to be placed on weapons, manpower and movement; facilities for observation and inspection);

(d) an agreement prohibiting the placing in orbit of weapons of mass destruction;

(e) an updating of the 1925 Convention to prohibit the use of chemical, biological and radiological warfare;¹

(f) a non-aggression agreement between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, perhaps linked with limitations on certain types of forces near East-West demarcation lines;

(g) immediate drafting of the Charter of an International Disarmament Organization and of arrangements for a United Nations Peace Force.

(4) I recognize that each of the foregoing measures could involve some disadvantages for the United States, but we must realize that without any of them our disarmament posture is thin and featureless. We should be prepared to offer some specific proposals to offset the Soviet propaganda onslaught calling for immediate and radical disarmament measures without adequate controls.

(5) I assume that the rationale for the decision to resume testing will be set forth fully and persuasively in a statement by the President which will be circulated to all UN Delegations in New York.

(6) I conclude with the suggestion that if testing must be resumed and an announcement is to be made promptly, we should attempt to:

(a) channel the discussion into the 18-nation Conference in Geneva;

(b) urgently propose a new test ban treaty;

(c) propose at the outset an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons;

(d) propose two or three other initial arms control steps of the type suggested above.

Unless we are prepared to come forth with a group of such initial measures, and unless the President indicates in his announcement that he intends to make such proposals, we shall be exposed to widespread protests and growing demands for unrealistic and unacceptable disarmament measures.

Let us lead not follow. The essential point is that test resumption makes it all the more necessary to press for a test ban and other immediate disarmament measures. Let us not insist on unattainable perfection in inspection and control and thereby jeopardize the whole disarmament enterprise.²

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests 2/17/62-4/4/62. Confidential.
1. For text of the protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925, and entered into force on February 8, 1928 (for the United States on April 10, 1975), see 26 UST 571.
2. This last paragraph is handwritten.