Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

13. National Intelligence Estimate⁰

NIE 4-2-61

Washington, April 6, 1961.

ATTITUDES OF KEY WORLD POWERS ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES

The Problem

To assess the underlying motivations and objectives of key world powers—the USSR, Communist China, France, the UK, West Germany, and Canada—in the field of disarmament and arms control.

Scope

Disarmament, as used in this estimate, refers generally to all forms and degrees of arms limitation, controls, regulation or reduction, and is not restricted to the idea of abolition of armaments. Where useful or necessary, the terms “general and complete disarmament” or “arms control” will be specified in the discussion according to the context.

This estimate does not aim to present the detailed negotiating positions of the various powers on all disarmament issues, or to examine the merits of different technical proposals, but rather to inquire into the underlying motivations and factors affecting the general attitudes of these states.

Conclusions

1. It is clear that the Soviet leaders see, in agitation of the disarmament issue, a prime opportunity to further their political purposes in the non-Communist world. What is not so clear is the extent to which they may actually desire to conclude agreements on disarmament. In approaching this latter question, they are influenced in contrary directions by a variety of considerations.

2. Communist ideology sanctions the use of any means which is deemed expedient to advance its cause. Military power in various forms, including the delivery of arms, is one of these means, and the Communist leaders are using it to extend their control and influence. At the same time, Marxism-Leninism, while favoring and supporting “wars of liberation,” teaches that the fundamental political, economic, and social forces at work in the world can bring about the eventual world-wide triumph of communism. And Communist doctrine enjoins the USSR to instigate and support subversive and revolutionary activities to accelerate final victory. One theoretically possible way to give revolutionary forces freer play would be by reducing or eliminating Western military force through agreements on disarmament. Marxism-Leninism therefore permits the Soviet leaders to consider that if the armed forces of their opponents were reduced or eliminated, the results might be worth limitations of their own military power, always provided the military power balance was not shifted to their disadvantage. (Para. 14)

3. The Soviets are also concerned by the consequences to them of general nuclear war. We believe that they continue to think that a complete ban on the use of nuclear weapons would be to their advantage. They also see advantages in some kinds of disarmament measures directed against the various ways in which nuclear war might break out. They are probably also attracted to disarmament measures as a possible means of achieving a military advantage by encouraging the West to cut its defense efforts even further than the terms of agreement, and of promoting a climate of relaxation favorable to Communist exploitation. (Paras. 16-19)

4. On the other hand, the Soviets perceive dangers and disadvantages in the prospect of substantial disarmament. They are deeply conscious of the impact which the image and the substance of their military strength have made upon the world, of the security which that strength has given them as compared with their exposed position in the past, and of the respect which it has compelled from other nations. Furthermore, the USSR would be reluctant to undertake measures which might endanger its control over Eastern Europe or alter the relationship of power, and hence of political weight, between itself and Communist China. (Paras. 21, 25)

5. From the Soviet point of view, the greatest difficulty in reaching disarmament agreements favorable to their ultimate world objectives is presented by Western requirements for inspection. A primary reason for the strong Soviet aversion to inspection is military: having developed secrecy into a major military asset, the Soviets are reluctant to impair and unwilling to relinquish secrecy until assured that the enemy has given up the forces which might use in an attack the knowledge acquired through inspection. Another is political: while the regime’s anxieties concerning contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners are diminishing, the implications of an international inspectorate—cooperation with the enemy and recognition of a higher sovereignty in the control organization—remain inimical to the political outlook fostered by the Communist Party. Finally, the Soviets obviously oppose effective inspection because it would foreclose the option of evading the agreement. (Paras. 22-24)

6. Apart from these considerations, the Soviets have a most lively sense of the political uses of talking about disarmament. Realizing that the intricacies of the subject are little understood, they have hit upon their proposal for general and complete disarmament as a way to capture the universal yearning for peace and, at the same time, to label the West as “against” disarmament. It is not a proposal which they expect to have to make good on, but it is a highly potent instrument of political warfare. (Para. 31)

7. The Soviet leaders may conclude, however, that some more modest proposals offer sufficient advantages, in terms both of their particular effects and the impetus they would provide to general agitation of the disarmament theme, to justify entering upon serious discussions of limited measures. They expect their advocacy of general and complete disarmament to create a strong position for them in any such negotiations. To date, however, the disadvantages of limited measures, including the inspection they would entail, appear to have predominated in Soviet thinking. (Paras. 32-44)

8. The Chinese Communists approach the disarmament question in a different spirit. They are less concerned than the USSR with the dangers of war, and they regard the tactic of negotiation with the enemy as offering dubious prospects and tending to sap revolutionary fervor. Peiping’s primary interest in disarmament, therefore, lies in the political gains—diplomatic recognition, the return of Taiwan, admission to the UN—which it hopes to extract when its participation in disarmament negotiations is sought. (Paras. 45-46, 48)

9. The Chinese leaders are determined to acquire a nuclear capability and appear to suspect (probably rightly) that Soviet disarmament policy is designed in part to delay or prevent this. They are anxious to forestall any agreements which might have this effect, such as the combination of a nuclear test ban and an agreement not to transfer nuclear weapons and technology to other countries. We believe that, as China’s weight within the Bloc grows, certain arms control measures are becoming more attractive to the USSR, while at the same time Chinese pressures are impinging upon Soviet freedom of action. (Paras. 26, 47, 49)

10. The strongest support for disarmament comes from Canada, which is especially concerned with being caught up in a nuclear war and has attempted to create a role for itself as a leader of the “middle powers,” urging the major contestants into serious negotiations. Another strong supporter of disarmament is the UK, which sees in arms control measures a chance to close the nuclear club and to initiate movement toward an East-West détente. In spite of a strong and genuine interest in disarmament both at the official and popular level, the government does not wish to jeopardize its relationship with the US by separating itself too far from US policies on disarmament. France, on the other hand, is determined not to be prevented from acquiring a national nuclear capability. French attitudes on disarmament will continue to be based on considerations of national prestige and the satisfaction of de Gaulle’s desire for international status, even though his determination to acquire nuclear forces is not widely shared by other French political leaders or even by many military leaders. The West German attitude toward disarmament is marked by an intense preoccupation with the implications of any general disarmament agreement for the special security problems of the Federal Republic. As West Germany’s national power increases, we believe that it will seek a more direct voice in disarmament matters. Both France and West Germany oppose regional schemes confined to Central Europe, fearing that these would discriminate against them and jeopardize collective security with the West. (Paras. 50-63)

[Here follows the 11-page “Discussion” section of the estimate.]

0. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Estimates 4, Arms and Disarmament. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: “Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency.” The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on April 6. The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.