12. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests 0
Nusup 1123. Upon invitation of Winiewicz, Head of the Polish UN Delegation and presumably at request of Gromyko, McCloy had two hour conversation night March 30 at Polish Mission New York with Soviet Foreign Minister. Others present were Zorin-USSR, Ambassador Lwandowski and Professor Lachs of Poland and Shepard Stone.
Prior to discussion more specific problems, McCloy described role as Adviser on Disarmament. McCloy stated he had not come to Washington to maneuver or to engage in tactical exercise but to help bring about agreement with Soviet Union on disarmament. President had made it crystal clear to McCloy that such was his objective. McCloy stated agreement with Soviet Union was imperative and it now remained to find items of common interest and to begin.
Gromyko asked many questions about economic aspects of disarmament. McCloy pointed out based on experience with U.S. industry and banking that though disarmament would mean readjustments and in a very few cases some dislocation, overwhelming emphasis U.S. industry and business was non-military and eager to expand non-military production. Economic problems were not a barrier to U.S. disarmament and Soviets should abandon myth that U.S. could not afford to disarm. Gromyko appeared to show interest in views outlined and said he accepted and gave credit to statement.
In answer to Gromyko question as to barriers in way of GCD, McCloy outlined his views on negative aspects of Soviet secrecy and need for inspection and controls so that both sides would gain mutual experience and overcome suspicions and fears. McCloy emphasized need for first steps which leading to growth of mutual trust would later accelerate to larger program. Throughout evening Gromyko emphasized what seemed to him American misunderstanding of Soviet proposals. He insisted Soviets agree on necessity inspection and controls and that at end of each stage of disarmament Soviet proposals contemplated a review of situation before going on to next stage. GCD objective necessary because partial steps taken independently without overall program would create disequilibrium. He implied that partial steps proposed by U.S. were aimed at weakening Soviet Union. McCloy argued [Page 33] against practicability of Soviet proposal and re-emphasized need to take first steps and build on them. Gromyko asked what first steps were contemplated. Without trying outline appropriate sequence, McCloy mentioned: (a) necessity to reach test ban agreement in Geneva, (b) cut-off of production fissionable materials to be followed later by decreases in stockpiles, (c) ban on bombs in orbit, (d) common efforts to work out measures to prevent accidental warfare and surprise attack, (e) common efforts in peaceful uses atomic energy. Gromyko asked for repetition this list two or three times and seemed to be interested. He was told we would welcome Soviet proposal as to first step but important matter was to get started.
Gromyko said Soviet at Geneva was waiting to hear full U.S. proposals and hoped there would be new things to come out of our “bag.” Soviet would make serious study proposals but was not impressed so far. Soviet Foreign Minister did not consider, for example 19 inspection stations in U.S.S.R. as against 21 as an important gesture but he did not labor the point. Gromyko insisted that three man administration was sticking point for Soviets admitting that Soviets wanted veto. He said he hoped we would not believe Soviet proposal was based on Soviet expectation that they would always get majority in control commission and he said that Soviets would be “reasonable” in the operation of the veto. McCloy emphasized that Soviet three-man suggestion had had serious negative effect in Washington and he hoped Soviets would reconsider. Gromyko admitted relationship of all this to the attack on UN.
Gromyko asked McCloy’s views on where June–July talks should take place. McCloy emphasized this a matter for discussion with Stevenson and Rusk, not McCloy and that any views he expressed were personal and without official significance. McCloy said he personally not in favor of Swiss resort town or similar place because other nations would become suspicious of a separate conference and, therefore, McCloy preferred Washington and Moscow. Gromyko said his views paralleled those expressed and he mentioned Washington in June and Moscow in July.
On French testing, Gromyko stated without emphasizing point that U.S. could be using France, its NATO ally, to do its testing. McCloy emphasized U.S. had not given weapons or information to France and had no intention of doing so. Essential for US-USSR to sign Geneva agreement and at that time world opinion would make it difficult for France and we hoped China not to accede to agreement. Gromyko’s only mention of China was to state that China like Russia favored GCD and wanted to bury all arms in a hole in ground.
[Page 34]The conversation was frank and friendly ranging from World War II memories of common effort to need for stopping and turning back arms race.
At his request Winiewicz met Shepard Stone at Century, New York on April 3 as follow-up Gromyko-McCloy conversation held at Polish Mission, New York March 30.
According Winiewicz, Gromyko, after McCloy and Stone departed, had stated conversation useful, productive and promising. Gromyko had gained impression of sincerity, frankness, and was returning to Moscow with belief U.S. launching serious disarmament effort. On other hand, Zorin, who had been present at conversation, had stated that first steps mentioned by McCloy were not new. Gromyko replied that steps were not new but that did not make them less important.
Apropos Geneva Test Ban talks, Winiewicz said that Gromyko had not been fully briefed on details and therefore had been somewhat reluctant to carry on discussions about Geneva. Winiewicz stated that he had impression from Gromyko, Geneva Test Ban negotiations would be “locked” with no real progress until after talks on comprehensive disarmament had started and showed some signs of advance.
Stone pointed out that failure of Russia to come to agreement at Geneva talks would have serious negative effect in U.S. in respect later comprehensive talks. Winiewicz said he thought U.S. had not made this point adequately clear to USSR and suggested that Ambassador Thompson ought to do so in Moscow.
Winiewicz put in a plea for previous Polish proposals, freezing of present arms situation in Central Europe and also for Rapacki Plan. He said that this would not mean Germany would have to withdraw from NATO, but that Germany and East European countries would not possess atom weapons.
In conclusion Winiewicz said major divisive point between US-USSR was position of Secretary General UN. As for Laos, he said “that is not a problem or conflict between U.S. and USSR, but it is a Moscow-Peking problem.”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/4-461. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Shepard Stone, Special Assistant to McCloy; cleared by McCloy, Fisher, and EUR/SOV; and approved by Spiers. Also sent to USUN and Moscow.↩