161. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs’ Special Assistant (Sullivan)1
I talked at length with the French Charge, the Canadian ICC Commissioner, and the Indian ICC Commissioner on the subject of relations between North and South Vietnam. All of them were inclined to doubt that there was much substance in current rumors about a Nhu-Ho deal. However, all of them insisted that we should not discount the possibility of such a deal in the future. (The French Charge said “three or four months.”)
Their reasoning was similar. All of them felt the North was hurting very badly economically and was aware that the Viet Cong was losing the battle in the South. They therefore concluded that, in return [Page 326] for two stipulations, the North would be willing to negotiate a cease fire agreement with the South. These two stipulations are: North-South trade and the departure of U.S. forces.
An additional factor which [less than 1 line not declassified] felt might impel the North to such a deal was Chinese pressure. If U.S. forces could be removed from Vietnam, the Chinese might ease somewhat their pressure on Hanoi and grant them a greater measure of autonomy.
All three felt Brother Nhu might be willing to make such a deal for two reasons. First, his supreme confidence in being able to “beat the Communists at their own game”; and second, his desire to be rid of the Americans. The French Charge admitted that Ambassador Lalouette had talked with Nhu in these terms. Both Nhu and Lalouette had concluded that the progress of the war, prior to recent events, was such that a deal could probably safely be negotiated by the end of this year. Nhu’s subsequent disclosure of these talks to Alsop2 has embarrassed the French and they now say they distrust Nhu’s ultimate intentions.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71-A-3470, Back up Documents and Notes, 9/25/63-Trip to SVN. Top Secret.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 151.↩