160. Memorandum of a Conversation by the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)1
Saigon, September 30,
1963.
- Point 1. [less than 1 line not declassified] resources include [less than 1 line not declassified] scattered throughout the country and university professors at Dalat, Hue, and Saigon. Many if not most of these men have had experience in Communist China as a basis for comparison with South Vietnam.
- Point 2. What one sees in South Vietnam is scenery but underneath the apparent calm of the surface is a “turning of the screw” which is increasing with control of the government over the people. The machinery to dominate the people is as perfect as that employed by the Communists. The government has established a police State although the family has successfully disguised this fact. [less than 1 line not declassified] will send us a list of examples of police state actions in South Vietnam.
- Point 3. At first, people who had been tortured were afraid to speak out but now they are willing to do so. “Absolutely people have been tortured.” He “is so harassed and bothered by the situation that he is asking himself should not the Church speak out and publicize it before the world?”
- Point 4. When the [less than 1 1ine not declassified] arrived, the regime and the Church sat in the witness box together but now he is separated. The government has gone so far as to censor the Pope’s speeches.
- Point 5. The torturing of prisoners is continuing and is applied to any adversary of the regime. The students and the intellectuals see all adversaries being eliminated. They see no help from the Church and the US. Therefore, they are forced to other solutions: some are going and will continue to go to the Viet Cong but more are turning to neutralists. With neutralism they believe “we will have no more war and at least a hope to topple the regime”. They “prefer the devil we do not know to the one we do”.
- Point 6. The intellectuals believe the continued presence of Diem could be useful (they say he is not very intelligent but that he does have the respect of many of the people). What they believe is that if the family stays they (the intellectuals) will be working for the Communists.
- Point 7. If the United States and the Church do not find a solution, they are working for the Communists. We could lose the country to the Communists even though we continue to have technical military successes. [less than 1 1ine not declassified] stated he was a Sicilian who knows the mentality of the Mafia. Here it is big Mafia, the Viet Cong. At a certain time all is quiet because the Mafia has given the order to make it so. But if the policy of the Mafia changes the calm disappears and unrest erupts. In South Vietnam, there are districts which we believe to be quiet but this is so only because the Viet Cong have an interest to make it appear so. Through the [less than 1 1ine not declassified] knows there are many districts where all appears tranquil, where people are working, and where VC attacks have dropped off but where there are many VC simply biding their time and the people appear to denounce them.
- Point 8. If Nhu achieves complete power, the first thing he will do is to ask the United States to go home, and then he will make a deal with the Communists because he believes he could then become boss of all of Vietnam, but, of course, the Communists would never permit him to do so.
- Point 9. The ideas that Nhu is teaching the republican youth are strongly Communist ideology—as laying the basis for Communism.
- Point 10. There is time to save South Vietnam but it requires that we change Nhu immediately. The results would be so advantageous that it is worth running the risk. There would be some disorder but the gain would be worth it.
- Point 11. Nobody, no Bishop, has sufficient courage to contradict Thuc. He has struck fear in the heart of all
- Point 12. It is impossible to reason with Nhu, Madame Nhu, and Thuc. They refuse to accept the advice of [less than 1 line not declassified]. It is too late to lead them to modify the policies. The only way to change the situation is to force Nhu to leave.
- Point 13. It is difficult to predict how the Army will behave if the Nhu’s continue in power because of “double controls” similar to but more effective than those in the Soviet Army. The authority of the generals is limited. They are moved around frequently to limit their power and the regime holds back from combat at all times certain units to utilize in support of the cell.
- Point 14. People are not sure of the position of the United States because in November 1960 and February ‘62, the United States appeared to support the government against those who wished to overthrow it. The people believe the Americans think that (the Americans) were wrong in criticizing Nhu, the elections are over, the Buddhist problem solved (this is of course nothing but scenery), and all is well.
- Point 15. The United States government has not been speaking with one voice in Saigon. This has blurred US policy in the minds of the potential opposition and has confused the people.
Robert S.
McNamara2