Office of the Historian

300. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(Taylor)1

Saigon, August 27, 1963, 8:05 p.m.

MAC 1540. Ref A. JCS 3354-63.2 B. CINCPAC 260302Z.3 Following observation keyed to paras of ref A:

1. US personnel, military and civilian are in no more immediate danger than usual. However, recognize full well that in atmosphere which exists here this situation could change momentarily. Situation is being closely monitored continuously. Arrangements for security and evacuation well covered in existing plans which support and are compatible with Embassy E & E plan. Am in direct liaison Embassy E & E officer on details. Published plans all based on assumption that friendly local government will be in control. Possibility that this assumption may not be valid has stimulated our thoughts along alternative lines.

Ref B indicates CINCPAC’s thoughts along this line and action he has taken and is prepared to take in such an eventuality. We are in detailed development and review of alternative courses of security and emergency evacuation actions based on degree of loss of control by friendly government. Cataloging of location of some 5000 US noncombatants in RVN in good shape, various notification nets appear adequate and procedures checking out okay.

Concur in SecDef observation on use of commercial air as primary evacuation mode. For alternative actions utilizes in country and other immediately available govt evacuation transportation assets as primary mode. [sic]

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2. In context of State 243 to Saigon4 “direct support” interpreted here as indicating that US diplomatic recognition will be forth coming promptly and that US economic and military assistance to RVN will continue as at present, even under most extreme contingency of military coup in which not only Nhus but also Diem is removed from scene.

Specifically unless I receive other instructions I interpret “direct support” of military as covering the following:

a.
Full military backing, military counsel and advice.
b.
Use of US communications and unarmed aircraft for troop transport, supply, recce and command liaison.
c.
Denial of further funds, equipment, advice, communication and aircraft to opposing military and paramilitary forces, and in particular, Col Tung’s units. CAS must of course also deny.

Feasibility of foregoing direct support measures in event pressure on armed intervention from forces loyal to Palace depends in large part on how play develops. Category of support covered in pare a above feasible under all conditions, though effectiveness can be reduced should key MACV staff be restricted in freedom of movement’ Believe however, we have enough good people to carry on despite some interruptions.

As to pare b above, a hostile VNAF could [garble] deny use of Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa. We will have to make tough decisions as between further concentration of aircraft VN-USA-Bien Hoa complex which is pertinent to E and E planning and dispersion suggested by maximum support of coup. Present disposition of USAF/USA/USMC aircraft outside Saigon area insures that we can provide considerable but not optimum assistance to forces converging on capital. Deployment of forces estimated to side with military takeover is reasonable assurance that major part of communication net would be preserved.

My best judgment as to reliability and alignment of senior military leaders is as follows:

a.
Composition of group which would coalesce to plan and execute a military takeover:
(1).
Gen Big Minh, Advisor to Pres
  • Gen Don
  • Gen Le, former JG of CG, now deputy to Don
  • Gen Little Minh, IG, ARVN
  • Gen Khiem, C/S, JGS
  • Gen Khanh, II Corps
  • Gen Tri, I Corps
  • Gen Le Van Kim, currently deputy to Don
  • Gen Chien, currently deputy to Don
  • Col Vien, CO ADH Brigade
(2).
Loyalty of all runs to Diem not Nhu. Estimate that all, except Don and Le, convinced that both Nhu and Diem must now go. bon and Le would probably accept retention of Diem as nominal head of state.
(3).
All are firmly pro-US with possible exception of Tri,. given his violent nationalism.
(4).
The only general to whom others would subordinate themselves is Big Minh.
(5).
Those most qualified and also in positions to take lead in planning are Khanh, Khiem, Tri, Kim, and Little Minh. Don is, of course, completely boxed in.
b.
Those who will stick with status quo, opposing takeover:
(1).
Gen Dinh, III Corps
  • Gen Cao, IV Corps
  • Col Tung, Cmdr Special Forces
  • Col Hien, Co VNAF
(2).
Estimate Dinh and Cao would eventually attempt switch but too late. Tung would go down swinging. Hien not likely to rally any significant portion of VNAF. No loyalty ties among any of four.
c.
The opportunists, who likely be aloof from planning but ready to jump quickly:
  • Gen Oai, RVNAF psywar chief
  • Gen La, CG Capital Mil Dist
  • Capt Quyen, Cmdr, VNH
  • Col Khang, Cmdr VNMC

4. Consensus here is that Vice President Tho is best candidate as man who all might rally behind as Presidential successor.

Will continue to maintain close liaison with Amb. Lodge. Keeping him informed of what I am doing and will file personal reports to JCS and CINCPAC as matters of significance [garble—occur?].

  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-172-69. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to Honolulu for Felt.↩
  2. Document 295.↩
  3. In this telegram, August 26, CINCPAC stated that Embassy and COMUSMACV plans for security and evacuation in the event of a coup were sound. CINCPAC also believed that Harkins had enough U.S. troops to evacuate the estimated 4,600 American noncombatants in Vietnam. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, 8/24/63-8/31/63, Defense Cables)↩
  4. Document 281.↩