299. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency1

[document number not declassified] 1. Colonel Conein met with General Tran Thien Khiem at the latter’s invitation at JGS Hqs 1450 local 27 August. General Khiem stated that the question of a military coup against the government had been discussed by a committee of Generals headed by General Duong Van Minh, and that they are agreed a coup will take place within one week.

2. The committee of Generals in addition to General Duong Van Minh includes the following additional personalities: General Le Van Kim; General Nguyen Khanh; General Pham Xuan Chieu; General Nguyen Ngoc Le; General Tran Tu Oai is not a member of the committee but has indicated he will cooperate. General Tran Van Don is a [Page 654] member of the committee but cannot act because he is surrounded by personalities from the Presidency who block effective action on his part.

3. The Generals who are not included in the planning and who must be neutralized include: General Ton That Dinh; General Huynh Van Cao.

4. Colonel Le Quang Tung is considered a primary target by the coup committee and will be destroyed together with his entire encampment as one of the first acts of the coup.

5. In connection with the destruction of Colonel Tung and his Special Forces, General Khiem requested and was told he would receive a complete inventory of the ordnance now in stock at the Long Thanh training camp.

6. Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho is aware of the coup planning and supports it. He is the choice of the Generals as civilian leader of the succeeding government. He is aware of the seven points presented by Conein to Khiem 26 August.2

7. The government to be formed after the coup will be headed by Vice President Tho but will include some military officers in Cabinet positions. The government will not be a military government or junta since the coup committee believes that circumstance would lead to instability as is the case in Korea at present.

8. General Khiem stated that General Duong Van Minh had specifically requested it be passed to Colonel Conein that General Minh feels his position is so precarious at the present moment that General Minh cannot make contact with any Americans at the present time. Americans should not try to contact General Minh.

9. Likewise, General Khiem stated that he did not wish Colonel Conein to visit JGS again on these matters until the coup has been completed. Alternatively, General Khiem suggested that [4 lines not declassified].

[Numbered paragraph 10 (5 lines) not declassified]

11. General Khiem also requested that all official American media cease all discussion of extension or cut-off of aid to Vietnam. General Khiem states that the recent statements on this matter by VOA have been confusing and could hurt the Generals’ cause by leading people to believe that the U.S. will continue aid to the present government regardless of circumstances.

12. General Khanh came to Saigon on night of 26 August and contacted General Khiem. General Khanh is in complete agreement with the coup plan.

[Page 655]

13. General Khiem asked for and received assurance that the U.S. would do all in its power to assist the families of the Generals engaged in the coup plot in the event of its failure.

  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-172-69. Top Secret. The source text is a copy sent by the CIA to the JCS exclusive for McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, and Krulak. Copies were also sent to the Department of State exclusive for Rusk, Ball, Harriman, and Hilsman and to the White House exclusive for Bundy. This copy was received at the JCS at 11:36 a.m.
  2. See Documents 290 and 291.