Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

298. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, August 27, 1963, 5 p.m.

346. CINCPAC for POLAD. Report of one hour meeting with Nhu.

1. After exchange of amenities, he called attention to the comment by the Department of State Spokesman on the VOA broadcast² and said that such statements from Washington should stop. He used the French phrase “doivent s’arreter”, which could be translated “must stop”. U.S. statements about Vietnam were accepted at face value by many other governments and U.S. was therefore injuring Vietnam’s standing with foreign countries. He said that Washington should await my report before making any further comment. Moreover the Washington statement was wholly false as regards the facts, inasmuch as it was the Generals themselves who had specifically demanded the action which had been taken. He thought that the U.S. people talked too much, whereas in Vietnam they did not talk enough.

2. I said that I did not know the details of the statement, but that there were some things that were very real to me as a man who had spent many years in public life and one of them was that no long range foreign policy could be carried out by the U.S. Government without the support of Congress and public opinion. I said that public opinion in the U.S. was much distressed by the treatment of the Buddhists and statements made in connection therewith. These have greatly complicated the job of the Executive branch of the U.S. Government in aiding Vietnam and that frankly I sympathized with whatever efforts the Executive branch might make to make clear to U.S. public opinion that our Vietnam policy did not involve stultifying ourselves-which would definitely be the case if we underwrote some of Madame Nhu’s statements like “barbecuing the Buddhists” and her last interview with Life which proposed total destruction of Buddhists.³ I said I was receiving letters about these statements and asked whether I should say in reply that Madame Nhu was not an official person and was speaking only for herself, to which he said that she was a member of the Assembly and was therefore a public person.

3. All of this took place in a pleasant conversational tone on both sides.

4. Other points made by Nhu:

5. 35 percent of the population were not in first class Strategic Hamlets. All of the people would be in Strategic Hamlets of some kind by the end of the year and the guerrilla war would then be over. Perhaps there would then be a conventional war.

6. There have been no more suicides since July 20. [?] This was because of the initiative which he had taken. Occidental people should understand that these suicides are brought about within the pagoda where in an atmosphere filled with incense and incantation, an individual is hypnotized, intoxicated and intimidated. This is how suicides are organized. That there have been no more suicides is proof that the measures that have been taken have had effect. He said he had wanted to clear up the matter before my arrival which, he thought, would be on August 26.

7. I said it would be very helpful in the U.S. if there could be some dramatic gesture here regarding the liberation of Buddhist prisoners.

8. He said it was now a fact that all the Buddhist prisoners were being released but he wanted this done quietly with the bonze in each area handling this himself and he could not make a dramatic gesture out of it.

9. He stressed the importance of winning the guerrilla war in terms of worldwide communist objectives and stressed the fact that he had invented personally the concept of the strategic hamlet.

10. When he accompanied me to the door to say goodbye, he said he hoped there would be no more statements out of Washington and I said I hoped there would be no more inflammatory speeches out of Vietnam.

11. This is a highly intelligent and effective man, and would be so considered in any country. My guess is that he is ruthless, not wholly rational by our standards and that he is interested above all in survival of himself and family.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 S VIET-US. Secret; Eyes Only; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC. Received at 11:30 a.m. and relayed to the White House, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and CIA exclusive for principal officers there.
2. Apparent reference to a reply by the Department of State’s Spokesman, Richard 1. Phillips, to a question posed at a press and radio news briefing, August 26. Phillips amplified the VOA broadcast of August 26, Document 287, but without any reference to U.S. aid being cut off. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 865.
3. For text of the interview, see Life, August 16, 1963, p. 31.