78. Editorial Note
On February 21, 1962, the intelligence community issued Special National Intelligence Estimate 10-62, “Communist Objectives, Capabilities and Intentions in Southeast Asia.” (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Southeast Asia.) It concluded (1) that the Communist bloc had maintained basic unity in tactics toward Southeast Asia, but a Sino-Soviet split might result in a more militant Chinese attitude in the area; (2) that large-scale military actions by Chinese or North Vietnam was unlikely; (3) that there was no timetable or priority listing that the Communist forces were following in the area; and (4) that Thailand was a prime candidate for subversion.
One paragraph dealt with South Vietnam; it reads:
“In South Vietnam, we believe that there will be no significant change over the short run in the current pattern of Viet Cong activity, although the scope and tempo of the Communist military and political campaigns will probably be increased. The Viet Cong will probably again resort to large-scale attacks, seeking to dramatize the weakness of the Diem forces and to reduce both civilian and military morale, in an effort to bring about Diemʼs downfall under circumstances which could be exploited to Communist advantage.”