77. Letter From the Commander in Chief, Pacificʼs Political Adviser (Martin), to the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell)1

Dear Cot: While Assistant Secretary Harriman was here2 he raised two subjects with me in a brief, private conversation, stressing the importance of my taking the right line on them. This conversation took place during the morning break, and although at lunch time Mr. Harriman said he wanted to have another word with me before he left, the opportunity for one never arose. The purpose of this letter is to find out just what the Departmentʼs thinking is on these subjects.

The first subject is Jungle Jim operations. Mr. Harriman expressed concern about the inadequacy of information as to targets with the consequent danger that innocent people would be killed. He emphasized that such operations should not be conducted in such a way as to alienate the Vietnamese people from the GVN and the United States. He had no objection to close support of ground operations but was worried about other types of air strikes.

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I told him that I had had a letter from you3 expressing much the same concern and had discussed it with Admiral Felt. I pointed out that targets were selected in Viet-Nam on the basis of recommendations by the Vietnamese, and I thought that everyone here was conscious of the great importance of hitting the right targets.

My conversation with Mr. Harriman took place before discussion of Agenda Item 5 on the subject of the problem of target selection and identification, including “action to minimize casualties and damage of friendly assets by air operations”. General Anthis briefed on this subject very thoroughly. He acknowledged that all target information came from the Vietnamese and that the United States could not determine as a fact the validity of target information. However, the USAF did not accept any missions which the VNAF could perform and took every precaution to screen the Vietnamese requests which came to it. General Anthis had imposed the restriction on Jungle Jim operations not to operate less than five miles from the Lao and Cambodian borders during the daytime and ten miles at night.

Following General Anthisʼ briefing Mr. Harriman asked how a decision was made in individual cases as to whether military advantage outweighs political disadvantage. Ambassador Nolting replied that he was convinced that the greatest care has been exercised to insure that wrong targets are not hit although we have to rely completely on Vietnamese intelligence at present. Our post-strike information, however, is virtually nil. He felt we should try to squeeze out more post-strike information and, as our own intelligence capabilities increase, to double check GVN intelligence.

Secretary McNamara said as he saw it there should be three primary restrictions on USAF operations: 1. Minimize risk of loss of US personnel; 2. Avoid trespassing beyond South Viet-Namʼs borders; and, 3. Conduct operations only when there is a net advantage. Ambassador Nolting pointed out (without contradiction) that the surest operations were those of close ground support while interdiction strikes were less safe. Mr. Harriman then said that as he understood it General Harkins and Ambassador Nolting would have to decide in each case the question of the net advantage of an air strike since the necessary information was not available in Washington.

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, I had the feeling (although I was unable to confirm it) that Mr. Harriman was satisfied that the responsible people in Viet-Nam, both on the Embassy and military side, are now doing their best to insure that United States air operations are conducted in such a way as to minimize political disadvantages and that day-to-day controls on such operations must be maintained [Page 163] as a practical matter in Viet-Nam rather than in Washington or Honolulu. If this is incorrect, or if you have further thoughts on this subject, please let me know.

The other subject which Mr. Harriman discussed with me was the defoliant operation. We had just had a briefing on defoliants and it was apparent that the technical information available on the results was inadequate and that management of the whole project had been somewhat confused by the autonomous workings of the R and D people. It also came out that the Communists were making propaganda out of the use of defoliants, as was to be expected.

Based on the communications I have seen from the Department on the subject of defoliants, there has been no conflict in view between this headquarters and the Department on this subject. CINCPAC has never been enthusiastic about the project and was firmly opposed to the spraying of crops, fully realizing the political and propaganda hazards. The push behind the project has come from the Vietnamese themselves and the R and D people. As you know the subject has been discussed at both the previous SecDef conferences and approval given for only limited spraying in order to determine the operational usefulness of defoliants under various conditions. To the best of my knowledge what has been done so far on defoliants has been concurred in by the Department. If there is going to be a change in the Departmentʼs thinking on this subject, I hope you will let me know.

Since I expect to leave with Admiral Felt on February 28 for a brief trip to Southeast Asia, you may not be able to reply to this letter in time to reach me in Honolulu. However, if there is some guidance which would be useful for me to have on these subjects prior to our visit to Saigon March 6-8, perhaps you could send your reply to me there in care of the Embassy, sending a copy to Tom here. I am, of course, at all times glad to receive guidance on such subjects as this from you and others in FE at any time that you feel there is need for it.

Thank you for sending personal regards via Mr. Harriman. I reciprocate them heartily.

Sincerely yours,

Ed
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/2-2162. Top Secret; Official-Informal.
  2. Harriman was in Honolulu on February 19 for the Secretary of Defenseʼs Conference.
  3. Not further identified.