79. Letter From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr) to the Vice President (Johnson)1
Dear Mr. Vice President: One of the nicest things said to me since my arrival here as Chief, MAAG, was your remark, “Iʼm glad we have you fighting for us out here.” Because of this, I feel as a fellow westerner, you will understand the following remarks and my feelings, both personal and professional, about fast moving events here. First of all, I am most happy that the wonderful impact made by your trip, and its dynamic pro-American effect on the Vietnamese people, has not been allowed to lag-that we are delivering on the promises and maintaining the image. Second, I get the distinct impression that since your visit and the advent of Vietnam on the forefront of the world stage, we have tended to be too pessimistic about the situation [Page 165] here. It is still critical but certainly not hopeless. Third, that other of our top people now understand what you learned last May-that there is a hot war going on here for which neither MAAG nor our country was geared.
This latter which I reported 17 months ago, was the key to my past problems here until your understanding began to change the climate of opinion at the policy and decision making levels. As you will recall, an already complex situation was made even more difficult by the military and political ideas on Vietnam which prevailed at that time. MAAG was trying to pull them together into a coordinated effort. However, along the way, the admittedly attractive idea of quick and spectacular military victories instead of the historically sound sustained longer range approach got the upper hand. Although this was contrary to MAAGʼs considered judgment, we naturally attempted to carry it out—even to the point of it becoming counterproductive with Diem.
I was most happy that the Secretary of Defense after hearing my ideas on this, which coincided with Diemʼs opinions, put this idea on the back burner. Time, of course, is the controlling factor for the work of the “Civic Action-Rural Reconstruction” teams in laying the absolutely necessary infrastructure at village and hamlet level which will allow GVN to eventually separate the VC from the people. Such a control framework, plus adequate force which is now on the way, will permit the development of badly needed operational intelligence, plus an understanding on the part of the people through assuring their better protection. These basic elements, with adequate training of sufficient military forces is the crux of the Pacification Problem toward which MAAGʼs advisory effort has been oriented since my arrival.
The announcement of the new Command, USCOMACV, has had a good psychological effect on GVN and RVNAF. However, in providing GVN the tools to do the job, we must not offer so much that they forget that the job of saving their country is theirs—only they can do it. In addition, the political, economic and psychological fields must march abreast of the military effort as a coordinated whole. Ambassador Nolting is working hard on this.
On the military side, while Diem still runs a highly centralized operation, significant progress has been made in the military—although his tendency to run the military show still persists. This will take strong coordinating political assistance in complementing areas. Training has been expedited and improved but, in my professional opinion, it has been cut to buy time until it is now barely marginal and cannot be further reduced. In addition, it is still difficult to get commanders and politicians here to think and act unconventionally. As our enemy is tough, dedicated and trained—we also must be if we are to win.
[Page 166]I feel the new command will find that a firm base has been built here for continued progress as an Area Command—the operational type work the MAAG staff has been hard pressed to do here since 1959. This new headquarters should now allow the slowly increasing staff and command increment which remains with MAAG as a subordinate headquarters, a chance to do a better Training-MAP-job. With the hot war situation, this training job must be especially done well and it must, of necessity, get into the field of daily small unit operational planning. The breakdown of functions and responsibilities between the two headquarters is progressing smoothly and will, no doubt, take this into consideration.
Naturally, due to the rapid build up of recently authorized MAAG Advisors, we are experiencing some “growing pains” in arranging for their logistical support and insuring their prompt assignment to the most productive advisory slots. Of course, we will continue to experience certain frustrations inherent in this wartime situation wherein we have no command authority vis-à-vis our counterparts. However, I feel we are continuing to make progress.
With the formation of a senior headquarters, I particularly wanted you to know the terrific job the people working under me have done—under complex and difficult conditions. I can truly report that we have not let you down with respect to your praise of last May. With the growing understanding of the complex situation here and the psychological effect of our countryʼs strong stand announced to the world—followed through with actions—I am more sure than ever that we will win! Of course,MAAG will continue to work as a part of the new team towards this end. Harryette, my boss from “Six Shooter Junction,” Hemsted, sends her very best to you and your good Lady, as does her sister-in-law, Amanda Amsler of Houston. You can be sure we will keep pushing!
Warmest personal regards,
Lieutenant General, USA
- Source: Declassified Documents, 1976, 33H. Secret.↩