262. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President 1
SUBJECT
- Chemical Crop Destruction, South Vietnam
This memorandum recommends U.S. support of a pilot program for Vietnamese crop destruction operations against the Viet Cong. The direct operation itself would be carried out entirely by Government of Vietnam personnel using their own helicopters. President Diem has consistently advocated the use of herbicides, particularly for crop destruction. Ambassador Nolting stated at my Honolulu conference on July 232 that a major limiting factor on Viet Cong infiltrators into the country is how to keep them fed. On the basis of extensive evaluation, I am satisfied that crop destruction, even in sections of one province, could provide a substantial military advantage.
Ambassador Nolting and General Harkins have recommended, and Admiral Felt has concurred, in a proposal for the Vietnamese to conduct a trial program of chemical crop destruction in Viet Cong territory of eight target areas totaling 2,500 acres (located within the marked square on attached maps)3 in Phu Yen Province. This experimental program, which the Vietnamese are now capable of attempting from the standpoint of technology, would be integrated closely with the Hai Yen II clear-and-hold and resettlement operation now in progress [Page 585] in Phu Yen. The best available political and military intelligence indicates a considerable Viet Cong presence in the target area, and this data would be reevaluated against information collected up to the launching of the program.
On the basis of extensive briefing and their evaluation of the technical factors and GVN preparations, Ambassador Nolting and General Harkins are convinced that crop destruction should be undertaken and that the material and herbicides to be employed are technically effective. They are further convinced that the GVN methods of determining targets, based on the best available ground and air intelligence, take into account all necessary factors. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, staff is in a position to render adequate technical advice.
Many Montagnard tribesmen have abandoned this area in recent months, and they are being resettled or assisted as an integral part of the Hai Yen II operation. Their crops should not be left for the Viet Cong to harvest. The Viet Cong also have crop programs in their mountain redoubt areas. Denial of food supplies would assist in forcing the Viet Cong out of the target area, an objective of the overall clear-and-hold operation.
You have previously directed that food-denial operations would be undertaken only after a careful basis for resettlement and alternative food supply had been created. The operation in Phu Yen, which is similar to Operation Sunrise, meets these conditions. This would be the first trial of both the strategic hamlet concept and the complemental food-denial operations since the successful campaign in Malaya.
There is ample precedent for food-denial operations within Vietnam. Both the Government and Viet Cong have consistently engaged in crop burning as a routine part of operations for a number of years. The efficiency of chemical sprays delivered by helicopters is in marked contrast, however. A single helicopter can spray one acre in about five seconds with very effective defoliant chemicals. The inaccessibility by ground routes of much of this target area has been its primary defense in the past, so that large numbers of plots have with impunity been devoted to crops to support the Viet Cong.
The only possible drawback anticipated is in the psychological area. The proposed operation will doubtless give rise to Communist and some neutralist propaganda, but Ambassador Nolting believes that its effect will be relatively negligible. American participation would be as unobtrusive as possible and limited to technical advice and assistance. The U.S. and GVN have already sustained the brunt of this propaganda line without significantly affecting local or international [Page 586] audiences. The ICC Report on Vietnam of June 2, 1962,4 made no reference to experimental defoliation tests.
In seeking to determine the effectiveness of a GVN crop destruction program on an operational basis, I therefore recommend that a trial operation as proposed herein should be conducted and that you authorize the release of the appropriate chemicals and materiel to the GVN.
The Department of State is submitting its views on the proposed operation by separate memorandum.5
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Secret.↩
- See Document 248.↩
- Neither found.↩
- See Document 208.↩
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Document 270. In a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) to McNamara, also dated August 8, the following paragraph described the State Departmentʼs position:
“The Department of State has neither concurred nor non-concurred. A proposed memorandum to the White House has been forwarded to Governor Harriman and Deputy Under Secretary Johnson for approval. A memorandum to Governor Harriman from Mr. Roger Hilsman [Document 250] … concludes that a crop destruction program should not be initiated until a later date. Governor Harriman earlier had expressed his concern that the U.S., a food-surplus country, would suffer in the Asian opinion forum by being associated with an operation denying food to segments of an underdeveloped country.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Vietnam 1962, 380-385)
↩ - Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.↩