250. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)1
Attached is a study of Embassy Saigonʼs and MACVʼs proposals for destroying crops in South Viet Nam, which we have prepared at Mr. Riceʼs request.2 A brief description of the reasoning and conclusions contained in the basic study follows:
Destroying crops will inevitably have political repercussions. Intelligence is not yet reliable enough to assure that the crops destroyed are those controlled solely by the Viet Cong. Some innocent, or at least persuadable, peasants will be hurt and the Viet Cong will make the most of this in their propaganda and recruiting. Internationally, there will undoubtedly be greater reaction to a program of crop destruction than there was to defoliation.
These are serious liabilities, but under certain conditions the benefits from an effective program for destroying crops might be even weightier.
Food in South Viet Nam is plentiful, and it is not likely that a program for destroying crops would be effective enough to produce starvation among the Viet Cong, but two realistic strategic goals do seem possible. First, an effective program might be able to cut down food supplies enough to prevent the Viet Cong from stockpiling, thus making it difficult for them to concentrate large forces and sustain them in combat. Second, an effective program would force the Viet Cong to spend an increasing proportion of their time on acquiring and transporting food, rather than fighting.
If these results could be achieved, then the political price might be acceptable. It seems clear, however, that such results could be achieved only at a later stage in the counter-guerrilla campaign, after the Viet Cong have been isolated from the peasants and driven into well-defined areas of concentration. To be effective, the program would have to be extensive, and it is doubtful whether the government [Page 562] could carry out an extensive program while the Viet Cong are as widely dispersed as they are at present. An ineffective or premature program would only force the Viet Cong to intensify their efforts to penetrate or destroy nearby strategic hamlets, and the strategic hamlet program is in its present nascent state still extremely vulnerable.