37. Memorandum From the President’s Special Counsel (Sorensen) to the President1
RE
- Plan for Vietnam
Mr. Bundy, Mr. Bell and I urge approval at Saturday’s N.S.C. meeting of only the basic concept of an all-out internal security effort to save Vietnam, indicating that the Task Force Report2 is only a first draft to be reviewed, reshaped and then carried personally by the Vice President on his trip.
1. We need a more realistic look.
To the extent that this plan depends on the communists being tied down in Laos or lacking further forces, on our blocking land corridors through which communist support flows, or on our obtaining effective anti-infiltration action from Laos, Cambodia and the Laotian negotiations, the outcome is highly doubtful.
To the extent that it depends on wider popular support among the Vietnamese, tax and foreign exchange reforms by Diem, and his agreement to the military and governmental reorganizations required, the outcome is speculative at best.
There is no timetable-no clear division of field authority between our new Ambassador and the military, or between U.S. and G.V.N.—and no realistic estimate of long-run costs and effect, with many estimates being omitted altogether. Many miscellaneous ideas are vaguely thrown in without any consideration comparable to that given the military and intelligence build-ups (e.g., a U.N. appeal, a 5-year economic plan, “a long-range plan for the economic development of Southeast Asia on a regional basis,” etc.).
2. More importantly, it may be necessary to recast this in terms of a joint plan to be implemented by both countries only after the Vice President and Diem have come to a firm agreement.
There is no clearer example of a country that cannot be saved unless it saves itself-through increased popular support; governmental, economic and military reforms and reorganizations; and the encouragement of new political leaders. We do not want Vietnam to fall-we do not want to add to Diem’s burdens-and the chief purpose of insisting upon such conditions should not be saving of American dollars but the saving of Vietnam.
[Page 85]A White House officer (e.g. Rostow) should prepare such a proposal for the Vice President, in consultation with Ros Gilpatric, General Lansdale and the Ambassador.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3078, Vietnam. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text.↩
- See Document 35.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩