38. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)1
SUBJECT
- Comments on Program of Action for Vietnam
This looks like a sensible putting together of most of the ideas floating around on how to cope with the internal security threat to the GVN. Except for the Presidential task force, I notice nothing particularly novel; however, the combined impact of these measures should be substantial, if actually carried out.
As usual in such outline plans, there is far more emphasis on what we ought to do than on the really gut questions-how to do so:
- (a)
- How do we get Diem’s indispensable cooperation, or to put it another way, how do we properly motivate Diem? We have not done too well on selling him those aspects of the CIP which call on him to do something instead of us to spend money.
- (b)
- How do we gain the cooperation of other free nations in the area especially Cambodia and Laos, in sealing off the borders. This is a lot easier said than done. What quid pro quos do we offer for Sihanouk’s cooperation?
- (c)
- If we are bailing Diem out, why aren’t we entitled to insist (Page 6) that he overhaul tax system, halt waste of foreign exchange and devalue currency to a realistic rate? To my mind one of the flaws of our Korean operation has been that we always gave and [Page 86] never demanded. This is war for Diem too, he’s got to understand that continued procrastination on his part will be fatal.
I question whether task force directorship should be in Defense rather than State, although I grant that the instrumentalities to be employed are largely military. We must also remember the face we present to the world, and the precedent we would set.
I miss any attention to how we tell the other side that we mean business. It is terribly important, of course, to convince the Communists of this, and to attempt to forestall a parallel intensification of their effort. Here’s a field for quiet diplomacy and even a few private threats.
How do we demonstrate our determination in unmistakable terms? At a minimum, why not give Diem now a public commitment that if things get to the stage of overt fighting, we will come to his support. (Like we had to do with Sarit). We should consider ways and means of putting token US forces in South Vietnam as further evidence (if this is possible under Geneva Accords). I know you are already on top of UN angle.
One purpose of an explicit US commitment along above lines would be to guarantee GVN border so that RVNAF’s 170,000 men can be more effectively deployed against Viet Cong. To me, MAAG is not yet on top of problem, but still regards internal threat as secondary. We should have a showdown on this, and if necessary replace MAAG chief.
Before we get into expensive radar surveillance (Page 5), do we have any evidence of extensive clandestine overflights? I had thought most VC support came in by land or sea. And don’t we need more than a “Junk force” to meet latter?
One big headache in Laos has been that our boys won’t fight. Should we consider putting MAAG advisers into operations down to battalion, etc. level? This might be more important than anything else. On this score, I can’t over-emphasize importance of having the best American personnel; the average MAAG officer is simply not suited for the type of war we’re going to have to fight (Lansdale is well aware of this). Instead of just adding on to 685 now there, we must insist on careful screening process!
Finally, while immediate focus must be on VC problem, we cannot neglect longer-range objective of a viable GVN. Our purpose is not just to conduct a holding action, but to use the time gained to build a structure which will last. Let’s not have another Korea, where prolongation of primarily military focus long after hostilities were over leaves us (eight years later) with the job of building a viable ROK still in front of us.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Top Secret. On April 28, Robert H. Johnson also sent a memorandum to Rostow commenting on the program for Vietnam. Johnson prefaced his remarks by saying that it seemed to lack a clear plan of political action for South Vietnam. For text of his memorandum, see Declassified Documents, 1975, p. 277C.↩