Office of the Historian

330. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1

Saigon, December 19, 1961, 7 p.m.

819. Eyes only Secretary and Deputy Under Secretary Johnson from Nolting. Embtel 801.2Deptel 772.3 I had opportunity in Honolulu last week-end to discuss with SecDef McNamara, Bundy, and Admiral Felt the question of US military organization and command for expanded US military support to SVN. Bundy showed me copy draft message from SecState to SecDef4 commenting on latter’s letter of December 7.5 It may be useful to have my further views following these conversations.

I am more convinced than ever that, in circumstances existing now in VN, division of US authority and responsibility would be a grave error and would jeopardize accomplishment of US objectives. I agree in general with points made in draft message from SecState to SecDef, but I do not think that draft is precise enough in defining responsibilities and command and inter-agency relationships in Viet Nam.

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In considering how best to organize, we should realize that our organizational arrangement will have a direct effect on: (a) What US does; (b) What GVN does; and (c) What the enemy does.

If we organize in manner proposed by Defense, we will, I think: (a) Put a disproportionate emphasis, in planning and allocation of US resources and manpower, on military means; (b) Encourage GVN to do likewise and thus neglect other measures essential to winning the allegiance of South Vietnamese people (there has always existed a strong tendency in GVN towards this error, e.g., recent demand for saturation bombing); (c) Play into hands of enemy, who is organized differently, for a different kind of war; or [(d)] Invite a military reaction from outside.

While I welcome vigorous planning and action by Defense in this situation, which was vividly demonstrated at recent Honolulu meeting, and regard more effective military measures as having highest priority in turning tide of VC insurgency, I do not believe that US organizational arrangements should, or need, be fundamentally changed to accommodate introduction of three to four thousand additional US military personnel. On the contrary, I think task force concept is still valid, needing only such modification as is required to satisfy sound requirement that US operational units shall have purely military chain of command. Vis-à-vis GVN, however, there should clearly be one US spokesman in VN; otherwise we shall get the run-around. This spokesman should be chairman and coordinator of US task force as at present, but should not, of course, interfere in command of US military forces.

Thus, I would envisage a top US military man here who would be a member of our task force; who would have two deputies (one for military assistance and advisory duties and the other for command of US operational forces). The top military man would be responsible for coordinating within the TF the military segment of the total US effort, and thereafter he would be responsible for carrying it out through one or the other of his two deputies. He would, of course, speak frequently with President Diem and other high GVN officials as at present, in discharge of the military elements of the US program. It should, however, be clearly understood that the chairman of the US task force, i.e., the Ambassador, has the responsibility and accompanying authority for the total US effort to sustain in Viet Nam.

If this were an active theater of warfare in the traditional sense, with US combat forces directly involved, the recommendation above would not be made. The fact that we have not put combat forces into this country, and intend to win without doing so, demonstrates to my mind that US relationships with GVN, and US organizational arrangements, should clearly correspond to our stated intention, [Page 749] which is to help the GVN to mount effective countermeasures in all fields to the VC insurgency. This is still essentially a political job in the broadest sense, and should be organized and run as such.

As a corollary, I should like to add that, no matter what the command arrangements, the vigor of the Dept of Defense in this situation needs to be matched by equal vigor in the non-military aspects if the proper proportions are to be maintained in our total effort here.

Nolting
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-1961. Top Secret; Priority.↩
  2. Document 318.↩
  3. See footnote 3, Document 318.↩
  4. See Document 317.↩
  5. Document 312.↩