318. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
801. Deputy Under Secretary Johnson from Nolting. Thanks for your 760,2 which I have studied closely.
Regret to say I have most serious concerns with what is apparently proposed as it applies to complex problem of VietNam. The Communist insurgency in Viet-Nam is as you know, carried on by political, psychological, economic, guerrilla, and military means under political direction at every stage and level. This is the essence of the new Communist subversive warfare. Our counter-insurgency effort must, in my judgment, be equally well-balanced and flexible otherwise we are likely either to lose the fight or to throw this country into another Korean-type war. Under present conditions, by setting up an area military command here, I think we will not only risk poor coordination, but we will almost inevitably build into our effort a disproportionate emphasis, in resources and planning as well as appearance, on a military solution to the problem of Viet Cong insurgency in VietNam. I am profoundly convinced that the problem cannot be solved on a military basis (although military force is an indispensable element), and I think my military colleagues here agree with this, as do all members of our task force.
My second point is related to the above. US efforts vis-à-vis the GVN over many months have been in the direction of encouraging and aiding them to take the offensive against the Viet Cong in many fields, not alone in the military. The GVN itself has been inclined to put too much emphasis upon military measures relative to civil measures. The establishment of a US area military command here would, I am afraid, encourage this tendency.
Broadly speaking, my view is that there should continue to be a unified all-agency effort in this country (i.e. the task force concept) supported and directed on a day to day basis by an all-agency directorate in Washington. I believe a way can be found within this framework to preserve a clear-cut military chain of command over US operational units presently planned for Viet-Nam without establishing [Page 732] a military command structure which would throw the total effort out of balance. Standby plans for military operations and command should be made for instant use in the event of escalation or a change in the nature of the present war.
I am sure I do not need to add that my strong convictions expressed above are based on what I consider to be the compelling interests of the United States in this matter, and are not dictated by considerations of a personal or jurisdictional nature.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K 00/12-1361. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Repeated to Paris eyes only for the Secretary.↩
- Telegram 760, December 10, summarized the contents of McNamara’s letter of December 7 to Rusk and the attached proposal and commented that the Department of State was inclined to accept the substance of the proposal as an important recognition of the increased scale of the U.S. military effort but that publicly the new commander should continue to be known as Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group. The telegram asked for Nolting’s comments and suggestions. (Ibid., 751K.00/12-1061)↩
- In telegram 772 to Saigon eyes only for Nolting, December 13, Johnson replied that prior to receiving Nolting’s telegram, the Department had already transmitted to Secretary Rusk in Paris a draft letter to McNamara (see supra) which Johnson thought met Nolting’s concerns and which in any event left the decisions open until after the Secretary of Defense conference in Honolulu. Johnson said that at the Honolulu conference Nolting should feel free to express his own views even if they differed from those in the letter. He also noted that decisions on this matter would be made only after Nolting returned to Washington for consultation early in 1961. (Ibid., 751K.00/2-1361)↩