312. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Secretary of
State1
Washington, December 7,
1961.
Dear Dean: I attach our proposed concept for elevating
the status of the senior US military man in Viet-Nam to that of a
“Commander, US Forces Vietnam”. This draft reflects discussions with
CIA and AID, and is a revision of an
earlier draft.2
Essentially, I believe that if we are to give full impact to the
increased efforts we are now making, and to take full advantage of the
additional weight that the Nolting-Diem memorandum3 gives us
in the conduct of the counter-insurgency effort, we must signalize the
change by such an elevation of the senior military man. The attached
proposal would give him a status, under CINCPAC, comparable to that now held by the Taiwan Defense
Command, by the US Commander in Japan, and by the Commander in Korea,
who is of course also the UN
Commander.
The attached draft would maintain the existing situation vis-a-vis AID
activities, with the military role confined to the coordination of those
AID activities that have a clear relationship to the counterinsurgency
effort. I understand that full coordination now prevails for such
activities as roads, telecommunications, and police support. We propose
no change in this.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
The attached proposal envisages a relationship with the Ambassador that
falls within the terms of the President’s basic letter of May 29,
1961,4 i.e., that an area
“military commander” is not under the Ambassador’s command, but retains
his direct line of authority via the JCS
to me and thence to the President. Obviously, political and basic policy
matters must remain in Ambassador Nolting’s hands. We must of course take every precaution
so that neither Diem, nor anyone else, can play off the two senior US
representatives against each other. But the military man should have his
status enhanced if he is to move into a new and more active role, and
should have complete access to Diem and all other top GVN officials on matters connected with the
counter-insurgency effort, keeping the Ambassador fully advised. I need
hardly say that in our nomination [Page 721] for the position we shall give weight to capacity
to work cooperatively under such an arrangement.
I should like to get a resolution of this issue as soon as possible, and
to have your views before I go to Honolulu direct from Paris.5 I would anticipate that a new
arrangement would require Presidential approval, which might be sought
promptly upon my return from Honolulu.
Sincerely,
Attachment6
CONCEPT FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUBORDINATE UNIFIED
COMMAND, UNITED STATES FORCES, VIETNAM
General
1. Subject to agreement with the Government of Viet-Nam (GVN), as represented by letters which
will be exchanged by President Kennedy and President Diem (copies of which will be
made available), the United States will establish a subordinate
unified command with Headquarters in Saigon.
2. The objective of this establishment will be to increase US
military and economic assistance to the GVN, short of introduction of combat forces, and to
increase US participation in the direction and control of Armed
Forces of Viet-Nam (RVNAF)
counter-insurgency operations, in order to assist the GVN to contain and eventually to
eliminate the Viet Cong. To this end the command will draw together,
under single command and control, all those US activities in
Vietnam, including military intelligence operations and MAAG South Vietnam, which are related
to the counter-insurgency effort.
3. The command title will be “United States Forces, Vietnam” (USFV); the commander’s short title
will be “COMUS Forces Vietnam”
Mission and Functional
Responsibilities
4. The mission of COMUS Forces
Viet-Nam will be to assist and support the Government of Viet-Nam in
its efforts to prevent the fall [Page 722] of Viet-Nam to communism, to defeat communist
insurgency, and to destroy the Viet Cong.
5. The commander’s responsibilities, in discharging the above mission
under CINCPAC, will include but
not be limited to the following:
- a.
- Exercise operational command over all US military forces
in Vietnam, including MAAG
South Vietnam.
- b.
- Plan and conduct all US ground, sea and air operations in
Vietnam, including US efforts undertaken in support of
RVNAF combat
operations against the Viet Cong.
- c.
-
Exercise full control of all US military intelligence
efforts in Vietnam.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
- e.
- Participate with the RVNAF at all appropriate levels in intelligence
activities, the development of plans, and the conduct of
operations, to the extent necessary to insure the effective
employment of RVNAF
forces.
- f.
- Coordinate, through the Chief of US Operations Mission,
and other appropriate members of the US Diplomatic Mission,
all US economic aid related to the counter-insurgency effort
in Vietnam.
- g.
- Function, on a direct and personal basis, as principal US
military advisor to the GVN
and as single US spokesman in Viet-Nam for US military
matters.
- h.
- Conduct planning, in coordination with PACOM agencies and
other appropriate agencies, for the effective application
and employment of US and GVN
resources in execution of his mission. Such plans will be
subject to approval by CINCPAC.
Command Arrangements and
Relationships
5. [sic] USFV
will be a subordinate unified command of PACOM with a joint
staff;COMUS Forces Viet-Nam
will report directly to CINCPAC.
USFV will be comprised of US
forces organized into Army, Naval and Air Force Service components
and assigned for the accomplishment of the mission.
6. Relationship with CINCPAC:
- a.
- COMUS Forces Viet-Nam
will coordinate all relevant activities with CINCPAC, who has over-all
responsibility for the Pacific area, including Southeast
Asia. As directed by CINCPAC, COMUS Forces Viet-Nam will communicate and
coordinate directly with subordinate agencies of PACOM in
areas adjacent to Vietnam.
- b.
- CINCPAC will be
responsible to provide logistic and communications support
to meet USFV requirements.
Requirements which exceed CINCPAC resources will be referred promptly to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, and when directed by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC will make available necessary staff and
forces, including air and naval forces operating in direct
support, for the execution of the COMUS Forces Viet-Nam mission.
[Page 723]
7. Relationship with the US Ambassador,
Vietnam:
The status of COMUS Forces Viet-Nam
will be co-equal with that of the Ambassador. In this connection
reference is made to a letter from the President to all Ambassadors,
dated 29 May 1961, which is pertinent to this relationship (copy
attached as Annex hereto).7
