Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

185. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense’s Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)¹

[Saigon, October 23, 1961.]

SUBJECT

• Unconventional Warfare

Here are answers to the first of three questions² you posed to me on the above subject.

1. What unconventional warfare techniques should be considered in coping with the VC insurgency?

Perhaps the truest thing that could be said about the situation in Viet-Nam today is that the accomplishments do not match the efforts that are being made. In reviewing programs and plans, I was struck by the wealth of ideas, abilities, and equipment which the U.S. has put into Vietnam. Yet, the Vietnamese governmental machinery seems to be bogged down, and somehow things simply don’t get done effectively enough. This might well remain true despite our sending in more people, new types of weapons, or changing organizational structures. Thus, just adding more of many things, as we are doing at present, doesn’t appear to provide the answer that we are seeking.

I suspect that too many of the people we are counting upon to get things done are frustrated by red tape or by lack of real understanding of the problems confronting them, with the result that they simply go through the motions of their work like puppets. Mistrust, jealousy, and self-seeking compound the error. Yet, the Vietnamese are an able and energetic people. They don’t seem to be themselves today. They are going to lose their country if some spark doesn’t make them catch fire to go to work to win this war.

The spark could well be to place the right Americans into the right areas of the Vietnamese government to provide operational guidance. These Americans should be collaborators, who quietly advise some key Vietnamese leaders on how to get things moving effectively, and are physically close enough to them to permit the guidance to be constant. Such work will require Americans of talent and compassion, who will engage in the task with considerable empathy. Perhaps the wisest method of selecting them would be to let each Vietnamese name the American he would like as an advisor; then the U.S. should go to work to make those people available. There have been close friendships between some Americans and some Vietnamese, with the Vietnamese responding warmly to the help of a friend while blandly circumventing the advice of an expert who wasn’t a friend. Likely, some of the Americans now in Viet-Nam would be named.

This concept does not envision a large group of Americans moving into the whole Vietnamese governmental structure. It is intended only for key spots in the Vietnamese government, where decisive action will pay off the most. Selected cabinet officers and a few Directors in some bureaus should have such American advisors. The list of key posts, where decisive action is needed to make the difference between winning and losing, should be made by the U.S. Ambassador.

The introduction of American operational advisors into key points of the Vietnamese government, of course, can only be done with the help of President Diem. He might find the idea attractive for several reasons. It would help stabilize the political situation and cut down the feelings for a coup. It would make his own decisions be more effective; when he wants something done, there will be an American quietly seeing to it that there is some real follow-through.

On the U.S. side, this group of Americans should be looked upon as a team, structured for guidance under the Chief of Mission. While there would be continual cooperation with U.S. organizations in Vietnam, the team would work more effectively if it looked upon itself as a team. Personnel would come from various U.S. organizations, which would have to transfer them to Vietnam. The team should have a small staff for administrative support. If the fiscal support of the team poses unworkable problems, perhaps Presidential contingency funds would provide the solution.

I believe that one year of devoted duty by such Americans would spark a complete psychological change in Vietnam’s situation, give the Vietnamese the hope of winning, and take the initiative away from the Communists, as long as we sustain all U.S. activities at the current accelerated pace. The constant, constructive help of these advisors will upgrade the effectiveness of the whole U.S. assistance program.

At the same time, all U.S. organizations in Viet-Nam should move into the field of operational advice, doing so as helpers, not as orderers. Secretary Thuan’s idea of a Combined VN-US Military Board is a good example.³ The positioning of the 4400th CCTS (Jungle Jim) unit right in with the Vietnamese Air Force to help give operational guidance is another example. Most of the covert operations offer further examples. Much more of this should be done, until the Vietnamese get the feeling of real alliance with the U.S. and the Americans themselves become personally involved in having the Vietnamese win the war.

Also at the same time, the U.S. officials in Viet-Nam should be freed of as much of the present burden of red tape as possible. Entirely too much time and energy is being devoted to responding to the demands for information, accounting for actions, over-planning, and opinions, particularly from Washington organizations. Some of this is essential. If the paper work could be reduced to the bare essentials, this should release much time and energy towards working more on winning the war in Vietnam. Perhaps a practical device would be in having the Washington Task Force visit Viet-Nam frequently enough to keep up with the situation. The Task Force members know their way around Viet-Nam well enough so that their visits need impose only a minimum extra effort on U.S. organizations in Vietnam.

There are numerous projects in the field of psychological warfare, civic action, and special operations which are being done now or are being developed, which I have discussed with the U.S. personnel responsible. There are many imaginative operations. I believe that one which might require an assist from you in Washington would be the TV proposal from USOM.⁴

A second project is one with which General Milton is concerned, the 4400th CCTS (Jungle Jim). Serious thought should be given to making this a combat force rather than an advisory group. If done overtly, it could become part of the token U.S. force requested by President Diem. However, it could be much more effective in accomplishing U.S. objectives if we were to free it into becoming the covert unit for which it was also designed. Personnel and aircraft could operate under cover of the VIAT. The unit could then undertake counter-guerrilla operations inside Vietnam, as well as support the 77th Tactics Brigade (the 1st Observation Group) in operations in Laos and North Vietnam. Its introduction now, even as an advisory group, is needed. A change in mission later could be done right in Vietnam.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 63 A 1803, Vietnam-Taylor Group. Top Secret.
2. See Document 173.
3. Lansdale discussed this idea with Thuan on October 20 and related the conversation to Taylor in a memorandum of October 21. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 63 A 1803, Vietnam-Taylor Group)
4. Apparently a reference to the proposal described in Document 166.