186. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense’s Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)1

SUBJECT

  • Unconventional Warfare

This is in answer to the second question you posed to me.2

2. How can we carry unconventional warfare to the enemy?

Current plans for action against North Viet-Nam appear to be about as extensive as can be made under present U.S. policy. Better intelligence should start providing a further selection of targets for destruction and sabotage, but it is going to take a long time and a lot of hard preparatory work before the Vietnamese can do more than harassment activities in North Vietnam. The new 20 kw radio transmitter at Hue should be of some help when it goes into operation, but it will be a weak voice compared to Radio Hanoi. (Lawrence at USOM states that it is 135 kw.)

Some economic warfare should be given serious consideration, to develop unrest in the population. If debasing the currency is not feasible, then measures should be taken to slow up the economy. One such measure might be the seeding of the Red River with a variety of water lily that really clogs up waterways and can make navigation almost impossible without extensive and continuous clearing operations. If seeded near the dams in the upper areas, this should have the blight gradually move down stream and eventually hamper the shipment of rice from the delta region. Rice production in the Red River Delta is critical to the economy of North Vietnam. It now depends mostly on waterways for its transport.

Consideration should be given to a longer-range policy towards North Vietnam. If the Communists can wage subversive war to capture a country, then it is high time that we paid them in the same coin. Admittedly, it is a long and arduous task to free a country behind the Iron or Bamboo Curtain. But, if our objective was to create a situation akin to that in Hungary, and then be prepared to help, with the end objective of uniting Viet-Nam again under a Free Government, there would be a considerably larger program to be planned for actions against North Vietnam.

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First, however, the situation in South Viet-Nam would have to be stabilized much more before it can be an effective base for operations aimed at liberating North Vietnam. On the other hand, if the Vietnamese thought that we were serious about freeing all of Viet-Nam from Communism, our present defensive counter-measures would be greatly enhanced. The Communist cadres and those supporting the regime do so mainly in a belief that they are going with the wave of the future. If we started actions to destroy the conviction that the Communists were here to stay, a lot of the support would start weakening, including support in the South.

Operations in southern Laos, by the 77th Brigade (1st Observation Corps), need to be continued as currently planned. DOD in Washington is now considering a request for assistance in training more Vietnamese for the 77th Brigade. It is possible that further teamwork … could be developed for such operations. An example would be the use of Redeye weapons by Army Special Forces personnel, who could accompany a 77th Brigade team to the Tchepone area to knock out Soviet aircraft; selected Special Forces personnel are now taking a familiarization course with this weapon, which is being developed further to improve its guidance system, with the intent of undertaking just such an operation as noted above.

  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 63 A 1803, Vietnam-Taylor Group. Top Secret.
  2. See Document 173.