184. Draft Paper Prepared by the Political Counselor of the Embassy in Viet-Nam (Mendenhall)1
HOW STABLE IS THE DIEM GOVERNMENT?
It is less stable than it was six or three months ago or even than it was a week ago. Major Viet Cong incidents in September and [Page 417] October indicating serious deterioration of security in Central Viet-Nam and the provinces north of Saigon have revived in increasingly acute form long-standing dissatisfaction with Diem’s lack of efficient organization and failure to rally broad political support among the masses and the educated class. The greatly increased infiltration of regular VC units through Laos and the horrible death inflicted by the VC on Colonel Nam have produced an atmosphere bordering on panic in Saigon.
Diem’s tenacious holding power may enable him to weather this crisis just as he has survived numerous others. Three political alternatives appear possible: a) a palace revolution of sorts; b) a military coup; or c) Communist overthrow of the government. Chances of either of the first two are about 50-50 as against Diem’s continuing essentially unchanged. Direct Communist overthrow seems unlikely during the next few months at least since the Communists do not yet have the military power for this purpose.
The palace revolution apparently now under discussion by senior GVN officials would aim at greater efficiency in government operations and broader national unity through increased use of mild anti-Communist oppositionists. Diem’s role would apparently be restricted to policy questions, and execution would be left to an emergency council. The group considering this has no clear idea as to how to achieve its aim. This plan might well improve government organization and somewhat broaden political support.
Only the military has the power to carry out a coup aimed at removing Diem from power. The possibility of such a coup is proportionate to the degree of success or failure in the war with Viet Cong, which in turn depends on proper governmental organization and extent of political support for the government. Coup mutterings are on the rise because of the recent deterioration in security.
A major risk in any non-Communist coup attempt is that the Communists would profit from the attendant confusion either to extend their hold in the countryside to major towns or even to succeed in taking over the government. Communist takeover of the government might be indirectly through a weak coalition or possibly (though this is unlikely) by seizing power and setting up a Communist government. There is greater danger from this at present than from direct frontal Commie overthrow of the Diem government since they still lack adequate forces and weapons for direct assault.
- Source: Department of State, Viet-Nam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, Coup Rumors GVN 1961. Secret.↩