Office of the Historian

106. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)1

Washington, July 27, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • The 30,000 Man Increase in Vietnamese Armed Forces

I understand that Col. Black, Cottrell and Staley are coming to talk to you at noon today about your questions yesterday to Mr. Gilpatric.2 This memo is prepared as a checklist of the points that might be discussed.3

1.
In general we believe that the President should have a comprehensive analysis of the basis on which the recommendations will be made to him for the 30,000 man increase. This analysis should be more than a formal military justification. Specifically, with respect to:
2.
Military aspects. We would like a military analysis which covers such matters as the following:
a.
The formal statement of mission of the added forces includes, I believe, dealing with the possibility of a major North Vietnamese [Page 247] attack. Is this necessary? Isn’t the U.S. sure to intervene in such a situation? Would GVN forces really be needed for delaying purposes?
b.
What will be the true missions of the added forces-how will they be actually employed? What kind of training will they get? Will they be anti-guerilla units?
c.
Does the U.S. government really accept the judgment that about 90 per cent of GVN combat forces are committed to counterinsurgency operations? For example, does the term “counter-insurgency operations” in this context include protection of the position of various political leaders? (I do not argue that some of this may not be necessary.)
d.
At what rate do we expect the already approved 20,000 man buildup to proceed? Will it really go as fast as presently estimated (completion by end of CY 1961)?
e.
Do we need parallel action by the U.S. and the GVN to ensure completion of a comprehensive, geographically-phased military plan for dealing with the VC?
3.
Economic Aspects. We would like an analysis of the effect of the proposed increase in real terms upon the Vietnamese economy to supplement the analysis of the financial impact made in the Staley report.
4.
Political Aspects. The President ought to be provided with the political assessment called for by the recommendations in the original VN Task Force Report which he approved. A political assessment was provided by Nolting sometime ago.4 If State accepts this as an adequate assessment, it should do the job.
Bob
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Viet-Nam Country Series. Secret.↩
  2. See Document 105.↩
  3. No record of the July 27 meeting among Rostow, Black, Cottrell, and Staley has been found.↩
  4. Presumably a reference to Document 92.↩