Office of the Historian

107. Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) and the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President1

Washington, July 27, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • Issues for Decision-Southeast Asia Meeting, Friday, July 28
1.
We do not know precisely what the Secretary will present on the basis of the paper being written by Mr. Steeves.2 Following, however, is our view of the issues which will arise for your decision.
2.

A Choice of Strategy. We must choose an integrated strategy for the entire area because the position in Southeast Asia is precarious: Laos could be lost to Communist control; the Viet-Cong offensive could overwhelm South VietNam; Thailand could slide toward an ambiguous neutralism; Cambodia could despair of maintaining its neutrality. In the face of this situation we must choose among three broad strategies:

  • —to disengage from the area as gracefully as possible;
  • —to find as soon as possible a convenient political pretext and attack with American military force the regional source of aggression in Hanoi; or
  • —to build as much indigenous military, political and economic strength as we can in the area, in order to contain the thrust from Hanoi while preparing to intervene with U.S. military force if the Chinese Communists come in or the situation otherwise gets out of hand.

We assume it is the policy of this Administration to pursue the third strategy; but some discussion of the alternatives may be useful. In any case, as we enter the Southeast Asia planning exercise, you should define your preferred strategy.

3.
Concrete Tactical Issues. Depending on the degree of development of State’s basic paper, the Friday conference will raise a good many concrete issues. Some may be ready for settlement between you and Mr. Rusk: others may be assigned to the new Task Force which is being formed under Mr. Steeves. The major issues as we see them follow.
4.
Laos. With respect to the Laos Conference, we must decide soon: [Page 249]
  • —What our sticking point at Geneva shall be and what kind of a Laos Government is minimally acceptable to us.
  • —In case of a breakdown of the Laos Conference we must decide whether SEATO Plan 5 is an adequate contingency plan. Here there are two questions: the present plan does not provide for the protection of the Laos-VietNam border and the Laos panhandle as a whole; the present plan would attempt to contain a substantial increase in Viet Minh interference in Laos by force applied in the Mekong Valley-it may be wiser to envisage less force in the Mekong Valley and Viet Minh containment via a heavier direct threat to Hanoi, to be applied only if the Viet Minh cross their frontiers in strength.
  • —Are we to accept a split Laos as an inevitable outcome of the present situation?
5.
Hanoi. Should we apply increased political pressure on Hanoi by exposing its role in both Laos and South VietNam? If so, how, where and when should it be done?
6.
VietNam.
  • —How shall we respond to the Staley Report,3 including the commitment to expand Diem’s forces up to 200,000 in the next eighteen months? The decision on the force increase should be made prior to September 1.
  • —Shall we send a military review mission to VietNam? If so, when?
  • —What should be our attitude toward use of Viet-Nam forces in Laos?
7.
Thailand.
  • —What kind of military and economic assistance program, in addition to that recently authorized in a message to Ambassador Young,4 should we mount in Thailand?
  • —What do we want from Thailand in blocking further guerrilla infiltration into Laos?
8.

Cambodia.

—How can we exploit Sihanouk’s present more worried mood to increase Cambodian cooperation with Viet-Nam and Thailand? Should we invite Sihanouk to Washington?

9.

Contingency Planning.

—What kind of contingency plan should we have should Khrushchev radically expand Communist aggression in Southeast Asia during the Berlin crisis?

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia-General 7/25/61-7/28/61. Top Secret.↩
  2. Not further identified.↩
  3. Not printed, but see Document 93.↩
  4. Not further identified.↩