105. Memorandum From Edwin F. Black of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)1
SUBJECT
- The Situation in South Vietnam
This memorandum is to provide you with answers to certain questions which you raised during your conversation with Mr. Gilpatric on 26 July.2
1. Is it a fact that 90% of Diem’s forces are committed to counter-insurgency actions?
Gen. McGarr and the MAAG staff who are intimately familiar with the day-to-day deployments of the RVNAF units confirm that [Page 245] this is the case. A glance at their latest order of battle map3 indicates how dispersed Vietnamese units are. Gen. Khanh, Chief of Staff,RVNAF, stated that this was a fact when he briefed both the U.S. and the Vietnamese Special Financial Groups the latter part of July 1961. Everything I saw during my fairly extensive travels throughout the country and during conversations with MAAG officers in the field led me to believe that the 90% figure was reasonably accurate.
2. What is Diem’s plan for using the additional 30,000 troops?
The additional 30,000 troops are needed to create two additional infantry divisions and minimum supporting air, naval and logistic units. These forces will be employed primarily to meet the increased threat resulting from the deteriorating situation in Laos. This includes the stepped-up infiltration of Viet-Cong supplies and guerrilla forces across the southern Laos border, as well as the very real threat of flanking attacks from north Viet-Nam which might strike eastward across Route 9 toward Hue and into the Kontum-Pleiku area further to the south. It should be remembered that as of July 1961 President Diem only had two regiments in general reserve to protect his country in event of an overt military attack. As indicated above, all the rest of his forces are deployed on counter-insurgency actions.
3. Are there sufficient manpower resources to permit an increase in fee GVN force level to 200,000?
The Manpower Division of MAAG states that there are and that it is entirely feasible for the GVN to call up additional forces at the rate of 5,000 men per month. The problem of providing adequate officer and NCO cadres for these additional forces is to be met by a revision in the draft law which will permit the induction of adequate numbers of high school graduates and first and second-year college students. Secretary of State Thuan informed us in President Diem’s presence that these proposed changes in the existing draft legislation were now on his desk and would be presented to the President for his approval in the immediate future. The GVN is well aware of the need to administer the draft intelligently so that key personnel needed in essential civilian capacities (for example, doctors which are in short supply) will not be absorbed into the Army to the detriment of the normal life of the country.
4. Is President Diem faking vigorous measures to carry out the essential administrative and organizational reforms needed to effectively pursue a successful counter-insurgency plan?
[Page 246]CINCPAC on 22 July responded affirmatively to this question-citing various specific steps which have been undertaken by the GVN since May to implement the recommendations contained in the U.S. counter-insurgency plan.4 These include implementation of a territorial and command re-organization plan, organization of a central intelligence organization, establishment of an improved military chain of command, redeployment of RVNAF units as recommended in the CIP. The effectiveness of these measures is borne out by the recent successful and fairly large scale operations against the Viet-Cong which have taken place within the last several weeks.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Viet-Nam Country Series. Confidential. No drafting or clearance information is on the source text.↩
- No other record of the Rostow-Gilpatric conversation has been found.↩
- No copy of this map has been found.↩
- See Document 1.↩