Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

85. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State⁰

Taipei, September 13, 1958, 5 p.m.

387. For Robertson. Reference my telegram 372.¹ Admiral Smoot and I discussed Kinmen resupply situation yesterday and today. In Smoot’s conversations yesterday at Makung with President, Tiger Wang, Defense Minister, Navy Chief of Staff Liang and others arrangements and understandings were reached re convoying which should result in improvements. Operational control of convoy effort is being transferred to Makung personnel, Chinese Marines brought into act, US convoy experts sent to Kinmen to assist in improving beaches, advising in unloading techniques, et cetera. Resort will now be made tonight convoy operations to see if they will prove more effective. Air resupply is being stepped up by CAF handle urgent requirements. Smoot is hopeful these efforts will improve resupply situation, but he is doubtful whether they will adequately solve problem. Communists are clearly zeroed in on all usable beach areas and their surveillance is excellent. They have shown capacity to throw a curtain of fire on beaches whenever craft hit beaches. Considering this capacity, it is remarkable that thus far only one LCM has been lost on beaches. In this situation any resupply effort is bound be highly hazardous and costly. I am gradually coming to view that we shall have to seek another solution if Communists persist in intensive shellings of GRC convoys after Warsaw talks start.

2. If Communists continue shellings despite our efforts at Warsaw and perhaps in UN, I think we should be thinking of taking over convoy responsibility soon. I would advocate daylight movement to Kinmen of all-American convoy with suitable notification to Communists. Convoy would be backed by adequate cruiser strength and air power. Convoy and escort would be authorized to defend if attacked by Communists. In this way onus would be placed on Communists if they attacked American convoy on humanitarian mission to assist beleaguered ally. I believe there is a fair chance Communists would refrain from attack which would pin label of aggression on them and at same time involve them in hostilities with United States.

3. I believe foregoing alternative should be tried before proceeding to more thankless, provocative and highly difficult task of concurring in GRC retaliatory action (which is not likely to prove effective) or of ourselves joining in attacks on Communist artillery positions, lines of communication and air fields.

Drumright

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1358. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 7:43 a.m.
1. Dated September 12, telegram 372 from Taipei predicted that if the interdiction problem was not solved within 2 weeks the situation would deteriorate increasingly, with impairment of U.S.–GRC relations and possible unilateral GRC retaliatory action. (Ibid., 611.93/9–1258; see Supplement)