Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

79. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles⁰

Washington, September 11, 1958, 4:02–6:10 p.m.

ALSO PRESENT

• Mr. J.N. Greene, Jr.

1. (General Goodpaster, Mr. Hagerty and Mr. Montgomery were also present.) We discussed draft #5 of the President’s Radio-TV talk¹ and the President incorporated a number of changes, including some that I told him had been suggested by George Allen. In discussing the philosophy of the talk, the President said he wanted to deal effectively with a major dilemma confronting the United States: On the one hand we must show both firmness and courage in our opposition to the use of aggressive force, combined with readiness to negotiate in a spirit of conciliation; on the other hand in the Taiwan Straits situation, we are committed, indeed over committed, to backing up Chiang Kai-shek in a policy of defending Quemoy and Matsu. The President understood that the JCS are now tending to the view that these islands are not defensible and probably not required for the defense of Formosa and Pescadores. The President said he is quite prepared to see the abandonment of Quemoy, but, of course, this cannot be said publicly at the present stage.

2. I told the President in general terms of the activities which the Chinese Nationalists have conducted from the offshore islands as described in Taipei’s telegram 357² of which I left a copy with General Goodpaster. I suggested that we should gradually try to get such activities stopped. The President agreed, and said that he found unrealistic, even though it might be important to morale on Formosa, Chiang Kai-shek’s thesis that he could use Quemoy and Matsu as stepping stones for a return to the mainland. I showed the President Ambassador Drumright’s report (Taipei’s 363)³ of the current jitters on Formosa.

3. We discussed the regrettable failure of many of our allies to stand by us publicly in the present situation or indeed in any situation in which they do not see that their immediate interests are directly affected. I suggested that we should be thinking of steps to encourage a greater sense of solidarity with our allies lest the several security systems of which we are a member begin to fall apart.

4. I noted that one of our aircraft over-flying the Chinese mainland pursuant to the President’s approval had been detected and that a protest had been publicized.⁴ The President was familiar with the episode. I said that the flights had taken place in good weather and had obtained good photographs which would probably suffice for our military for some time. Accordingly, I had recommended to Secretary McElroy and General Twining, and they had agreed, that such flights be suspended.⁵

5. I showed the President an FBIS report of a Peiping statement characterized as the Chinese Communist Government’s “Fourth warning” against our convoy activities in waters which the Communist regime has recently proclaimed to be its territorial waters.⁶ I said that while we, of course, have every right to conduct convoy operations on the high seas, I thought it might be well to try to find a good reason to ease up on these activities at least for a few days. This should not be done abruptly so as to alarm the Chinese Nationalist Government. The President agreed, noting that our naval activities in this respect seemed inconsistent with the spirit of his forthcoming speech. The President also noted that the third convoy to reach Quemoy had backed off the beach almost as soon as they came under heavy fire; this raised some question whether the risk we were taking was consonant with the determination of the Chinese Nationalists themselves. I said that we would ascertain when the next convoy operation is planned and then arrange to ease off on the operation.

[Here follows brief discussion of Japan.]

8. The President approved the draft of a reply to Khrushchev’s letter to him of September 7, with the addition of a final paragraph which he had drafted.

9. The President had a telegram from Cyrus Eaton saying that the Soviet Union is in his view prepared to support the Chinese Communists in the Formosa Straits dispute and that the Soviet people backed the Government in this. The President said this latter point coincided with reports which had reached him from others including Edward Ryerson that they had found the morale of the Soviet people good and that the people are indeed backing the government. I said that even if this be the case in the Soviet Union it is not, according to our information the case in Communist China, where the people’s morale is indeed so bad that the regime has just cancelled the visas of all foreign newspapermen and ordered them out of the country, apparently to prevent reports of how bad the situation is.

JFD

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Drafted by Greene. The meeting was held at the White House. The time of the meeting is taken from Eisenhower’s appointment diary. (Ibid., Whitman File)
1. Several drafts by Dulles, including one showing the President’s revisions, are ibid., Dulles Papers, President’s Statement on Taiwan Straits Situation.
2. Dated September 10. (Filed with a September 11 covering note from Fisher Howe to Dulles; Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1058; see Supplement)
3. Dated September 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1158; see Supplement)
4. A September 10 New China News Agency release charged that a U.S. U–2 plane had intruded into Chinese air space that morning. (Survey of the China Mainland Press No. 1853, September 15, 1958, p. 35)
5. At a meeting that day recorded in a memorandum by Reinhardt. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation; see Supplement)
6. The statement was contained in a New China News Agency release of September 11. (Survey of the China Mainland Press No. 1854, September 16, 1958, p. 35)